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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, an Expeditionary Warrior 2010 based humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief mission conducted by U.S. forces set in the 2020 Joint Operational Environment is 
evaluated to determine potential surface connector system alternatives.  The Sea Base 
surface connector system is tasked with not only supporting the Sea Base logistics 
sustainment, but also critically enabling delivery of commercially transported relief 
support cargo to austere coastal and inland destinations.  Utilizing Dr. Steven H. Dam’s 
methodology in developing vision architectures, a DoDAF 1.5 compliant architecture was 
created using Vitech’s CORE© model-based systems engineering software.  Within the 
backdrop of both Navy and Army operational concepts current watercraft programs of 
record were evaluated to assess the impact of potential capabilities of ONR’s 
Transformable Craft.  Through operational and functional model evaluation of the 
planned 2020 surface connectors through assembly, employment, and early sustainment 
amphibious operations, four discrete Transformable Craft capabilities were identified and 
discussed.  An alternative Army-centric operation was encompassed for later 
consideration of the Transformable Craft’s capabilities within the context of their 
watercraft activities.  It is recommended that this architecture and its generated system 
configurations be used in further Modeling and Simulation (M&S) to refine 
Transformable Craft capabilities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The operational and logistical momentum of U.S. military forces in response to global 
events are anticipated to be greatly diminished by the ongoing trend of state and non-state 
adversaries engaging in anti-access strategies.  A foreign overseas presence is vital in 
establishing and sustaining deployment momentum during major combat engagements, 
crisis response, and contingency operations.  Pre-positioned reactionary forces, crisis 
management forces, and supporting logistics provide the means for the U.S. military to 
achieve the initiative; however, a reduction in the quantity of forward operating bases 
within key regions increases the difficulty of delivering a balanced joint force to include 
ground forces of sufficient weight and strength.  In the case of U.S. response to a natural 
or manmade crisis, the nation’s population may be exposed to additional crisis effects.  It 
is all too common that the same uncontrollable factors that caused a humanitarian crisis, 
such as flooding, earthquake, or tsunami, have also severely degraded the operational 
ports required to conduct massive crisis response contingency operations.  Regardless of 
cause, the Navy’s Seabasing concept is the answer to insufficient access from the sea.   
Naval Power 21 is comprised of Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver 
Warfare Capabilities.  An essential pillar of Naval Power 21 is Seabasing.  According to 
the Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC), Seabasing is defined as:  
The rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and 
re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing 
continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select 
expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint 
Operational Area.  These capabilities expand operational maneuver 
options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea. (Department 
of Defense, Chairman,  Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005) 
While the physical concept of the Sea Base has not been fully established, the current 
conceptualization of the Sea Base is a collection of naval assets, some of which exist 
today and others that are being defined.  The notional Sea Base components are 
composed of a Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, Maritime 
Prepositioning Group, Combat Logistics Force, surface connectors, Coalition Forces, and 
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other U.S. service ships.  From initial conceptualization to now Seabasing has remained 
aligned to the same core strategic principles. 
Seabasing encompasses seven principles essential to our future naval fighting 
force. 
• Use of the sea as a maneuver space 
• Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence 
• Protect joint force operations 
• Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection 
• Sustain joint force operations from the sea 
• Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases 
• Create uncertainty for our adversaries. (Department of Defense, 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005) 
A key component of the Sea Base is the collection of Joint and service specific surface 
ships known within this document as Sea Base connectors. 
Sea Base connectors (SBC) perform numerous functions within expeditionary 
warfare and these are infinitely varied throughout the spectrum of peacetime crisis and 
conflict intensity.  The purposes of the Sea Base connectors are to enable the Joint 
requirements within the Range of Military Operations (ROMO).  Specifically, within the 
context of the major combat operations, enabling the 10-30-30 swiftness goals1 is an 
objective.  Emerging Navy doctrine highlights that the Sea Base is more than a launching 
point for Joint Forcible Entry Operations in an unavailable or adversarial denied 
surface/air point of debarkation, but the Sea Base must enable the Joint ROMO and 
perhaps even the Range of Government Operations (ROGO).  The more frequent but less 
hostile ROMO/ROGOs are characterized best through humanitarian assistance/disaster 
 
                                                 
1 The 10-30-30 Joint swiftness goals were established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 
2003 with respect to operations to swiftly defeat the efforts of a regional aggressor.  The 10-30-30  
guidance indicate a 10-day goal to for U.S. force to seize the initiative, 30 days to defeat the enemy, and 
prepare for  redeployment to a near-simultaneous conflict within the second 30-day period.   
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relief, non-combatant evacuations, and stability operations scenarios.  Among the 
proposed 2020 Sea Base Connector System (SBCS) is the Office of naval Research’s 
(ONR) transformable craft.   
The Office of Naval Research conducts research and sponsors programs that 
could have a game changing impact on the way the Navy operates.  The Sea Base 
connector Transformable Craft (T-Craft) is a technology being explored in the ONR’s 
Innovative Naval Prototype program that grows such programs from initial concept 
design to construction and testing of a full-scale prototype demonstrator.  The INP 
program is valuable in fostering collaborative research and design efforts in technological 
areas that are conceptually undefined and when the technology level is immature.  The 
intent of the T-Craft INP program is to provide the availability of such a revolutionary 
surface platform for future Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
capability assessment.   
The transformable craft operational concept is yet undefined.  There have been 
thorough capability-based assessments by both the Navy and the Army for parallel 
concept austere access platforms such as the Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) and Joint 
High Speed Vessel (JHSV), respectively.  The author cedes both craft will enhance the 
Joint Forcible Entry Operation capabilities and support conceptualized Seabasing 
operations; however, none of the 2020 surface craft inventory will fully enable the 
envisioned needs of twenty-first century amphibious operations requiring unprecedented 
over-the-horizon operations, heavier high speed lift for Joint forcible entry operations, 
and at-sea cargo assembly with multinational and commercial organizations.  While the 
T-Craft program could indeed offer the availability of a superior technological platform, 
the operational concept of this craft has yet to be defined not only within the context of 
the T-Craft’s mission portfolio, but within cooperation and integration of other Seabasing 
systems.  Like a worker ant in a healthy colony the T-Craft alone cannot accomplish the 
multitude of tasks required for mission accomplishment, yet it must fulfill an operational 
niche that may at times robustly supplement or uniquely provide to the legacy Joint 
surface connector system through Seabasing operational transitions. The author believes 
that exploration of the T-Craft, within the major combat operations and humanitarian 
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assistance/disaster relief environments, will exemplify the T-Craft’s game changing 
utility in both peacetime and mid-to-high conflict environments; however, it is believed 
that the greatest opportunities for a single acquisition such as the T-Craft for capability 
gap fulfillment are within the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief environment.   
The purpose of this analysis is to allow the determined Sea Base Connector 
System (SBCS) requirements to shape and define the role of the T-Craft.  The problem 
was scoped to allow the interoperability and compatibility interface requirements of 
operational input/output items (physical and data) to define the alternative SBCS 
configurations.  Examples of such physical and data input/output items are mechanical 
connections or transfer systems for at-sea loading/unloading and C2 data exchanges or 
voice communication links, respectively. More specifically, the SBC’s interfaces with the 
future Maritime Prepositioning Force, Army Strategic Flotilla, Expeditionary Strike 
Group, commercial shipping, and intra-theater ports of the Sea Base were evaluated 
through the transfer of items necessary for the Joint landing forces to conduct the HA/DR 
mission. Items such as the Naval Construction Brigade’s construction equipment, the 
Navy’s Riverine patrol boats, or ISO containers were included.  As anti-access 
environments only prohibit early access to theater surface and air access points, the bulk 
of this analysis was conducted on in-theater assembly, employment, and early 
sustainment lines-of-operations. Since the intent of this architectural description is to 
identify the requirements fulfillment of the Sea Base Connector System and its possible 
configurations, the internal and external system quantities and threshold requirements 
development were left for further M&S analysis.  Programs of record in 2010 and current 
platforms still intended to be active in the 2020 timeframe were included.     
The methodology of this thesis followed that developed by Dr. Steven H. Dam 
presented in DoD Architecture Framework: A Guide to Applying System Engineering to 
Develop Integrated, Executable Architectures.  This process is particular to architecting 
“to be” or vision architectures.  The methodology applied to “a vision architecture,” 
typical of conceptual development of future military systems, is appropriate for 
architectural development of systems that initially lack a detailed set of requirements.  
The resulting architecture was documented in Vitech’s CORE© database tool and 
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presented through DoDAF 1.5 viewpoints.  The Sea Base system-of-system constraints, 
capabilities, and assumptions were established utilizing a firm conceptual background 
established from capturing current and relevant source documents regarding Seabasing 
and HA/DR operations.  Development of the Sea Base Connector System’s architecture 
required the simultaneous generation of its operational and system domains through a 
highly iterative and interdependent process.   
The SBCS’s operational domain presented in DoDAF 1.5 consisted of three 
interlinked groupings: operational activity and hierarchies, concept of operations 
(CONOP), and originating requirements definition.  The HA/DR mission operational 
activity and organization hierarchy outlines and provides traceability of the SBCS’s 
essential inter-service HA/DR requirements, describes mission significant SBCS 
measures-of-effectiveness/performance, and describes resource exchange interfaces 
within internal/external system interactions.  The CONOP details a relevant and 
significant strategic level operation to assist in shaping SBC system requirements.  The 
SBCS originating requirements, extracted from Joint and service specific guiding 
documents, provides JCIDS tracing from the established Joint Capability Area 
framework to designated Functional Needs Analysis requirements.  It also consolidates 
Joint and Army watercraft SBCS objective hierarchies for further M&S weighting.  The 
operational domain is intertwined and linked to the system domain.   
The SBCS’s system domain presented in DoDAF 1.5 consisted of two primary 
groupings: external/internal system descriptions and functional decompositions.  The 
system descriptions decomposed the 2020 Sea Base systems into manageable groups and 
described their interactions, described their organizational and operational authority 
linkages and tracing, and provided a structure for the 2020 Joint force resource pool for 
alternative M&S Sea Base configurations.  All assisted to create a shared understanding 
of the SBCS roles within the Seabasing system.  The functional decompositions, to 
include docking, load transfers, marshalling/staging, and transits, were diagrammed and 
detailed using IDEF0 modeling.  These models provided detailed descriptions of physical 
resource exchanges between resource producers and consumers.    
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Systems engineering analysis of the 2020 Sea Base within the established 
architecture resulted in four discrete T-Craft capability alternatives: 1) direct large ship 
side/stern port connection only, 2) vertical replenishment capable with a dynamic 
positioning system, 3) vertical replenishment capable with a direct Large-Medium Speed 
Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) ship side/stern port, 4) or direct large ship side/stern port 
connection with dynamic positioning system.  However, the last alternative may possibly 
offer redundant functionality between phased mission tasks.  These variants would 
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1. The Military Problem 
The operational and logistical momentum of U.S. military forces in response to 
global military campaigns are anticipated to be greatly diminished by the ongoing trend 
of state and non-state adversaries engaging in anti-access strategies.  International 
politics, often persuaded by U.S. adversaries or competing states, influence the 
availability and constraints of Forward Operating Bases (FOB) that are critical to wartime 
operations and logistics infrastructures.  Such was possibly the case in the closure of 
Manas air base, located in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, near the capital, in 2009.  Manas air base 
was a key staging point for operations in the Afghanistan War and, although citing base 
closure due to insufficient reimbursement, likely received external pressure from 
Moscow to squeeze the United States out of a region it historically has considered within 
its own sphere-of-influence (Schafer, 2009).  Such internal or global pressure has induced 
many nations to find it untenable to allow U.S. presence or access through their nation as 
evident in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Illustrated reduction of U.S. controlled overseas land bases.  This figure 
indicates a large number of overseas bases have been dramatically reduced in the 
time from the end of the Cold War to 2005 (From Department of Defense, 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005, p. 17) 
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Regional political pressure is not only isolated to FOB availability, but also may 
create operational constraints by inducing restrictions on operational capabilities and/or 
visibility to the host nation support.  Adversarial states can “further take action to 
influence neighboring states, through threats, coercion, and/or positive incitements, to 
deny support to U.S. action in terms of overflight, basing privileges, logistical support 
(e.g., refueling), port access, transit of territorial waters, and other forms of support” 
(Joint and Army Concepts Division, Army Training and Doctrine Command (ATDC), 
2006).  Non-state sponsored adversaries also influence the FOB availability and 
capability constraints through acts of terrorism and direct targeting of critical overseas 
base elements.  Anti-access strategies such as attacking maritime and land chokepoints, 
improved aerial and surface points of departure, or staging bases directly diminish FOB 
capabilities.  Such efforts were exemplified by early Al Qaeda or supporting terrorist 
group/state’s efforts to destabilize Pakistan.  Consequentially, Pakistan’s operational 
support to the Afghanistan war was reduced.  Such anti-access strategies are explicit in 
the established Joint Operational Environment (JOE) that sets the stage for the future 
joint capabilities.   
A foreign overseas presence is vital in establishing and sustaining deployment 
momentum during major combat engagements, crisis response, and contingency 
operations.  “Deployment momentum is achieved through the use of multiple, 
simultaneous, and sequential force flows by air and sea.  The future force must have the 
capability to employ multiple entry points throughout the course of a campaign or risk 
being denied entry into the joint operating area by a capable, imaginative adversary” or 
even exclusively through the effects of a natural disaster (Joint and Army Concepts 
Division, ATDC, 2006).  Pre-positioned reactionary forces, crisis management forces, 
and supporting logistics provide the means for the U.S. military to achieve the initiative; 
however, a reduction in the quantity of FOB within key regions increases the difficulty of 
delivering a balanced joint force to include ground forces of sufficient weight and 
strength.  As the current U.S. FOB capabilities are quite limited in regions of anticipated 
future need, such as illustrated in Figure 2, it is reasonable to expect that future combat 
operations will continue to have a significant time gap between entry operations and the 
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arrival of a sufficient force to initiate decisive operations.  This diminishment of 
deployment momentum leaves U.S. forces vulnerable to enemy action and adversaries to 
maintain significant freedom of action.   
 
Figure 2.   Seabasing enabled principles within emerging critical regions.  Emerging 
areas pose a challenge to existing FOB capabilities. (From United States Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command (U.S. MCCDC), 2010, p. 24) 
In the case of U.S. response to a natural or manmade crisis, the nation’s 
population may be exposed to additional crisis effects.  It is all too common that the same 
uncontrollable factors that caused a humanitarian crisis, such as flooding, earthquake, or 
tsunami, have also severely degraded the operational ports required to conduct massive 
crisis response contingency operations.  Such was evident in the January 2010 earthquake 
in Haiti that destroyed approximately 50% of its only developed port leaving it at 10% 
normal capacity for a week prior to normalization about a month later (Doyle, 2010).  
While the emerging famine and medical crisis was primarily rebuffed by the close 
American military presence and world aid organizations, the need for enhanced at-sea 
assembly and distribution network was evident.  The bulk of humanitarian aid via 
commercial shipping vessels were incapable of accessing Port-au-Prince to any 
significance for weeks and then became subject to slow distribution across the island’s 
damaged transportation network.    
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2. Strategic Lift Requirements 
An Army TRADOC evaluation in 2006 projected the capability gaps of the DoD 
airlift and sealift programs for the next 20 years in the JOE.  The projection is conditional 
upon an immediate intra-theater employment of U.S. Armed Forces from a strategic 
expeditionary posture for a swift defeat or decisive victory in an extended campaign 
against an aggressor.  “The current and projected suite of strategic lift capabilities is 
insufficient to meet DoD 10-30-30 swiftness goals for strategic responsiveness of joint 
force as a whole within the 1-4-2-1 framework” (Joint and Army Concepts Division, 
ATDC, 2006).  In 2006 these strategic and tactical lift were achieved through C-5, C-17, 
and C-130 airlift, prepositioned materials in the Navy’s Maritime Preposition Squadron 
(MPSRON) and the Army’s Afloat Strategic Flotilla (ASF), and immediate logistics 
support from the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships.  The 2006 capability assessment 
included Naval force projection through the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) ships and 
logistics support was accomplished through TRANSCOM’s strategic sealift capabilities 
without the JHSV consideration.  These programs were assessed to have insufficient 
capability to: 
• minimize reliance on improved aerial and surface points of 
debarkation (A/SPOD). 
• employ multiple, simultaneous force projection routes. 
• exploit multiple entry points to overcome enemy anti-access 
measures. 
• operate effectively within austere theaters2. 
• project and sustain forces ashore from afloat amphibious forces 
within the immediate response timeframe. 
• deliver ground forces in depth in combined arms configurations for 
immediate employment. 
                                                 
2 An operational environment with the following characteristics: little or no host-nation debarkation; 
inadequate transportation and communications networks; unsophisticated medical, supply and other 
services.  (Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005). 
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• close the gap between early entry forces and the heavy forces that 
often follow. 
• operate from unimproved landing areas. 
• deliver Army forces through other than deep water ports in 
significant numbers. 
• build and maintain deployment momentum. 
• sustain forces within forward operating areas. (Joint and Army 
Concepts Division, ATDC, 2006) 
3. Seabasing 
Naval power 21 is comprised of Sea Power 21 and Expeditionary Maneuver 
Warfare Capabilities.  An essential pillar of Naval Power 21 is Seabasing.  Seabasing is 
defined as  
the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and 
re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing 
continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select 
expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint 
Operational Area.  These capabilities expand operational maneuver 
options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.   
Seabasing encompasses seven principles essential to our future naval fighting 
force: 
• Use of the sea as a maneuver space 
• Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence 
• Protect joint force operations 
• Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection 
• Sustain joint force operations from the sea 
• Expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases 
• Create uncertainty for our adversaries. (Department of Defense, 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005) 
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a. Sea Base Components 
While the physical concept of the Sea Base has not been fully established, 
the current conceptualization of the Sea Base is a collection of naval assets, some of 
which exist today and others that are being defined.  The notional Sea Base components 
are composed of a Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, Maritime 
Prepositioning Group, Combat Logistics Force, an assortment of surface connectors, 
Coalition Forces, and other U.S. service ships. 
(1) Logistic Support Ships. Sea Base operations are supported 
by the various classes of ships within the Combat Logistics Force Maritime 
Prepositioning Squadron—Enhanced (MPS(E)), and TRANSCOM’s Maritime Sealift 
Command (MSC) vessels, the Army’s Afloat Strategic Flotilla, and countless classes of 
commercial shipping vessels with varying capabilities.  While the CLF vessels will 
continue to provide the baseline logistics support for Naval sustainment, the rapid 
buildup and assembly operations will be supported by the MPS(E).  Follow-on 
sustainment logistics will be supported by the various commercial MSC vessels that have 
been modified to additionally conduct at-sea assembly with the MPS(E).  While the CLF 
and MSC vessels of today will likely resemble the same classes and support capabilities 
of those in 2020, the Navy’s concept of the MPS is rapidly evolving to specifically 
support the Seabasing concept.  With the future capabilities of the MPS(E), commercial 
vessels are anticipated to become an increasingly significant source of cargo transport 
particularly in immediate humanitarian assistance missions or sustained stability 
operations.   
(2) Advanced Bases. Closure and assembly of the assault 
echelon (AE), Follow-On Assault Echelon (FOAE), and Fly-In Echelon (FIE) can occur 
at operational area-located advanced bases to include Forward Logistic Sites (FLS) and 
advanced logistics support sites prior to continuing on to the Sea Base or directly ashore 
in the JOA.  Closure assault forces or Crisis response forces may originate from CONUS 
or from prepositioned forces from advanced bases.  Sustained combat operations, 
particularly in MCO, require an immediate resupply of critical supplies such as food, 
fuel, and ordnance.  Especially in extended length and scale missions, FLSs will continue 
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to be the primary transshipment points for the majority of all personnel and supplies and 
thus typically maintain the transient demands of the so called “iron mountain” stockpile 
that can be moved from the shore to the Sea Base.   
b. Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
Amphibious operations enable joint forces the capability to pit their 
strengths against enemy weaknesses.  The use of the sea offers Joint forces the maneuver 
space and freedom of action to overwhelm the enemy at planned or opportunistic points.  
Seabasing force projection provides an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) an unprecedented 
operational maneuver, unimpeded operational momentum, and assured access to maintain 
sequential force flows. In operational maneuvers from the sea, the landing force is 
primarily assembled, employed, and sustained from the Sea Base.   
The landing force consists of ground combat units and any of its combat 
support and combat service support units that will be further organized into “landing 
teams” to facilitate the ship-to-shore movement and initial operations ashore.  A Landing 
Force (LF) assembled and employed from a Sea Base for a MCO will likely be composed 
of one MEB, a light or medium Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT), multinational 
forces, and appropriate combat service support capabilities (Joint and Army Concepts 
Division, ATDC, 2006).  Lower intensity conflicts such as humanitarian operations from 
the Sea Base will be composed of reduced scale and tailored MAGTF and BCT units.   
4. Sea Base Connectors 
Sea Base connectors perform numerous functions within expeditionary warfare 
and these are infinitely varied throughout the spectrum of peacetime crisis and conflict 
intensity.  The purposes of the Sea Base connectors are to enable the Joint requirements 
within the Range of Military Operations (ROMO).  Specifically within the context of the 
MCOs, enabling the 10-30-30 swiftness goals is an objective.  The primary roles of a Sea 
Base connector have been well articulated by the Army’s CASCOM Functional Needs 
Analysis (FNA) of their watercraft (U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, 
2006).  Emerging Navy doctrine highlights that the Sea Base is more than a launching 
point for Joint Forcible Entry Operations in an unavailable or adversarial denied 
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Surface/Air Point of Debarkation (SPOD/APOD), but the Sea Base must enable the Joint 
ROMO and perhaps even the Range of Government Operations (ROGO).  The more 
frequent but less hostile ROMO/ROGOs are characterized best through humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief, non-combat evacuations, and stability operations scenarios. 
a. Austere Beach Access 
Sea Base connectors with the ability to access the shores of states with 
damaged or no port access are critical in realizing the Sea Base’s Joint Force 
Expeditionary Operations (JFEO) and humanitarian assistance operation requirements. 
JFEO is characterized by the ability to seize multiple entry points through the acquisition 
of improved and unimproved APOD/SPOD.  The overall capability [JFEO] will be made 
possible by high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors (air/surface) that are able to 
operate over-the-shore or through unimproved, shallow water or austere ports for near 
simultaneous reinforcement of immediate response forces to enable the Joint Force 
Commander to apply expanded maneuver options through the JOA (Department of 
Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).  The same capability provides access to 
heavily damaged or inaccessible ports common to foreign humanitarian assistance 
operations in response to a crisis.  The vessels with austere beach access and 
subsequently developed and undeveloped port access considered in this research are the 
LCAC/LCAC SLEP, SSC, T-Craft, LCU-2000, and LSV. Except for the T-Craft all 
platforms are established and funded FY2010 programs of record, possess distinguishable 
austere beach access characteristics necessary for Sea Based Amphibious Operations 
(AOs), and are currently planned to be operational in 2020.   
(1) T-Craft INP Program.  The Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) conducts research and sponsors programs that could have a game changing impact 
on the way the Navy operates.  The Sea Base connector T-Craft is a technology being 
explored in the ONR’s Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) program that grows such 
programs from initial concept design to construction and testing of a full-scale prototype 
demonstrator.  The INP program is valuable in fostering collaborative research and 
design efforts in technological areas that are conceptually undefined and when the 
technology level is immature.  The intent of the T-Craft INP program is to provide the 
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availability of such a revolutionary surface platform for future Joint Capability 
Integration Development System (JCIDS) capability assessment.  New technologies that 
are being explored for the T-Craft program include: catamaran/Surface Effect Ship hull 
forms, multi-mode propulsion systems, (including hybrid electric drive), inflatable bow 
and stern seals, retractable side skirts, ramp technologies and dynamic positioning 
systems, lift fan developments, automation, and human systems integration” (Joint and 
Army Concepts Division, ATDC, 2006). The T-Craft has been subject to workshop 
analysis of its operational concept, evaluated as the solitary surface connector within 
limited Seabasing logistics M&S, and as a component within Joint Seabasing war games 
hosted by Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).  The INP Phase II 
contractor design down-select of competing T-Craft designs and experimental 
demonstrators is currently scheduled for May 2010 and the selected prototype 
demonstration is anticipated to occur in 2014.    
(2) UHAC INP Program.  ONR is additionally sponsoring the 
design and testing of the Ultra Heavy-lift Amphibious Craft (Figure 3).  The UHAC, 
designed as a nearly submerged displacement vessel, could potentially provide three 
times the load capacity of a LCAC and also have an over-the-beach capability.  
Operational within the same well-deck footprint as a LCAC, its acquisition would 
substitute for the LCAC/SSC in amphibious shipping or MLP transport.  Ongoing testing 
indicates the feasibility of this platform offering high speed transport of multiple M1A2 
tanks.  Combined testing of the UHAC and SSC is anticipated to be completed by 
FY2018.    
 
Figure 3.   A modeling illustration of ONR’s UHAC.  The UHAC supports multiple 
mixed load configurations and an unprecedented heavy load capacity. (From Main, 
2010, p. 21) 
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b. Austere Port Access 
Joint forces intend to achieve the 10-30-30 swiftness goals partially 
through the employment of their Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).  The JHSV is the only 
high speed, heavy lift, and shallow draft vessel that is optimal for the roles of a Sea Base 
surface connector. “MPF(F), JHSV, and [Super-Short or Short Take-Off/Landing 
aircraft] STOL/SSTOL capabilities permit deploying forces to avoid improved PODS, 
exploit multiple entry points, deliver forces in combat configuration for immediate 
employment, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and achieve operational surprise” 
(Joint and Army Concepts Division, ATDC, 2006). 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this analysis was to allow the determined Sea Base Connector 
System (SBCS) requirements to shape and define the alternative system configurations.  
The problem was scoped to allow the interoperability and compatibility interface 
requirements of operational input/output items (physical and data) to define the 
alternative SBCS configurations.  Examples of such physical and data input/output items 
are mechanical connections or transfer systems for at-sea loading/unloading and C2 data 
exchanges or voice communication links, respectively. More specifically, the SBC’s 
interfaces with the future Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPS(E), ASF, ESG, 
commercial shipping, and intra-theater ports of the Sea Base were evaluated through the 
transfer of items necessary for the Joint landing forces to conduct the humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) mission. Items such as the Naval Construction 
Brigade’s construction equipment, the Navy’s Riverine patrol boats, or ISO containers 
were included.  As anti-access environments only prohibit early access to theater surface 
and air access points, the bulk of this analysis was conducted on in-theater assembly, 
employment, and early sustainment Lines-of-Operations (LOOs). Since the intent of this 
architectural description is to identify the requirements fulfillment of the Sea Base 




uantities and threshold requirements development were left for further M&S analysis.  
Programs of record in 2010 and current platforms still intended to be active in the 2020 
timeframe were included.     
The methodology of this thesis followed that developed by Dr. Steven H. Dam 
presented in DoD Architecture Framework: A Guide to Applying System Engineering to 
Develop Integrated, Executable Architectures.  This process is particular to architecting 
“to be” or vision architectures.  The methodology applied to “a vision architecture,” 
typical of conceptual development of future military systems, is appropriate for 
architectural development of systems that initially lack a detailed set of requirements.  
While a set of originating requirements exist for the T-Craft technology, they primarily 
exist to guide technology development and conceptually establish the T-Craft capabilities 
within a military operation framework.  However useful for initial conceptual 
development, they are without regard to the integration, interoperability, and interface 
requirements of the T-Craft within the SBCS architecture.  Dam’s methodology is based 
upon the classic SE approach. 
Dam’s middle out approach within the classical SE four-phase process, as 
depicted in Figure 4, enables the development of the originating requirements primarily 
through operational scenarios.  The middle out approach was integrated into the 
architecture development and system design levels of the “V” lifecycle model.  The 
approach was applied to the Sea Base Connector System (SBCS) conceptual 
development and high-level system requirements by determining the function’s activities 
and decomposing them through functional modeling to their elemental functions within 
the context of a selected Seabasing mission.  The Seabasing requirements specified in the 
Seabasing Joint Capabilities Document provided an outline of the desired Seabasing 
capabilities and derived SBCS capabilities Department of Defense (DoD), Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), 2007). Through functional decomposition of 
the SBCS over the assembly, employment, and sustainment phases of amphibious 
operations the SBCS capability requirements within the context of the mission were 
refined.   
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Figure 4.   Dam’s middle-out perspective of a classical SE four step waterfall 
process.  Using a modification of EIA-632 Dam integrated the development of the 
requirements analysis and synthesis through functional and operational scenario 
modeling. (After Dam, 2006, p. 139) 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Current USN and USMC leadership has reemphasized the needed capability of 
heavier high speed lift from OTH and enhanced commercial and multinational shipping 
vessel interoperability.  A previous argument has been made for the fulfillment of the Sea 
Base connector’s JFEO and at-sea assembly capability gaps with the JHSV and SSC 
acquisitions.  However,  in the March 2009 Amphibious Operations in the twenty-first 
Century guidance, the Commanding General, MCCDC, Lieutenant General Flynn 
underlined a combination of vertical and surface lift as the key to rapid projection of 
combat power ashore.   
This issue has become so extreme that in recent years the five established 
embarkation planning factors…have been trumped by a previously 
unforeseen sixth factor: weight. The acquisition of an increased number of 
vehicles of all types, to include mine resistant vehicles, as well as larger 
assault support aircraft, has increased the weight problem exponentially. 
(U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant, 2009) 
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The Marine Corps Commandant highlights that, for more than a decade, the Marine 
Corps have fielded vehicles and equipment optimized for extended combat operations 
ashore with little regard to future AO embarkation requirements.  Existing surface 
connectors capable of transporting such heavy vehicles to austere beaches are both slow 
and antiquated Army beach craft or are high speed air-cushion-vehicles that are 
overloaded with one over-sized vehicle.  While the JHSV in combination with near-term 
innovations such as the Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) or Lightweight 
Modular Causeway System (LMCS) have been shown to meet the above conditions, they 
do not offer JFEO solutions or a robust mobile at-sea assembly area necessary for 
commercial cargo handling.  Aside from JFEO, a DoD recognized capability gap to 
support commercial based logistics for low to mid conflict intensity and high frequency 
operations is becoming evident.  
Missions within the ROMO that are detached from traditional military 
amphibious operations, newly classified as “other,” show fresh emphasis on coalescing 
the efforts of numerous multinational organizations, both military and civilian, and their 
respective sea shipping in a common mission.  An example of this new focus is the recent 
Seabasing wargaming that focused on HA/DR and stability operations.  Post-assessment 
revealed that the Sea Base’s capability to conduct at-sea offload of commercial ISO 
containers, mission integration, palletization, and distribution of the necessary cargo was 
exhausted. The conference proceedings recommended to “ensure connectors are 
interoperable across multiple military and commercial platforms” to include partner 
nations and continued support of capabilities to transfer, receive, and unload containers 
at-sea (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010).  
While such missions are often perceived as lower threat environments, even apparently 
peaceful humanitarian missions occur in uncertain and militant regions and thus are more 
appropriately supported by employing seabasing principles.   
Unstable sociopolitical environments and religious extremism characteristic of the 
joint operational environment openly challenge the perceived safety of the Sea Based 
multinational forces rendering military supported assistance and aggravate the host 
nation’s sensitivity to foreign assistance.  More pointedly, “the proliferation of anti-
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access weapons among both state and non-state actors has further complicated the access 
challenge, even for benign missions.  This is exemplified by Hezbollah employing a C-
802 ASCM against an Israeli warship during the Lebanon crisis in 2006, which added an 
additional dimension to U.S. noncombatant evacuation operations” (USMC, 
Commandant, 2009).  In assuring governmental stability and maintaining its perception 
of control, the Sea Base will likely be tasked with conducting HA/DR or stability 
operations utilizing a minimal footprint ashore.  Such scenarios validate the wisdom of 
operating, at least initially, from over the horizon and illuminate potential for further 
surface connector acquisitions. 
The T-Craft operational concept is yet undefined.  There have been thorough 
capability-based assessments by both the Navy and the Army for parallel concept austere 
access platforms such as the SSC and JHSV, respectively.  The author cedes both craft 
will enhance the JFEO capabilities and support conceptualized Seabasing operations; 
however, none of the 2020 surface craft inventory will fully enable the envisioned needs 
of twenty-first century amphibious operations requiring unprecedented OTH operation, 
heavier high speed lift for JFEOs, and at-sea cargo assembly with multinational and 
commercial organizations.  While the INP program will indeed offer the availability of a 
superior technological platform, the operational concept of this craft has yet to be defined 
not only within the context of the T-Craft’s mission portfolio, but within cooperation and 
integration of other Seabasing systems.  The author believes that exploration of the T-
Craft within the MCO and HA/DR environments will exemplify the T-Craft’s game 
changing utility in both peacetime and mid-to-high conflict environments; however, it is 
believed that the greatest opportunities for a single acquisition such as the T-Craft for 
capability gap fulfillment are within the HA/DR environment. 
The following benefits of this thesis research will be: 
• To define the Sea Base Connector (SBC) operational concept and required 
capabilities within the context of a low intensity and uncertain threat 
environment while conducting HA operations. 
• To develop alternative configurations of the Sea Base Connector System 
(SBCS) physical components that meet stakeholder requirements that can 
be further evaluated in M&S analysis. 
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• To develop initial SBCS functions and operational activities critical to 
conducting an M&S analysis to determine T-Craft measures-of-
performance and design requirements.  Such analysis will provide 
program decision makers insights to the T-Craft’s mission portfolio and 
performance tradeoffs that define the design requirements.   
• To generate DoDAF viewpoints and presentations of a capabilities-based 
SBC architecture that will aid in the conceptual development and 
experimentation of the T-Craft concept. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What are the mission, originating, and system requirements for a SBC 
system? 
• What is the objectives hierarchy of the SBCS as seen from the primary 
stakeholders?  Who are the stakeholders? 
• What are the appropriate Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for the SBCS 
mission requirements? 
• What is the operational concept of the SBCS over the lines-of-operation?  
How are surface connectors being used?  What are the operational 
activities of the SBCS?   
• What is the functional behavior of the SBCS? 
• What are the internal and external interfaces between SBCS elements? 
• What are the appropriate Measures of Performance (MOPs) for the SBCS 
requirements? 
• What are the alternative families of SBCSs and their associated 
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II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. CLASSIC SYSTEMS ENGINEERING WATERFALL  
The classic SE Process includes the non-linear phases of requirements analysis, 
functional analysis and allocation, synthesis, and system analysis and control (Figure 4). 
The requirements analysis phase is conducted to decompose the customer requirements 
into testable requirements for system development.  The requirements are derived from a 
doctrinal review of the internal and external systems and regular discussion of the 
stakeholder’s originating requirements.  The functional behavior of the system (or 
systems in an architecture) is determined in the functional analysis phase and then 
allocated to generic components.  A functional analysis consists of defining a hierarchical 
model of the functions and activities performed by the system and its components and 
modeling the flow of information and physical items from outside the system through the 
transformational process of the system’s functions and onto the serviced external 
systems.  The synthesis phase is the mapping of those generic components to physical 
components.  Within synthesis the functional architecture and coinciding functional 
activities are grouped into system appropriate cohesive units closely evaluating the 
component interfaces for coupling.  The system analysis and control phase is 
continuously integrated into each of the previous three phases to provide a balance 
through trade-off studies, risk analysis, and other design verification and validation 
techniques (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006).  These phases are non-linear and not only 
spiral through increasingly lower levels of system definition, but also evolve throughout 
the system lifecycle.   
B. MIDDLE-OUT APPROACH APPLIED TO THE SBCS 
Utilizing a variation of the system engineering process presented by Dam, the 
following steps were taken using CORE’s© Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) 
approach:  
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1. Literature Review 
The author obtained relevant Sea Base, Sea Base connector, Joint amphibious 
operations, Joint ship-to-objective-maneuver, and the Joint force combat unit 
organization related documents and captured them in CORE’s© architecture repository.  
A document analysis to discover desired external system capabilities and SBCS issues, 
risks, and assumptions for other activities and capabilities was accomplished. The 
primary design documents that defined the SBCS capability requirements in a Joint 
environment were the Seabasing Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) and the Army 
Watercraft Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) (DoD, JROC, 2007), (U.S. Combined 
Armed Support Command, 2007).  Seabasing guidance documents such as the Seabasing 
Joint Integration Concepts (JIC) and the Seabasing Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 
provided descriptions of the strategic and operational actions of the Sea Base  
(Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), (Department of the 
Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters & U.S. Marine Corps, 
2006). 
2. Assumptions and Derived External System Capabilities 
The author reviewed assumptions and doctrine derived external system 
capabilities with the stakeholders to verify subsequent work met desired objectives.  
Seabasing doctrine and the assessed capability needs of Army watercraft were used to 
generate capability requirements of the SBCS.  These capabilities typically include 
objective and threshold values and are often characterized as surface connector 
requirements for all Seabasing assets that could ultimately be allocated to task specific 
load requirements for each connector.  All assumptions, issues, and risks were 
documented in CORE© for continuous assessment and re-evaluation.  These records 
provided a traceable and validated catalog of accepted and ongoing assumptions, 
constraints, and risks essential to strategic, operational, and tactical decisions that were 
either established through Joint Seabasing documents or the author’s documented 
assumptions (Appendix A.  Sea Base Connector System Capabilities). 
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3. Existing and Planned Systems Identification  
The author conducted a survey of the planned or ongoing activities relevant to 
Seabasing and individual service or Joint surface craft to ensure that capabilities already 
available or planned were taken into account.  Joint wargaming and applicable surface 
connector conferences provided insight into inter-service areas of focus, updates to 
existing acquisition or research programs, and CONOPS of future focus (USMC 
Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010).  Establishment of 
the components of the 2020 SBCS was essential to determine its capability gaps for 
further surface connector acquisition assessment.  Acquisition plans and service life 
upgrades to Army watercraft were particularly beneficial in determining the available 
2020 Army watercraft assets (U.S. Army Transportation Office, 2008).  Army and Navy 
acquisition plans and the intended assignment of those assets provided a phased 
description of the quantities and availability of those assets in the CONOPS.  The 
programs of record in FY10 that were planned for 2020 operation were verified by the 
stakeholders prior to including in the analysis.      
4. Constraints 
The author captured the technical and schedule constraints imposed by external 
policies, regulations, and standards.  The current acquisition schedules and anticipated 
technical innovation plans were used to generate and support the SBC system 
components.  While the planned quantities of future platform acquisitions change 
frequently within their lifecycle, the type and planned capabilities that each platform 
provided to the Sea Base were of more importance in this analysis than the planned 
quantities available in 2020.  This was most significant in the planning and service-life 
upgrades of existing Army and Navy watercraft.  
5. Operational Context Diagram 
Through an extension of the context diagram, the architecture environment to 
include the internal and external interactions was described within the context of a 
general Seabasing mission.  This operational view provided the broad overview of the 
inter-service contributions and their required mission tasks in the HA/DR campaign while 
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foreshadowing the general assumptions of the CONOPS.  Such analysis shaped the 
fundamental descriptions of the SBCS, external systems, and their interfaces.  The 
interfaces were decomposed to physical and informational linkages that better defined the 
future necessary standards and external system interoperability considerations.  As 
emphasis in this analysis was upon the physical linkages, it was a concern to develop and 
describe the external Sea Base load exchange links (Appendix E.  Operational/Physical 
Context Diagram).   
6. Operational Scenarios 
The author evaluated the directed and implied operational tasks of the SBC 
system in a HA/DR CONOPS to determine the simplest use-case and expanded it to 
encapsulate the most complex scenarios.  The simplest use case for the SBC system was 
at-sea loading of cargo from CLF ships and deploying that cargo to shore facilities.  This 
use case was expanded to eventually include the exchange of objective area personnel to 
and from the Sea Base.  The directed tasks originating from a recommended Uniform 
Joint Task List (UJTL) operational humanitarian assistance template were further 
decomposed from operational activities into their respective Joint and inter-service 
military tasks (CJCS, 2003).  A MBSE approach to define a hierarchy of each service’s 
operational tasks and appropriate measures-of-effectiveness (MOE) was used to 
simultaneously define the functions necessary for their fulfillment.  While numerous Joint 
and multinational strategies to achieve the HA/DR tasking exist, a holistic view of these 
combined tasks and the limitations imposed by the crisis was used to formulate an 
operational plan of Seabasing activities.  To quantitatively evaluate the capability of the 
SBCS the generic scenarios were applied to a Navy and USMC relevant and significant 
mission.  
The lessons and the general strategic plan discussed in the Expeditionary Warrior 
2010 war game’s HA/DR mission provided a general description of anticipated Joint and 
multinational operations. The HA/DR CONOPS utilized in this analysis offered 
numerous scenarios differing by geographic limitations, local threat, and crisis severity 
across the entire coast and inland waterways of Nigeria, but a single  scenario with  
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accompanying constraints and assumptions was used to capture the bulk of LOO-phased 
SBCS capability requirements.  The author derived operational and tactical level scenario 
descriptions and use cases to allow proportional adjustment of the Sea Base’s resources 
available in the selected scenarios with respect to the entire Nigeria crisis response and a 
potential description of T-Craft tasking within the SBCS.  While such operational 
analysis through potential scenarios is useful in constraining operational variables and 
defining performance requirements, it needs to be highlighted that these detailed 
activities are highly dependent upon the strategic, operational, and tactical plans and 
assumptions generated by the author.  Although the basis for such strategic plans and 
assumptions are referenced in Seabasing doctrine and validated through USMC 
wargaming, the 2020 HA/DR Sea Base is still yet an evolving concept and specific 
operational plans are not publicly available.      
7. Derived SBCS Functional Behavior 
The author developed a functional decomposition of the SBCS from the 
operational scenarios.  Stated HA/DR tasking was decomposed, guided by the military 
task list(s) refining the operational activities, to define the necessary SBCS functions.  
IDEF0 modeling and FFBD modeling provided a means of decomposing the functions of 
the SBCS to appropriate levels while simultaneously allowing them to be traced to the 
operational activities hierarchy.  From the operational scenarios, the data list of inputs, 
controls, mechanisms, and outputs of the SBCS’s top-level functions were determined to 
model the conversion of the external Sea Base system’s provided resources to be 
consumed by the objective area system and vice-versa (i.e., delivering food to Lagos or 
civilian MEDEVACs to advanced base).   
8. Functional Elements 
The author developed generic components for the physical architecture which 
incorporate all functions identified during the functional architecture development.  This 
packaged functionality was specific to both the selected HA/DR scenarios in the 
Assembly, Employment, and Sustainment AO phases and mapped to those existing 
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SBCS components to determine their individual ability to conduct such functions.  The 
author then generated alternative physical architectures using the generic components 
developed and selected candidate physical configurations.    
9. Function to Element Allocation  
A traceability matrix was created by allocating SBCS functions to potential 
candidate physical system configurations.  The priority of functional to physical system 
mapping was to first utilize legacy SBC platforms available within the CONOPS phase 
and scenario and then supplement with a generic INP acquisition platform that could 
enhance the system configuration.  The selection of alternative system configurations was 
driven by increased at-sea assembly interface capabilities and deployment of the 
functional items to the objective area.   
10. Interface Diagrams 
The author defined potential physical load exchange interface capabilities 
between SBCS and Sea Base components that would enable a new platform acquisition 
to meet the needs of candidate alternative SBCS configurations.  Given the purpose of the 
research and 2020 assessment considerations, only relatively mature technologies were 
considered beyond standard Navy load exchange systems.   
11. Alternative System Configurations 
The author documented SBCS physical alternatives, noted shortfalls and gaps, 
provided options for problem resolution, and developed conclusions.  A 2020 legacy 
watercraft SBCS alternative was established and evaluated as a baseline consideration to 
illuminate potential capability gaps.  The author then evaluated and documented trade-
offs conducted throughout the process.  The integration of stand-alone capabilities was 
required to develop a robust solution throughout all phased requirements.   
12. Views, Briefings, and Reports 
The author created the DoDAF viewpoints shown in Figure 5 throughout the 
development of the SBCS architecture.     
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Figure 5.   SBCS architecture plan.  The plan indicates a chronological but 
overlapping methodology tailored to generating relevant architectural DoDAF 
viewpoints. (After Dam, 2006, p. 144) 
C. DOCUMENTATION AND PRESENTATION 
1. System Engineering in CORE© 
The CORE© software by Vitech is a systems engineering software tool that 
manages the numerous components of an architecture.  The CORE© tool allows the 
Systems Engineer to integrate the system architecture with behavior models, 
requirements, and verification/validation throughout the design process.  CORE© 
facilitates the functional and operational requirement traceability within the operational 
and system architecture domains.   
CORE© offers a schema that divides an architecture into operational or system 
architectural domains (Figure 6).  The operational domain is best understood as a 
construct of the operational activities that are specifically defined by their operational 
tasks that are required to accomplish a mission.  These relate to the Joint force’s 
hierarchical listing of mission, to operational activity, to service task descriptions. The 
operational architecture domain is used to capture originating concepts, capabilities, and 
supporting analysis to expose requirements used in the system domain architecture.  The 
system’s domain is best visualized by the defined system’s functional decomposition 
mapped directly to system requirements and defined physical systems.  By utilizing 
CORE©’s DoD Architectural Framework (DoDAF) schema requirement’s tracing from 
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the customer to the physical components can be verified and more easily configured. The 
preconfigured schema provides input on-demand graphical and tabular representations 
and/or reports aligned to DoDAF views.  Through CORE’s model based simulation 
behavior diagramming can be completed rapidly and CORESIM© can provide high level 
trade-off analysis data to evaluate system specifications.             
 
Figure 6.   CORE© DoDAF V1.5 architecture composition.  This perspective divides 
the architecture into two domains: operational and system. (From Vitech, 2007, p. 
vii) 
2. DoDAF 1.5 Description 
DoD Architecture Framework “provides a foundational framework for developing 
and representing architectures across organizational, Joint, and multinational boundaries” 
(Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, 2007).  DoDAF 1.5 emphasizes a 
disciplined process of defining the purpose, scope and information requirements of the 
architecture up-front, followed by a collection of data in accordance with a standard 
vocabulary. Visualization of the architectural data is accomplished through models that 
are typically documents, spreadsheets, or viewpoints, or other graphical representations.  
The models serve as a template for organizing and displaying data in commonly 
understood and communicated formats.  Various perspectives, appropriate to the 
 25
audience, are called views (i.e., operational, systems, services, standards) and collections 
of these views are termed viewpoints as individually described in Figure 7.  Collectively 
the composition of these viewpoints creates an architectural description.     
 
Figure 7.   DoDAF 1.5 Overview of system architecture viewpoint linkages.  The 
illustration describes the internal relationships between the architecture viewpoints.  
(From Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoDCIO), 2007, pp. 1–8) 
3. DoDAF 1.5 Application to the SBCS 
Steven Dam’s methodology of architecting a DoD system was based upon the 
2004 DoDAF V1.0.  While the application of his methodology is still solidly 
representative of system architectural modeling, DoDAF 1.5 “places more emphasis on 
architecture data, rather than products, introduces the concept of federated architectures, 
and incorporates the Core Architecture Data Model (CADM) as an integral component of 
the DoDAF (DoDCIO, 2007).  Figure 5 illustrates the SBCS engineering timeline and the 
model viewpoints generated.  Not all pertinent views are included within this 
architectural description as many require in-depth technical analysis of the SBCs and 
their sub-systems and were evident to be beyond the scope and resources of this analysis.  
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III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 
A. EXTERNAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
1. Sea Base  
While the physical concept of the Sea Base has hardly yet been established, the 
current conceptualization of the Sea Base is a collection of naval assets, some of which 
exist today and others that are being defined.  The logistics backbone of the Seabasing 
concept is currently the enhanced Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS(E)).  A 2007 
report to Congress on Seabasing requirements “states that the key performance 
parameters for the MPF(F) squadron include… an ability to deliver ashore, in a period of 
8 to 10 hours, one Marine Brigade Landing Team (BLT) by surface transportation from a 
range of up to 25 nautical miles, and a second BLT by air transportation.from a range of 
up to 110 nautical miles” (Defense Science Board, Task Force on Mobility, 2005).  The 
MPS(E) concept includes supporting and sustaining Seabasing operations through the 
following capabilities: prepositioned USMC MEB equipment, unhindered operations 
without port or host nations support, enable at-sea arrival and assembly of forces, 
providing unreinforced sustainment of twenty days or more from the Sea Base pre-
combat configured and tailored logistic packages (U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant 
(CMC), 2009)). 
The notional Sea Base components are composed of a Carrier Strike Group, 
Expeditionary Strike Group, Maritime Prepositioning Group, Combat Logistics Force, an 
assortment of surface connectors, Coalition Forces, and other U.S. service ships (Table 
1).  As no two Sea Bases will be alike and their future components will look much 
different than those shown, the Sea Base is better viewed as a scalable portfolio of 




Table 1.   Notional components of the Sea Base.  The diagram summarizes the potential 
Sea Base assets available to the 2020 COCOM.  Note that the T-AE will not 
be a in the U.S. inventory by 2020.  NECC’s NCW forces and the MPF(F) 
have transitioned to the Maritime Expeditionary Security Force and the 
MPS(E), respectively. (From Department of the Navy, 2006, pp. 1–7) 
The Sea Base is a system of inherently mobile and networked platforms that will 
revolutionize the way Joint and multinational forces provide movement, maneuver, and 
sustainment for campaigns, major operations, and other contingencies.  While the desired 
capabilities of the Sea Base system are more Jointly explored and understood in the 
context of MCOs, a robust method of achieving those capabilities is still far from being 
determined.  Significant DoD doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) gaps exist within the Sea Base concept 
and more have yet to be recognized.  Some of the Seabasing capability gaps are currently 
being explored through Joint Capability Based Assessments and experimentation through 
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wargaming, but some have already initiated DOTMLPF changes.  These efforts have had 
substantial focus on MCO Concept of Operations (CONOPs), but recent focus has been 
on Military-Operations-Other-than-war (MOOTW). 
Seabasing offers substantial capabilities in the globally prevalent MOOTW, 
constituting non-combatant evacuation operations, peace operations, foreign 
humanitarian assistance, crisis consequence management, strikes and raids, and homeland 
civil support operations.  
Seabasing provides adaptive force packages with the requisite capacity, 
rate, and infrastructure to support a tailored maritime or joint force.  
Adaptive Force packages optimize the combination of people and 
platforms to provide the right force at the right time, given a particular 
operational requirement which is enhanced by the inherent scalability of 
Seabasing. (Department of the Navy, United States Fleet Forces 
Command, 2009) 
The enhanced capabilities of the Sea Base’s MPS(E) will provide groundbreaking at-sea 
assembly of personnel, cargo, and vehicles exchange from military prepositioned 
shipping vessels, military vessels, and commercial shipping to support the logistics 
requirements within the ROMO/ROGOs. 
The overarching Seabasing phases of operation are typically described through 
the sequential simplification of five primary Seabasing lines-of-operations (Figure 8).  
While the missions within the ROMO vary, the persistent and scalable Joint force 
projections of the Seabasing LOO are equally relevant in all missions.  Although the 
established LOO is traditionally applied to MCO, these basic functions are universal for 
all MOOTW and only differ by scale, temporal variations, and frequency of occurrence.  
The LOO have defining metrics within the context of a MCO.   
Although the MPF(F) guided metrics were generated for MCO, some have direct 
application to MOOTW and others can be scaled accordingly.  Currently desired MCO-
defined LOO capabilities require the Seabasing concept to close the force within 10–14 
days of the execution order by leveraging the forward presence of Joint prepositioned 
forces.  This is accomplished through a combination of strategic intra-theater Air/Surface 
Point[s] of Departure.  The joint force is assembled and married with their equipment in 
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theater within 24–72 hours of arrival without host nation support.  The USMC and the 
USA landing forces are united with their prepositioned stock and equipment aboard the 
MPS(E) and the Army Strategic Flotilla, respectively.  This necessarily requires utilizing 
the sea as a maneuver space.  Employment of at least one brigade OTH within one period 
of darkness (8–10 hrs) and sustainment of at least two joint brigades is envisioned.  The 
Sea Base reconstitute LOO requires reemployment of one brigade operating ashore 
within 10–14 days (Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, (2005).  
While the LOO for MCOs provide the framework for parallel Seabasing operations to 
support MOOTW such as HA/DR, multiple variations to the process depend upon the 
forces at which military vessels are to interoperate with and the availability or operational 
status of advanced bases or objective access points. 
 
Figure 8.   Seabasing lines-of-operations.  The graphic highlights the logical 
progression of the operational phases with respect to a general amphibious 
operation. (From Strock, 2007, p. 7) 
Seabasing provides improved operational maneuver of joint landing forces by 
minimizing the needed setup and protection of support facilities ashore.  “By performing 
command and control, fires, and logistics functions afloat, fewer personnel and resources 
would need to be transported ashore and amphibious flexibility, tempo, and 
unpredictability would be enhanced, permitting the landing force to maneuver directly 
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from the sea to inland objectives” (CMC, 2009).  A practical example is when key supply 
stockpiles are maintained safely at sea, vice the supply stockpile on the coast commonly 
referred to as the “iron mountain,” and the ATF is able to expand its operational region 
away from the logistics supply.  Additionally, the landing force is not constrained to 
protecting the logistics stockpile and the military personnel and facilities footprint ashore 
is minimized.  The Sea Base’s inherent maneuver flexibility enables deployment 
momentum by projecting forces directly from the sea.   
With assembly being conducted at sea, deployment momentum can be maintained 
through assured access to the objective territory and operational responsiveness.  The Sea 
Base concept allows assured theater access and if strategically positioned it can 
significantly improve force flows through simultaneous entry of objective territory at 
multiple points.  The improved operational maneuver capability over a large JOA allows 
the Joint force to be strategically unpredictable, thus less vulnerable to attack, and bring 
operational surprise and the ability to adapt to changing battlespace conditions.  Current 
employment operations afforded at SPOD/APOD cause considerable time delay “to 
unload LMSRs that are loaded administratively at high STOW factor rates, to move those 
unit sets and stocks to assembly areas, to link personnel arriving by strategic air at 
airfields within the region, and then to organize into units and move to objective areas” 
(United States Fleet Forces Command, 2009).  At-sea staging can facilitate operational 
responsiveness by deploying in unit configurations with personnel and rolling stock fully 
integrated and immediately employable at arrival to a SPOD/APOD.  
a. Logistics Support Ships: MPS(E) 
The recently funded MPS – Enhanced includes one T-AKE class vessel, 
an LMSR, a new design MLP, and four T-AKs to augment the existing fleet tanker and 
container ships Figure 9 (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2010). The MPS(E) will provide the 
Sea Base with revolutionary maneuver flexibility and logistics support.  Three MPS(E) 
squadrons will be prepositioned around the world.  These squadrons are expected to be 
located in the Atlantic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea, Diego Garcia, or Guam/Saipan areas.  
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The MPS(E) is capable of independent operations with Sea Base components in a low-to-
medium threat environment.  The MPS(E) does not currently have any additional 
berthing facilities or C2 functionality, provide any maintenance, repair, or medical 
treatment support, or possess any capability to handle standardized commercial Twenty-
Foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) containers.  However, the MLP is intended to support such 
functional specific modules that can be later developed.  The landing force’s logistics 
infrastructure will be maintained afloat at the Sea Base and replenished from T-AKEs 
provided by the CLF ships arriving from CONUS or other FLSs.   
The MPS(E) is a combination of legacy MPS ships and existing ship 
classes or variants, but all will have technology insertions that are currently being 
developed to create improved at-sea assembly operations. The technology insertions and 
the proposed MLP Lite are illustrated in Figure 9.  The existing T-AKE provides 
ammunition and dry stores to include frozen, chilled, spare parts, consumables, and 
limited quantities of fuel.  It has upgraded material handling equipment, transfer deck and 
pre-staging areas, shipboard warehouse management system, lightweight cargo stowage 
system and elevator upgrades. The T-AKE will have the ability to receive at-sea the 
specialized military container (QUADCON)3 level cargo that is dense packed aboard the 
T-AK vessels or others and palletize it for vertical lift or underway replenishment.  
Operationally it will act as a station ship or shuttle ship to support the future Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) indefinitely.  From tanks, ammunition, food, fuel, spare 
parts to engine oil, the prepositioned T-AK vessels contain nearly everything combat-
loaded that the USMC’s MEB will need for initial assembly to support a MCO.  Since the 
components of the MPS(E) already exist or have been funded, its capabilities will be 
assumed for this analysis.  Each prepositioned group contains one MPS(E) vessel  pre-
loaded and configured for HA/DR mission with the following capabilities: 
• It contains equipment and supplies to support an Expeditionary 
Airfield (EAF). An EAF provides the flexibility needed to allow 
the force commander to order a variety of airfield configurations to 
suit the tactical situation.  
                                                 
3 A TEU equivalent container that is separable into four individual ISO containers.   
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• Naval Expeditionary Medical Support System (NEMSS). Staffed 
by 940 Sailors, the NEMSS can be fully operational in 10 days. 
This expeditionary hospital consists of six operating tables as well 
as 80 intensive-care and 420 acute-care beds. The NEMSS 
provides in-situ state-of-the-art medical care for personnel engaged 
in remote areas.  
• Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB). The NMCB, which 
is capable of carrying out numerous vertical and horizontal 
construction missions, will be able to build troop billeting facilities 
and both refueling and ammunition supply points, to clear main 
supply routes, and to provide other construction support as needed. 





Figure 9.   Notional MPS(E) and ongoing technology experimentation.  The MPS(E) 
is to support a 2015 MEB and the joint swiftness goals.  (From Strock, 2009, pp. 18–
20) 
LMSRs are primarily equipped with heavy lift cranes and all include a 
stern ramp or side ramp for pier side or at-sea RO-RO Discharge Facility (RRDF) cargo 
transfer.  Successful underway transfer of vehicles from a modified LMSR side-ramp to a 
proxy Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) via a horizontal side ramp in sea-state 3 has been 
conducted.  Additionally, similar sea-state 3 cargo transfer testing to a notional MLP 
from an existing LMSR crane with pendulation control has been completed.  Retro-fitting 
of the pendulation crane to the existing MPS LMSRs is extensive and the implementation 
 34
of such technology has not yet been determined at this time, however, this technology is 
assumed to be present in at least one LMSR within the 2020 MPF(F).   
The MLP version recently funded is a flow-on/flow-off (FLO-FLO) vessel 
that has the ability to submerge the majority of its main deck.  This gives it the ability to 
transport other large vessels and act as a mobile landing dock for displacement and 
ACVs.  The general purpose value of this vessel is to offer a large area for vehicle, 
personnel, or cargo assembly and integration prior to distribution via its docked vessels or 
transfer systems. It will likely house the Vehicle Transfer System (VTS) ramp for at-sea 
employment to at least fitted LMSRs. 
The closure and assembly phases particular to MCOs currently depend 
upon advanced bases or FLS to provide a staging and assembly areas for the USMC and 
Army equipment and supplies prepositioned aboard the MPS and ASF, respectively.  The 
MPS(E) will capitalize on OTH usage of the sea as a maneuver space to support the full 
range of military operations.  The planned capabilities of the MPS(E), from the Seabasing 
Naval Warfare Publication, include the following:  
• Close a MEB in 10–14 days. 
• Provide at-sea arrival and assembly in 24–72 hours.  
• Support forcible-entry operations when joined with a CSG or ESG, 
or both, by employing two battalions, one by air, and one by 
surface, in a single period of darkness.  
• Sustain joint Seabased operations, including up to at least two joint 
brigades operating ashore, for an indefinite period using advance 
bases up to 2,000 miles away.  
• Reconstitute one brigade from ashore to the Sea Base; reemploy 
within 10–14 days of execution order. (Department of the Navy, 
United States Fleet Forces Command, 2009) 
The Army’s strategic flotilla contains the Army Prepositioned Stock 
(APS) in dense packed storage.  As an alternative to combat-loaded methods, dense 
packed storage maximizes loading capacity by sacrificing any ability for selective 
offload.  While the Navy has made strides to provide a selective offload capacity, the 
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Army has yet to make modifications to its prepositioning concept.  The ASFs are 
typically collocated with the MPSRON and each consists of various combinations of 
vessels classified as Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR), Roll-on/Roll-off 
(RO-RO), Lift-on/Lift-off (LO-LO), break bulk, and container ships.  The LMSRs are 
primarily equipped with heavy lift cranes and all include a stern ramp or side ramp to 
pierside, at-sea RRDF, or the Army’s Joint Logistics over the Sea (JLOTS).  While both 
the LO/LO vessels and container vessels contain TEU loads, only the LO/LO has an 
organic capability to heavy lift crane containers at-sea or to undeveloped piers.  It is 
assumed that the Army’s LMSRs and LO-LO vessels will not be outfitted with MPS’s 
enhanced sea-state 3 crane pendulation system.  Lastly, break bulk vessels contain large 
open or covered containers well suited for loose cargo.  Within this analysis it is assumed 
that the ASF has made some steps to modularize the loading of its APS to support 
HA/DR operations, but will remain aligned to developed port offloads. 
b. Logistics Support Bases 
Logistics support bases include those military bases located in CONUS or 
overseas.  The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), through the Maritime 
Sealift Command (MSC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC), provides cargo and 
personnel sealift and airlift either directly to the JOA, or established advanced bases. The 
Navy possesses many advanced bases such as those in Spain or Bahrain and the Army 
utilizes bases in Germany or Iraq to provide prepositioned forces and logistics.  The 
Navy’s established FLSs, currently Guam, Diego Garcia, Sigonella, and Rota, is assumed 
to be indefinitely sustained from the highly developed logistics bases within the 
continental United States (CONUS).  In order to meet typical supply demands of military 
operations a FLS commonly has a deep water harbor, sufficient number of large ship 
berths, a military or commercial airfield with sufficient throughput and maximum on-
ground transport capability, petroleum storage, container marshalling yards, ordnance 
magazines, cranes, trucks, material handling equipment, and barges.  Container 
marshalling yards must contain adequate equipment and machinery to sort, store, 
consolidate, and repackage cargo as necessary.  Typically, at least a minimal medical and 
maintenance facility are available.  As one would expect, the likelihood of a FLS or even 
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a developed port being available in an objective theater is improbable.  The Joint 
Operational Environment assumes such a case and has defined seaports with limited 
infrastructure, either inherently or through man-made/natural disasters, as austere ports or 
those with no infrastructure such as a beach or shore as austere accesses.       
The sources and delivery methods of Joint logistics advanced bases are 
varied.  Fuel is often delivered in-theater by merchant tankers.  Supplies may arrive in-
theater by commercial container ships, AMC assets, or CLF T-AKE ships. The MPSRON 
and the ASF may utilize advanced bases as an assembly area for unloading and 
subsequent loading onto amphibious shipping or high speed connectors.  During MCO or 
HA/DR sustainment of the Sea Base from advanced bases CLF ships may provide 
logistics support via station ship or shuttle ship methods with additional high speed 
surface craft augmentation available in the latter.    
2. Combat Elements  
a. Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
The 2015 baseline Marine expeditionary brigade is functionally composed 
of traditional Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements; a command element, 
ground combat element, aviation combat element, and a logistics combat element.  The 
MEB varies in size and composition and is task-organized to meet the specific situation.  
“The various missions likely to be conducted in an uncertain environment may be 
performed by a MEB embarked aboard amphibious, by an ARG/MEU, by disaggregated 
portions of an ARG/MEU, by a SP (Special Purpose) MAGTF embarked in one or more 
amphibious ships, or by other task organized Navy-Marine Corps forces operating from a 
variety of vessels” (CMC, 2009).  The notional 2015 baseline MEB elements and unit 
approximations are provided in Figure 10.  A MEB can operate by itself with a self 
sustainment capability of 30 days, fully integrate within Navy/Joint logistics systems for 
indefinite sustainment, and can conduct forcible entry operations.   
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Figure 10.   MAGTF Elements of a notional Sea Base MEB.  The MEB includes unit 
troop and equipment approximations.  (From Department of the Navy, Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2005, p. 12) 
The baseline 2020 MEB is organized to be deployed and employed from 
Amphibious Warfare Ships.  The amphibious MEB is assumed to be transported and 
employed in four echelons.  It is likely that an advanced force, primarily composed of 
Joint special operations forces conducting operations in the area, will be employed to 
prepare the OA stage before the main echelon’s force arrives.  This would include 
operations such as reconnaissance, preparation of supporting positions, and crisis 
assessment.   
The rapid reinforcement echelon and the follow-on echelon may each be 
composed of an additional MEB equivalent and select Joint or multinational forces which 
can be assembled and employed in the OA to provide strategic reinforcement of the main 
echelon through the MPS(E).  The follow-on echelon deploys on ten to fourteen combat 
loaded strategic sea sift ships, as available, and provides troops, vehicles, aircraft, 
equipment, and supplies required to sustain the operations. The forward base echelon 
flows to a forward base to support fixed wing aircraft that are not Sea Based such as the 
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KC-130, EA-6B (or its successor), and F- 35 Joint Strike Fighters. The Amphibious Task 
Force with its follow-one echelon will accommodate a Navy Support Element that may 
have 2,500 to 4,000 Navy personnel, depending on the deployment/employment mode 
(Strock, 2007). 
b. Brigade Combat Team 
 The Army is currently undergoing an overall transformational effort to 
reorganize the force from a division-based to a modular brigade-based force.  The intent 
is to redesign organizations to perform as integral parts of the Joint force, making them 
more effective across the ROMO and enhancing their ability to contribute to Joint, 
interagency, and multinational efforts.  The modular brigade-based force is mission-set 
tailored, but illustrated most appropriately here by degrees of combat armor, ranging 
from light, medium, to heavy.  The modular brigade concept includes three types: light, 
or airborne brigade; mechanized infantry (Stryker); or heavy with armor.  An additional 
variant that should be highlighted here is the Security Force Assistance BCT that is 
assumed to be equated with the similar loading and sustainment requirements as the 
Stryker BCT.  While the Army has shaped much of its future fighting concept around 
access-denial, thus projecting and sustaining its forces through multiple parallel paths, 
implementation of such a strategy in a MCO still relies heavily upon austere port access.  
However, as the at-sea closure and assembly capability of the Sea Base is realized the 
Army’s concept of deploy-employ will be recognized directly from the Sea Base vice 
through an advanced base.   
3. Commercial Shipping Description 
Commercial shipping has been differentiated from the vessels of the MPS(E).  
While both the commercially provided vessels, either owned or contracted by the MSC, 
government organizations, or non-government organizations, have the same general hull 
type descriptions and rigging suited for HA operations they have not been adapted to 
directly interoperate with the U.S. Navy’s Sea Base connectors or enablers.  For the sake 
of simplification in system modeling these vessels are either organically rigged load-
on/load-off container ships or break-bulk vessels.  It is assumed that they are capable of 
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at-sea load exchange operations in a low sea-state environment, such as a protected 
harbor or channel inlet, to include directly moving container or palletized loads from a 
beam mounted crane over-over-the-side to an adjacent MLP, INLS, or dynamic 
positioning system (DPS) enabled vessel. 
a. MSC Shipping 
The MSC utilizes tankers, dry cargo ships, and LMSRs to move more than 
ninety-percent of the U.S. war fighter’s equipment and supplies by sea.  MSC seeks to 
economically lease cargo space aboard U.S. flagged vessels before using its own vessels.  
Most cargo shipping requirements for the military are fulfilled by the Army Surface 
Deployment and Distribution Command’s usage of commercial container shipment that is 
undistinguishable from civilian channels.  Dry cargo ships are specifically tasked with 
cargo that is too large to fit in containers, military vehicles, aircraft, or ammunition.  It 
also utilizes its own 10 ship surge ready LMSR fleet that is currently capable of crane 
offloading in calm waters to lighterage or barges.  These LMSRs are surge ready within 
as little as four days.  Additionally, MSC maintains a ready reserve fleet consisting of fast 
sealift, RO/RO, heavy lift, and crane ships quickly ready to support operations such as 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Military Sealift Command, 2010).  
b. International Relief Agency Shipping 
No particular ship class or types are indicative of the countless numbers of 
relief ships that may be utilized by international relief organizations to offer humanitarian 
assistance.  They are characteristically likely to be older vessels equipped with their own 
rigging and have been refitted for dry cargo transport to austere accesses.  Such vessels, 
frequently providing assistance in undeveloped nations during times of peace or internal 
struggle, may offer 5,000 tons of humanitarian assistance cargo to be transported to 
austere accesses and are typically offloaded using a boom crane.  These ships also may 
offer medical staffing, supplies, and mobile hospitals.    
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B. SEA BASE CONNECTOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The Sea Base Connector (SBC) or Sea Base Connector System (SBCS) provides 
the following functions within the ROMO/ROGO.   
• Conduct Force Closure. Deploy from CONUS or a pre-positioned site in 
a JOA to another JOA in the required timeframe. Depending upon a 
SBC’s endurance, underway replenishment, and loading/unloading 
capabilities, it may close to an advanced base, Seabasing component, or 
directly to an improved or unimproved port or austere beach.  Navy 
Seabasing doctrine emphasizes the ability through employment operations 
to “maintain deployment momentum and to create multiple dilemmas for 
the adversary by utilizing simultaneous and/or force flows through these 
multiple entry points to provide more rapid buildup of combat power 
throughout the JOA” (DoD, JROC, 2007). 
• Conduct Maneuver Operations of the Joint Landing Force.  Provide 
the Sea Base simultaneous maneuver, maneuver support, and maneuver 
sustainment at the operational and tactical levels.  This includes linking 
with amphibious warfare ships to load assault or sustainment forces and 
deliver them directly to and from the objective port or beach.  This activity 
may include evacuating casualties, bulk liquid movement, or bulk liquid 
transfer systems.  The current logistics sustainment of the MEB is 
currently preferred to be accomplished via cargo-carrying aircraft (MV-22 
and CH-53K) to assist in the rapid maneuvering of the landing force 
inland; therefore, ongoing sustainment of material through surface 
connectors will likely be limited to heavy armor and bulk liquids or via 
available inland waterways.  The greatest sustainment challenge in any 
Seabasing ship-to-shore operation is the movement of liquids.  Bulk 
liquids potentially account for more than 75 percent of the tonnage moved 
ashore during a Sea Based operation (Department of the Navy, Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, 2005). This may be fulfilled by physical 
transfer of bulk liquids provided from the MPS(E) or CLF ships or may be 
done more efficiently through the transport of Offshore Petroleum 
Discharge Systems (OPDS) or Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer Systems 
(ABLTSs). 
• Transporting Personnel and Material between Sea Base Components.  
SBCs conduct personnel and material transfer activities to enable the 
preparation and sustainment of the landing force.  This activity may 
include transferring casualties to medically capable vessels or acting as 
intermediary transport of personnel, equipment, or cargo.    
• Transporting Personnel and Material between the Sea Base and 
Advanced Bases.  SBCs are tasked with transporting personnel and 
material to-and-from improved and unimproved SPODs within the JOA.   
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• Serve as a Common Intermediary Interface.  SBCs may transfer 
material and personnel between unimproved ports or austere beaches and 
those Sea Base components or SBC unable to do independently.  This may 
be accomplished by temporarily acting as a physical linkage between two 
non-interfacing platforms or austere port/beach. 
1. Austere Beach Access Sea Base Connectors Description 
a. LCAC/LCAC SLEP 
The LCAC is the default surface connector for existing and planned well-
deck ships.  The LCAC is the Navy’s primary means of transporting weapon systems, 
equipment, cargo, and personnel from ship to austere beaches.  The advantage of the air 
cushion vehicle is that it can access over 70 percent of the world’s coastlines, as 
compared with 17 percent for the conventional landing craft, at loaded speeds (60-ton 
nominal) in excess of 40 knots (Rivers, 2009).  A 75-ton overload condition allows the 
LCAC to operate at a reduced speed.  It operates independent of tide levels, water depth, 
underwater obstacles, and beach gradients.  With a one-way range of 50 nautical miles 
fully-loaded, its speed and beach access provides the ATF the greatest OTH opportunity 
to achieve Joint objectives of assured access and operational responsiveness.  The 
platform’s air–cushion capability allows it to avoid the buildup of troops and material in 
the surf zone by discharging cargo directly onto dry trafficable beaches.  With the current 
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) the LCAC inventory could be sustained at 72 
units in FY 2020, all of which will have undergone updated C4I system upgrades that 
enable future COTS equipment upgrades.  Only LCAC SLEP units will be operational 
within the 2020 period considered (Rivers, 2009).   
b. SSC 
The Ship-to-Shore Connector will replace the current LCAC capabilities. 
The SSC enhances the LCAC capabilities by providing a sustained speed in excess of 35 
knots in the loaded condition (74 STONS) in increased sea states (NATO 3-4) for 86 
nautical miles (Figure 11).  The SSC is planned to operate with the same footprint as the 
LCAC.  A highly anticipated feature of the SSC is the bow door/ramp system and the 
ability to un-gripe vehicles near shore that would improve the speed and security of an 
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OTH Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle debarkation or a rapid offload of existing or off-
the-shelf mechanized vehicles to the shore.  The planned fleet introduction of the SSC is 
FY 2014 (Rivers, 2009).   
 
Figure 11.   SSC model with LCAC enhancements.  Major technological 
improvements over the LCAC include improved payload capacity and range. (From 
Rivers, 2009, p. 28) 
In a Joint CONOPS STOM scenario of a moderate or greater threat 
environment the SSC will be tasked with deploying the heavier follow on forces from the 
ESG, MPS(E), or ATF to support the main effort.  If outfitted with a personnel carrier 
they can be used to evacuate up to 180 non-combatants or the wounded to the ESG or 
move additional forces across short spans of water such as a peninsula or island.   
b. T-Craft 
The Transformable Craft (T-Craft) will be capable of high speed inter-
theater deployment to the JOA in an unloaded condition.  Unlike the predecessor air 
cushion vehicles (ACVs) the T-Craft will be capable of self-deploying to long ranges 
(2500 nm) while possessing superior heavy lift amphibious beach landing capabilities 
than the legacy ACVs.  This revolutionary capability will be accomplished through a 
transformation of the craft from a high speed Surface-Effect-Ship (SES), which in 
combination with ACV characteristics enables high sea-state vehicle transfer, to an 
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amphibious craft employing heavy loads or vehicles on an austere beach.  The T-Craft 
could potentially physically interface at-sea with a LMSR, conduct vertical replenishment 
operations, conduct skin-on-skin crane operations with amphibious shipping, or offer a 
highly mobile and large area platform for military staging and integration or commercial 
TEU breakouts.  A generic ONR model of the T-Craft carrying an entire MEB Light 
Armored Reconnaissance vehicle company is illustrated in Figure 12.  Thsize and lift 
capacity of the T-Craft with a threshold lift capacity of 280 s-tons (4 M1A1 tanks) 
enables the employ-to-deploy strategy and offers cohesive elements of the MEB to be 
maneuvered and employed together. 
 
Figure 12.   A rendering of a concept T-craft.  This MCCDC illustration shows an 
idealized T-craft employment of a MEB LAR company. (From Booth, 2009, p. 12) 
The availability of a self-deploying high speed sea lift with a greater lift 
area and weight capability than legacy ACVs has the potential to release the true 
advantages of OTH operations.  The T-Craft will enable Seabasing employment and 
logistics out of the littorals and enhance operational and tactical surprise and flexibility.  





Figure 13.   ONR established proposal objectives.  This illustration highlights the 
general operational concept as provided in the initial ONR solicitation. (From 
Paulo, 2009, p. 5) 
c. LCU-2000 
The Landing Craft, Utility, 2000, is a medium sized self-deployable vessel 
that provides intra-theater movement of cargo and equipment (Figure 14).  The LCU-
2000’s shallow draft and bow ramp enable it to be commonly used for tactical resupply 
missions to remote, underdeveloped coastlines, and inland waterways or 
unloading/loading RO/RO vessels through Logistics-Over-the-Sea (LOTS) operations.  
The LCU-2000 modernization strategy plan includes improved C4ISR, force protection, 
fuel transfer upgrades and a SLEP to provide the enhanced capability by 2015 through 
2024 (U.S. Army Transportation Office, 2008). 
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Figure 14.   LCU-2000.  It provides a slow heavy lift container or vehicle transfer to 
shallow water austere ports or beaches. (From U.S. Army Transportation Office, 
2008, p. A–7) 
d. LSV 
The Army’s Logistics Support Vessel provides transport of combat 
vehicles and sustainment cargo to the JOA theater (Figure 15).  The LSV replicates many 
of the LCU-2000 functions; however, with bow and stern ramps it is particularly adept in 
RO/RO operations.   
 
Figure 15.   LSV.  It provides a slow moving heavy transport well suited for LOTS 
operations. (From (U.S. Army Transportation Office, 2008, pg, A–5)  
2. Austere Port Access Sea Base Connector Description  
JHSV The Joint High Speed Surface Vessel provides a self-deployable and rapid 
inter/intra-theater movement of personnel and equipment to an austere port.  The JHSV 
provides COCOMS a 35 knot intra-theater transport of over 600 tons of combat ready 
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units over 1200 nautical miles (Figure 16).  The JHSV contains a telescoping boom crane 
that enables it to move medium weight cargo (up to 13.5 tons at 15m) from its decks to 
the pier, a slewing articulated ramp, and an embarked helicopter detachment; thus, 
providing the unique capability of rapid cargo offload in an austere port with little or no 
infrastructure.  With a modicum of armament and ATFP weaponry the JHSV possesses a 
limited Joint Forcible Entry Operation capability, but its advanced C4I package enables it 
to coordinate directly with attached security forces.  However, it is capable of being 
equipped with an embarked helicopter detachment. 
 
Figure 16.   JHSV description and characteristics.  The JHSV will be well suited for 
austere port accesses with its slewing ramp, flight deck, and shallow draft. (From 
Austin, 2009, p. 16) 
The JHSV’s speed and load capacity enable it to maximize intra-theater lift 
to/from advanced bases or Sea Base components to the austere ports located in littoral 
battlefields or rivers to realize the Army’s deploy-employ strategy.  The JHSV is 
particularly well suited for tactical shore-to-shore movement of troops and vehicles 
through ports with limited infrastructure.  Advanced ramps currently being tested will 
provide a higher sea state interoperability with the INLS, LMCS, and RRDF that will 
greatly enhance the JHSV’s ability to delivery cargo and vehicles directly to austere 
accesses.    
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IV. OVERVIEW OF SEA BASE CONNECTOR CAPABILITIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Sea Base Connector System is an open system, with permeable system 
boundaries, and its functional and process requirements are defined by its external system 
interfaces.  These interfaces are defined by their exchange of input and output items, such 
as personnel, fuel, sensor data, etc, that occur at the boundary interface of the external 
and internal systems.  The SBCS’s functions and processes are evaluated by a set of 
measures-of-effectiveness and measures-of-performance/suitability.  The Sea Base, 
logistics support ships and bases, and combat forces were previously established as 
external systems.  While the actual Sea Base concept includes the surface connectors 
internally, they have been isolated as a cohesive group for the sake of this analysis.   
The Sea Base connector system is to be defined through Seabasing logistics and 
amphibious operations capability requirements across the range of military operations.  A 
closer examination of the Seabasing assembly, employment, and early sustainment LOOs 
was conducted as it was found that the highest level of concern and difficulty occurred 
within these coinciding phases. The provisional SBCS capability requirements were 
initially defined by the established JCIDS analysis of Seabasing and Army watercraft 
documents.  The Sea Base logistic and landing force capability requirements were each 
respectively captured by the supposition of the capability requirements determined in the 
Joint Seabasing JCD and the Army Watercraft FNAs.  
Joint Capability Integration Documents share common conceptual strategies and 
goal.  The two system capability assessments have been rigorously evaluated by their 
respective Joint or service and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC).  The Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) of each system was completed 
under the guidance of the 2005 Joint Chiefs of Staff document, Capstone Concept for 
Joint Operations, and the Joint Operational Environment, the World Through 2020 and 
Beyond.  The Joint Operational Concepts (JOpsC) document states the ultimate goal of 
the U.S. military forces is to accomplish the National Strategies through four Joint 
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Operational Concepts: Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations, Homeland 
Security, and Strategic Deterrence.  All future combat scenarios are cross-cut by the Joint 
Integration Concept (JIC), thus, the derived Joint and Service capabilities envision the 
Seabasing concept within MCOs and stability operations.  The stratification from 
National Strategy documents to the SBCS capabilities is illustrated in Figure 17.  In order 
to uncover the system capability requirements across the ROMO, variations to the 
Seabasing based MCO and the use complementary defense planning scenarios occurred.   
 
Figure 17.   Derivation of SBCS originating requirements.  This illustrates the 
stratification of SBCS capabilities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine and 
service capabilities assessments.   
B. SCOPE OF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Some Joint capabilities were excluded from the Sea Base Connector System 
capability analysis.  The largest capability exemption is the Joint forces vertical lift 
capacity.  This system was determined to be independent from the surface connector 
system, although vertical lift capabilities were assumed to fulfill some overlapping 
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Seabasing logistics and maneuver support capability requirements.  The mission 
capabilities and surface connectors of the special operations force were excluded under 
the assumption that the small group and clandestine mission scenarios would be more 
appropriate for vertical delivery or their own specialized high speed vessels.  Harbor 
clearance and salvage platforms were also excluded because Joint maneuverability 
concepts adhere to a common strategy of avoiding degraded ports.  Lastly, the Army’s 
Joint Logistics over the Sea capability was excluded until the early sustainment phase 
because of its slow and cumbersome logistical assembly and anticipated later availability.  
Applicable SBCS capabilities were also only evaluated through specific LOO phases.  
The Seabasing capabilities were defined over the spectrum of combat intensity as 
illustrated in Figure 18.  Desired external and internal system capabilities were evaluated 
within the scope of the assembly, employment, and early sustainment LOOs within a 
HA/DR operational concept.  Overall emphasis capitalized on the Sea Base’s OTH 
movement and maneuver capability enabling unopposed force employment at the beach.  
According to U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the most significant challenge for the 2020 
SBC system will be in the simultaneous employment and sustainment of combat forces 
ashore.   
There are limited connectors on the Sea Base and these same connectors 
have potentially competing demands based upon mobility needs, medical 
evacuation, ship-to-shore logistics, ship-to-ship logistics, and maintenance 
down time. (Department of the Navy, United States Fleet Forces 
Command, 2009) 
All significant cargo transfers of personnel, food, water, fuel/water, ordnance, 
infrastructure materials, and major end items will be included.  Late sustainment and 
reconstitute phases were not considered as it is assumed that mature infrastructure of at 




Figure 18.   Seabasing operational continuum.  Seabasing provides opportunities for 
scalable and responsive power projection (From Strock, 2007, p. 8) 
C. SYNTHESIS OF EXTERNAL SYSTEM CAPABILITIES 
The Joint Sea Base capabilities, while still evolving through Joint 
Experimentation efforts, have been initially established through the completion of the 
Seabasing JCIDS process.  The initial Seabasing Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) 
established a comprehensive list of necessary Sea Base capabilities through CONOPS 
analysis and wargaming insight.  The capabilities were based upon the CBA approach to 
MCO CONOPS outlined in the Seabasing JIC report version 1.0 and other defense 
planning scenarios designed to explore low conflict and peacetime Seabasing capabilities.  
A key characteristic of the JCIDS approach is to ensure adequate Joint representation of 
the inter-service stakeholders. 
Generation of the JCD Seabasing capabilities was accomplished through the 
active participation of multiple stakeholders in the CBA approach.  The JCD was 
validated and approved by the JROC through Initial Capabilities Document approval.  
Legitimacy of purpose of the required Seabasing Concept capabilities was achieved 
through comprehensive participation of the major and minor program stakeholders as 
listed below (DoD, JROC, (2007). 
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Major Stakeholders 
• Operational Commands 
• Joint Staff 




• Coast Guard 
• Functional Capabilities Board (JFCOM, TRANSCOM) 
• Secondary Stakeholders 
• Seabasing Studies, Analysis and Wargaming Division  
• Seabasing Working Group – OSD representatives 
1. Capabilities 
The comprehensive list of Seabasing capabilities generated in the Seabasing FNA 
was prioritized by the surveyed needs of the Combatant Commanders (COCOM) and the 
JCD functional capabilities board.  The priority capabilities were assessed on the 
perceived risk the gap posed to mission success.  The resulting prioritized list of thirty 
required Seabasing capabilities was used in this analysis to construct the SBCS 
capabilities from the Seabasing logistics and force projection viewpoint.  This list 
provides a Joint agreement of the Seabasing capabilities specific to the subsequent 
assumptions, risks, and constraints.  The capability gaps were ordinally ranked within 
each phase to determine their relative risk to mission failure.  This subject matter expert 
guidance was used to generate an input to the combined SBCS functional hierarchy and 
can be further used to weight the selected M&S MOE.  The top concerns that were 
centrally applicable to the SBCS were that: 
• The Joint force has limited C2 capacity, along with limited C2 and 
weapon systems interoperability to integrate into the command-
overall picture.    
• The joint surface connectors have insufficient throughput to supply 
forces operating ashore from advanced bases at extended distances, 
specifically  
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• an inter-ship equipment, cargo, and personnel transfer capability, 
• the quantity of air and surface connector interface points,  
• to distribute bulk liquids in quantities needed to support medium 
and heavy maneuver forces,  
• and the quantity of connectors that can meet the range, speed, and 
lift capacity required of the Sea Base’s sustainment distance. 
• The joint force lacks the ability to conduct forcible entry from 
OTH to austere entry points. 
• Current surface connectors do not provide adequate skin-to-skin 
transfer or platform-to-platform interfaces to support at-sea 
transfer required supplies and medium and heavy equipment within 
the current family of ships in SS2–SS4. (DoD, JROC, 2007) 
2. Assumptions 
The JCD Seabasing capabilities were generated from the Joint CONOPs and 
defense planning scenarios derived HA/COIN scenarios established from the JIC 1.0 
assumptions extrapolated to the 2025 timeframe.  The following assumptions were used 
in the development of the JIC; thus will provide the foundation for the SBCS architecture 
assumptions.  
• Reduced access to forward operations bases. 
• U.S. joint forces will be required to conduct operations in anti-
access environments. 
• CONOPS and force structure based on baseline security posture, 
defense planning scenario(s) and multi-service force deployment 
campaigns with the following deviations:  
• Seabasing will complement existing OPLANS, CONPLANS, and 
FUNCPLANS by reducing footprint at land bases, denying the 
adversary essential elements of friendly information, reducing 
transloads and minimizing in-route stops, and compressing 
reception, staging, onward movement and integration of joint 
forces. 
 53
• Future Seabasing systems, platforms, and capabilities will be 
employed (e.g.,, high-speed inter and intra-theater connectors 
(air/surface), selective off-load, etc.).  
• Key Seabasing elements will continue to be forward deployed or 
pre-positioned in accordance with current and future defense 
strategies. (DoD, JROC, 2007) 
3. Constraints 
In addition, to support the scope of the effort, SBCS CONOPS development was 
bounded by the following JIC considerations: 
• Examining an operational force capable of supporting four 
scenarios, including MCO, COIN, and Humanitarian Assistance 
(HA) Operations.  
• No specific force size has been established for these operations, 
however to support capabilities and CONOPS development, the 
JIC referred to the 2003 Defense Science Board task force on 
Seabasing that examined Seabasing in support of brigade-sized or 
larger combat operations.  (DoD, JROC, 2007) 
4. Risks 
In any operation, a variety of factors can pose risks to execution. These risks can 
be mitigated by accounting for them in advance and monitoring their feasibility through 
the analysis.  Many of these factors are common across most, if not all, operations. The 
following factors are considered in the JIC to have a great impact on Seabasing 
operations, and were thus directly extracted into the SBCS architecture.    
• Enemy anti-access capability—mines, missiles, aircraft, 
submarines, ships, and surveillance assets – threaten or delay the 
Sea Base’s ability to achieve maritime and air/space superiority.  
• Force protection assets supporting the Sea Base must provide 
sufficient protection for the Sea Base and employed forces.  
• Adverse weather conditions and sea state impact sea-based 
operations and affect the rapid build-up of combat power and 
timely sustainment of employed forces.  
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• Capacity, rate, and survivability of high-speed inter and intra-
theater connectors (air/surface) must be sufficient to provide for 
the timely closure, assembly and sustainment of the Sea Base. 
• Capacity, rate, and survivability of prime movers and connectors 
(air/surface) must be sufficient to provide for the timely projection 
and sustainment of necessary combat power ashore.  
• Range of operations can be affected by need for self-protection and 
the size, distance, and distribution of joint forces that need to be 
sustained.  
• Sea-based joint C2 is dependent on a secure, reliable, net-centric 
environment that supports distributed, on-the-move, over-the-
horizon (OTH) operations. Future treaties and international laws 
may impact Seabasing operations.  
• CONUS-based and forward land-based platforms/points of 
embarkation are vulnerable to terrorist attack. 
• Surface vessels have unique decontamination requirements when 
subjected to chemical/biological attack. (DoD, JROC, 2007) 
D. SEA BASE CONNECTORS  
The Army watercraft capabilities are derived from the functional area analysis of 
the transportation needs of the Army’s BCT based Modular Future Force.  Under the 
general the guidance of the Army Capstone Concepts, The Army in Joint Operations, and 
The United States Operating Army Operating Concept for Operational Maneuver, 
specific Army watercraft tasks were developed (Table 2).  In the FNA the Army 
watercraft tasks were evaluated by standards within the context of achieving FAA 
derived Joint capabilities and established transportation tasks.  The Army capabilities that 
were considered an essential foundation to Joint operations were Joint Command and 
Control, Battlespace Awareness, Assured Access, Operational Maneuver, and Distributed 
Support and Sustainment (U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, 2006).  The 
intent was to determine the existing and expected capability gaps of the focus areas and 
explore further research into necessary DOTMLPF changes. For the purpose of this 
research the developed Army watercraft capabilities were used to govern Army specific 
SBCS needs.   
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Table 2.   Army watercraft tasks.  An Army Functional Needs Analysis identified nine 
watercraft tasks derived from the Army Transportation FAA. (From U.S. 
Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), 2006, p. 7) 
The following Army stakeholders participated in the Army Watercraft FNA 
capability gap assessment including the development of the objective hierarchy 
weightings within the context of the BCT operating in the Joint Operating Environment: 
Army Stakeholders: 
• Army Combined Arms Support Command 
• Strategic Plans & Operations 
• Force Development Directorate 
• Material Systems Directorate 
• Concepts & Doctrine Directorate 
• Sustainment Battle Lab 
• Liaison Offices 
• Army Medical Department 
• Strategic Studies Institute 
• The Judge Advocate Legal Center and School 
• Army Test and Evaluation Command 
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1. Capabilities 
The comprehensive list of the JCIDS approved Army watercraft capabilities 
generated in the FNA was prioritized by CASCOM.  Additionally, the capability gaps 
were identified and prioritized to support FSA quantitative analysis and further decision.  
The prioritization by Army subject matter experts was used as input guidance to the 
combined SBCS functional hierarchy.  The weighted concerns from the Army Watercraft 
FSA are depicted in Figure 19, and should also be used to determine the weighting of 
appropriate SBCS MOE.  
 
Figure 19.   FSA capability-gap weight and priority.  This stakeholder input may be 
used to support the determination of a SBCS functional hierarchy.  (From U.S. 
CASCOM, 2007, pp. 2–1) 
2. Assumptions 
The Army’s watercraft FNA assumptions were representative of those highlighted 
in the Seabasing JIC, but emphasized an Army specific subset to create added value to its 
Future Modular Force concept.  The major assumptions that shaped the Army watercraft 
capabilities are as follows: 
• Opponents will rely on less expensive but still sophisticated assets 
that are plentiful, easy to operate, and difficult to detect. Shallow 
mines, patrol craft, vessel-borne improvised explosive devices, 
torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles will be effective weapons 
defending against U.S. naval forces.   
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• The Army will always conduct operations as an integrated 
component of a joint force and will thus depend upon the 
capabilities of the joint force. (CASCOM, 2006) 
3. Constraints  
To support the scope of the Army Watercraft Capability definition effort, 
CASCOM utilized the following considerations: 
• The Army’s Future Force relies upon its watercraft fleet as the 
primary means for operational maneuver to project combat power 
throughout the battlespace.    
• U.S. fleet’s primary future operating environment will be in the 
shallower waters of the littorals.  (CASCOM, 2006) 
E. SEA BASE CONNECTOR SYSTEM ORIGINATING REQUIREMENTS 
Synthesis of the SBCS’s originating requirements was conducted through the 
context of the phased lines-of-operations.  As previously discussed the emphasis of 
system requirements is upon closure, assembly, employment, and early sustainment.  
This was approach was taken to draw out the activity and interface requirements of the 
SBCS with specific regard to the T-Craft.  The single greatest critical operational issue, 
appropriately characterized by its mission performance and risk, is the ability of the Joint 
force SBCS to conduct simultaneous assembly, employment, and early sustainment 
operations in a major combat environment.  While it is understood that the LOO are not 
linear events, but are often simultaneous and reoccurring functions and activities, the 
originating requirements have been ordinally grouped within their respective phases 
where the majority of their activities are to occur.  This results in constraining the AO 
phases to distinguishable and measurable performance metrics.  However, in addition to 
the five LOO phases some specific capabilities were seen as overlapping at least one 
aspect of each function and were therefore included in a universal function and 
decomposing activities.  The phased SBCS originating requirements are included in 




The Seabasing JCD and Army Watercraft FNA provided an ordinal value to their 
respective system’s capabilities.  This was used to develop a notional SBCS objectives 
hierarchy to support the selection and optimization of the selected M&S MOEs (Figure 
20).  While the rigor of such assessments is unknown, they do offer valuable insight into 
the collective opinions of the Sea Base and Army Watercraft stakeholders.  Numerical 
weightings of the SBCS objectives hierarchy were avoided as to not convolute the 
outputs of two differing assessment methodologies and conceptual precepts.  However, 
the nature and the scope of stakeholder involvement in the Seabasing JCD with the 
definite overlap of senior Army staff preferences gives these capabilities precedence over 
that of the Army Watercraft FNA.  The intent of the Army Watercraft FNA capability 
was subsumed into the JCD where appropriate.   
 
Figure 20.   Sea Base Connector System Objectives Hierarchy.  This consolidates the 
weighted priorities of the stakeholder inputs discovered in an analytical document 
analysis 
Sea Base Connector System Objectives Hierarchy 
Joint & Multi-National C2 Capacity  
Surface Connector Throughput 
• At-Sea Transfer 
• Air & Surface Interface Points 
• Bulk Liquid Distribution to Support 
Medium/Heavy Maneuver Forces 
• Quantity of Connectors to Meet  Sea 
Base’s Sustainment Distance 
OTH Access to Austere Entry Points to Support Distributed 
Operations
At-Sea Interfaces to Support Transfer of Supplies and Medium/Heavy 
Equipment in SS4 
Rapid Shift of Combat Ready Units 
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V. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
A. BASIS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF 
MISSION SELECTION 
While the SBCS capability requirements previously determined reflected a Joint 
assessment throughout the ROMO/ROGO, greater exploration and concentration of such 
efforts and experimentation have focused on the Seabasing supporting a MCO.  An 
obvious demarcation within the ROMO exists between mission probability and threat 
level.  Through the author’s participation in Expeditionary Warrior 2010 wargame and 
ASNE’s High Speed Vessel Conference, a systemic shift of new Seabasing system 
acquisition interest towards supporting capability gaps within the high frequency and low 
threat missions was observed. The existing or planned acquisition of programs of record 
(JHSV, SSC, V-22 Osprey, and Joint Heavy Lift Replacement helicopters), near term 
realization of austere access enablers (INLS, LMCS, advanced JHSV ramp, and VTS), 
and the inherent limitations of MPS(E) emphasize less of a need for another surface craft 
directed at assault wave delivery of oversized vehicles.  Current Sea Base gaps and 
Seabasing ROMO/ROGOs illuminate best utilizing the T-Craft as a large and mobile 
assembly area that uses its space to capitalize on general functions such as logistics on-
load and breakdown, personnel and equipment integration, or housing modular Joint C2 
Modules (JC2M).  While this shift in focus is not unfounded from previous T-Craft 
workshop discussions, this research will not focus on the oversized vehicle/intact unit 
delivery of forces ashore in a MCO.  The HA/DR operation scenario was determined by 
the author’s wargame participation and conference de-briefing to most substantially strain 
the Sea Base and its surface connectors within the scope of the wargame.   
The premise of the Nigerian HA/DR mission, excerpted from Expeditionary 
Warrior 2010 wargaming, is to provide aid and support to thirteen cities within Nigeria 
that have been devastated by extreme flooding of the Nigerian delta and inland 
waterways (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 2010).  
The sheer magnitude of the total Nigerian aid, large regional separation between aid 
stations, and limited interior transportation networks requires a distributed network that 
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will surely strain the resources of the Joint and multinational forces.  This aspect must be 
considered in the M&S analysis through thoughtful limitations on the quantities of air 
and surface connectors, and at-sea availability of logistics vessels mobilized over the 
entire Nigerian coast to support both U.S. and multinational operations.  Additional 
considerations of each individual state’s need must also be accounted for.    
The situations for each state vary in their combination of access from the sea, 
threat levels, and the type and amount of need required.  While the mission subsists of 
thirteen tailored packages provided from Joint and multi-national forces, some 
originating from the Sea Base and others not, only two scenarios were developed and 
modeled.  The two most strenuous Nigerian government requests were to provide a 
tremendous and comprehensive amount of aid to the sea port city of Lagos and Delta 
state in uncertain threat environments with sensitivity to establishing a large coalition 
footprint.  Each modeled CONOPS offers different challenges that the author believes 
will capture the majority of SBCS operational requirements.  The humanitarian effort to 
Lagos poses a sea-lift capacity challenge in providing a tremendous volume of 
humanitarian aid cargo from the nearest supporting sea port of Lome that requires an 
approximately 140 mile coastal transit to the neighboring state of Tome.  The second 
scenario demands a balance between the limited maneuverability of surface connectors to 
areas affected by inland flooding and the expansive coverage area of a difficult terrain 
environment.  Each scenario can be described through a strategic, operational, and 
tactical level concept of operations. 
While the strategic and operational plans for such a multinational effort have not 
been made available in this analysis, EW10 participation and enclosed assumptions for 
general Seabasing CONOPS were used to roughly establish the strategic Joint and multi-
national force lay-down.  The HA effort by the U.S. is anticipated to be largely conducted 
by the Army, Navy, and USMC forces and relies heavily upon the prepositioned ASF and 
MPS forces, respectively.  From a broad strategic perspective the Army BCT and ASF 
forces are centrally tasked with providing requested HA support to the sea port city of 
Lagos primarily via coastal shipping channels provided from Lome, Togo.  Naval assets, 
to include the Amphibious Ready Group, MPS assets, and CLF vessels are positioned to 
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conduct assembly Seabasing operations outside of the Nigerian Delta and transition as 
needed along the coast to assist MN partners.  The SBCS platforms are appropriately 
distributed to their service components; however, Joint high speed surface connectors 
such as the JHSV and T-Craft are dispatched as necessary to support phase dependent 
requirements.  The viewpoints generated from the SBCS architecture’s operational 
domain captured the CONOPS.   
The operational concept is best depicted through phased diagrams and 
accompanying narratives.  As illustrated in Figure 21 the SBCS provides early transport 
services of intra-theater fly-in forces followed by at-sea reception and staging of supplies, 
equipment, and vehicles from prepositioned forces, CLF support vessels, and amphibious 
shipping vessels sequentially.  As shown, very few advanced shipping ports are available 
and most are degraded due to immense regional flooding debris.  Initial actions to 
accomplish Delta HA mission essential tasks are done through the at-sea preparation of 
food stores, infrastructure repair equipment and supplies, emergency medical facilities 
and supporting staff, and the military security personnel to achieve such tasks are 
assembled on austere access vessels.  The same HA/DR tasking is applicable to the Lagos 
assistance, but instead of a BCT staged for HA operations from the ASF vessels, it is 
provided from a sea port.  As high speed surface connectors are anticipated to reach the 
operational theater first they initially embark fly-in forces to primarily include the 
Riverine squadron personnel, supplies, and watercraft for later objective area 
employment security and NEO/SAR operations.  Within 18 -24 hours of arrival of the 
MPS vessels SBC enablers such as RRDFs in combination with INLS will further expand 
the large-to-small ship interconnectivity (Defense Industry Insider, 2009).  The majority 
of consumable HA cargo designated for Delta relief is provided initially from amphibious 
shipping and MPF assigned T-AKE vessels.   
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Figure 21.   Nigerian HA/DR OV-1 of assembly operations.  This depicts a strategic 
level operational view of the Navy forces operating at-sea and the Army assembling 
in semi-degraded ports and harbors. 
HA/DR employment activities consist of the SBCS transporting embarked Navy, 
MEB, and BCT units to the objective area’s austere accesses or degraded ports (Figure 
22).  Given the widespread flooding debris fouling the inland river waterways, only air-
cushioned vehicles or alike are considered capable of surface delivery to the disbursed 
IDP camps and villages of Delta state.  The majority of Delta state’s waterways with 
ocean access typically are draft limiting to 6.4 m and further inland access, primarily 
served by the Niger river, decreases to 2.5 m.  However, additional draft and hull form 
considerations should be made to compensate for rapid flow and debris.  Riverine units, 
in coordination with and under sustainment support of SBCs, provide local and regional 
transport of IDP, are the main thrust of SAR activities, and conduct civilian NEO 
operations.  Employment of HA goods and services to Lagos are accomplished through 
the transport of palletized cargo, equipment, vehicles, and personnel originating from port 
Lome.  The SBCS’s role in force projection in both scenarios consists of routinely 
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transporting the majority of security and aid distribution personnel to the Sea Base to 
minimize the military footprint ashore.  The specified SBCS tasking then phases from 
assembly/employment to early sustainment needs.   
 
Figure 22.   Nigerian HA/DR OV-1 of employment operations.  This illustrates a 
strategic level view of the Navy, USMC, and multinational forces conducting 
employment operations in support of Delta state.    
The beginning of sustainment activities are primarily distinguished by a shifting 
of operational activities to support HA cargo sourcing from a shuttle ship strategy 
conducted by amphibious shipping and MPF T-AKEs to a dependence upon NGO/GO 
commercial vessel sources.  These vessels are typically large to medium load-on/load-off 
vessels equipped with rigging adequate to unload/load cargo from their decks to austere 
ports or accesses.  These commercial container or break-bulk vessels are owned or 
contracted by government agencies or international crisis relief organizations.  Given a 
low sea state feasible of harbor or near shore operations these vessels are assumed to be 
capable of at-sea offload when coupled with surface vessels equipped with Dynamic 
Positioning Systems (DPS) or RRDF/INLS systems.  SBCS sustainment activities 
additionally shift to providing routine MEDEVAC transport to at-sea T-AH vessels or to 
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Sea Base assets and high speed surface connector activities in support of long range high 
priority transport of personnel, equipment, and repair parts to and from the Sea Base  
and the advanced base.  A graphical depiction of the sustainment CONOPs is shown in 
Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23.   Nigerian HA/DR OV-1 of sustainment operations.  This depicts the 
strategic level view the Joint and multinational forces conducting early sustainment 
operations. 
B. RESOURCE POOL ASSUMPTIONS 
The previously identified external systems and Sea Base connectors are assumed 
to be available to the COCOM for the HA CONOPS.  These are summarized in Appendix 
C to include recent Army and Navy watercraft service life modernization and acquisition 
plans (U.S. Army Transportation Office, 2008).  General assumptions were made for the 
initial locations of COCOM available assets, their anticipated transit times to include 
reasonable delay estimations in conducting pre-closure activities, and unit availability to 
determine an estimation of the force pool for the entire Nigeria HA/DR mission.  The 
time-phased force deployment lists for Seabasing forces that are applicable to the SBCS 
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analysis are shown in Table 3.  The assembly/employment LOO is presumed to begin 
with the arrival of the prepositioned forces and rapid fly-away forces.  While sustainment 
activities actually occur from Closure on, early sustainment is marked in this analysis by 
the completion of the Assembly specific activities particular to providing HA aid and 
equipment directly from prepositioned supplies and amphibious shipping.  The shift from 
Assembly/Employment activities to Sustainment activities is distinguished by the sources 
of HA aid transitioning from prepositioned assets, the initial CONUS load out of 
amphibious shipping, and assigned USNS shipping to a robust reliance upon MSC Sealift 
and NGO/GO commercial shipping vessels equipped for such operations.  The force mix 
available to conduct the Delta state and Lagos CONOPS scenarios should be judiciously 
selected given the difficulty of the Nigerian humanitarian assistance mission.   
 
Table 3.   Time-Phased Force Deployment of SBCS.  This table highlights the 
quantities and arrival times of the SBCS assets based upon prepositioning, 
Naval, anticipated deployment, availability, and transit times. 
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C. MISSION OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
While the types of aid for the ports are similar, the quantity of aid, available 
objective infrastructure, and access to the region vary greatly.  Port Lagos has open 
access from the sea, and although initially very much restricted by flooding and debris, it 
can be logistically provided through a neighboring state sea port and directly from the 
sea.  Both scenarios occur at an escalated threat level due to local internal strife and 
regional religious extremism targeting western nations.  The Nigerian state of Delta is not 
accessible via the port of Sapele and thus access to the numerous Internally Displaced 
Person (IDP) camps and towns affected by widespread flooding from the Niger and 
Escravos rivers must occur from their flooded banks or vertical lift where available.  The 
following city specific task requirements in Table 4 and amplifying scenario information 
provided in Appendix B.  Design Reference Mission  was excerpted from the EW10 
Player Book (USMC Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010).  



































X X X X X X X Uncertain 
Table 4.   Selected SBCS scenarios for the MBSE approach.  Two scenarios within the 
context of the entire Nigeria HA/DR mission offer the best requirements 
determination of the SBCS. (After USMC Wargaming Division, Marine 
Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010, pp. 4–6) 
Operational activity modeling was used to define the Sea Base mission tasking 
and derived SBCS tasking details to include what types of cargo or personnel were to be 
transported and standard MOE/MOP particular to those tasks.  The provided scenario 
tasks, MBSE requirements-to-activity tracing of the SBCS, and operational activity 
decomposition dictated the following specified and unspecified essential mission tasks 
for the SBCS: 
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Provide Delta State Assembly/Employment 
• Palletized Consumables 
• Provide Infrastructure/Engineering Repair 
• Provide Medical/Veterinarian Support 
• Provide Force Projection Support 
• Provide NEO/SAR Support 
 
Provide Delta State Sustainment 
• Palletized Consumables 
• Containerized Consumables 
• Force Support 
• MEDEVAC 
• Priority Transport 
The MBSE approach also allowed verification that every operational activity was 
assigned to an operational node and that it was capable of conducting the supporting 
functions.  The UJTL provided an initial humanitarian assistance mission template that 
was modified as shown in Figure 24 (CJCS, 2003).  This template was segmented 
between general Seabasing activities and those that significantly impacted the roles of the 
SBCS.  These general operational activities were linked to intermediate CONOPS 
defined essential tasks and then further reduced to their tasking requirements.   
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Figure 24.   Humanitarian Assistance Mission Operational Activity Template.  The 
UJTL provided HA template provided the initial scope of an operational activity 
description. 
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A sample of a single derived SBCS operational activity hierarchy is shown in 
Figure 25.  An operational activity decomposition tree was constructed from mission 
essential operational tasks to service specific tasks (Appendix G.  Operational Activity 
Heirarchy Descriptions).  Each specified universal or service specific task and 
MOE/MOP was defined for further operational analysis determination of the most 
appropriate SBCS or single platform measurement criteria given the scope of analysis 
and model parameters.  Table 5 shows a single Army Tactical Task (ART 6.1.6) specified 
from the Army task list.  The operational activities hierarchies, complete with 
requirements and guidance references, are best viewed in the CORE© application.    
 
Figure 25.   SBCS operational activity decomposition of “Provide Delta Food, Water, 
& Medicine” (Portion of the OV-5).  The atomic-level operational activities provide 
service specific descriptions of the cargo class and appropriate MOE/MOPs.  The 
blue and green coding indicates distinct service specific Navy and Army tasking, 
respectively.  
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ART 6.1.6 Provide Personal Demand Items (Class VI): Coordinate and provide personal 
demand items, such as health and hygiene products and nonmilitary sales items (FM 10-1) 
(CASCOM). 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has the necessary class VI supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for class VI supplies before it can 
conduct its mission. 
03 Time Required to develop or update plans to establish support operations 
after receipt of warning order. 
04 Time To develop concept of support sustainment requirements after 
receipt of warning order. 
05 Time To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels of supply in AO. 
06 Percent Difference between planned and actual demand by supply line in 
AO. 
07 Percent Of class VI supplies available in AO compared to requirements. 
08 Percent Of replenishment stocks delivered on time in AO. 
09 Percent Of shortfalls in class VI supply in AO that have acceptable 
alternatives. 
10 Percent Of required class VI supplies in AO delivered. 
11 Percent Of planned class VI supply support achieved in AO. 
12 Percent Of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in 
moving class VI supplies. 
13 Number Of days of class VI supply stockpiled in AO to support campaign. 
14 Number Of days of sustainment supply in AO supported by available 
facilities. 
15 Number Of tons per day of class VI supply in AO delivered to operating 
forces. 
Table 5.   Sample ART “Provide Personal Demand Items (Class VI)”.  The size, weight, 
and loading considerations for each cargo class can be further considered for 
SBC Transport. (After Department of the Army, Headquarters,  
2003, pp. 6–11) 
D. SYSTEM BOUNDARY THROUGH AN EXTERNAL SYSTEMS 
DIAGRAM 
1. External Systems 
The Sea Base connector system boundary was defined both operationally and 
physically.  The operational boundary is defined through the operational node interfaces.  
The operational nodes participating in the HA/DR mission are illustrated in Figure 26.  
The operational nodes are considered to be static during the phases evaluated.  In peace 
time operations some surface connectors such as the JHSV and T-Craft will likely be 
under the authority of TRANSCOM, but operational control will be shifted to a subset 
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operational node within the Joint Operational Commander’s authority during wartime and 
contingency operations.  During the context of foreign humanitarian assistance the SBCS 
operational activities will be conducted within the authority and control of the Joint 
Operational Commander.  As a result the operational architecture domain consisting of 
the operational nodes, or better understood as organizational leadership, and the mission 
essential operational activity occurs entirely within the Joint Operational Commander’s 
(JOC) operational domain.  Additional operational node hierarchy diagrams of the SBCS 
nodes can be found in Appendix E.  Operational/Physical Context Diagrams (OV-2, SV-
1, and SV-3a). 
 
Figure 26.   Operational Nodes Required of a Humanitarian Assistance Mission.  The 
complex operational and administrative organization was decomposed and modeled 
to determine the Seabasing system communication and load transfer interfaces.   
The physical humanitarian assistance Seabasing system as a whole was divided 
into four systems within this analysis; the Sea Base, to include advanced bases, surface 
vessels, and the objective’s austere accesses; the landing force system composed of the 
Army BCT, USMC MEB, and the Navy NECC assets; the commercial vessels system; 
and the surface connector system Figure 27.  The high level interface interconnections are 
HA Mission Operational Needs 
Civil-Military Operations Center Secretary  
Joint Operational Commander 
U.S.-Nigeria Ambassador 
Intl. Relief Agency Leaders 
Secretary of State 
Host Nation Ambassador 
Joint Special Operations Component Commander 
DART Team Leader 
President of Nigeria 
Transportation Command 
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representative of physical and communication linkages through systems to their sub-
systems.  It is within these physical linkages between system elements that is a concern of 
the SBCS and will ultimately define the key interoperability standards and requirements 
of each system.  Compatibility within the SBCS was not evaluated as each system 
element was considered independently capable from one another in conducting its 
operational activities.    
 
Figure 27.   Viewpoint of the humanitarian assistance response systems (SV-1).  
Further detailed modeling indicated the required interface linkages between the 
SBCS and external systems that required load exchange resource exchange 
modeling.  Note that the commercial shipping system I/F does not occur until the 
commencement of sustainment operations. 
2. System Boundaries  
The SBCS operational nodes resemble the organizational hierarchies of the 
Navy’s ATF and the regional MSC’s COMLOGEUR/CTF-63 structures.  Figure 28 
depicts the general logistics need-lines that encompass C2, logistics, force application, 
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battlespace awareness, and force protection requirements.  Its purpose is to track the 
exchange resources from specific operational nodes that play a key role in the 
architecture.  Each operational node of this architecture, such as the regional MSC 
Commander, COMLOGEUR, coincides with an organization and is assigned to directly 
provide or support specified HA/DR operational activities.  Within the phases evaluated 
all SBCs have linkages with afloat Seabasing assets and objective accesses or port, but 
only the JHSV or similar craft link with advanced bases.  The need-lines are further 
disaggregated into physical and informational linkages to better describe connections 
between their sub-system elements.   
 
Figure 28.   The Joint Operational Commander’s Organizational Model (OV-2).  It 
was determined that that the assessed SBCs operated within the operational 
responsibility of the JOC.  The physical elements of the operational nodes are 
included.   
The following figure illustrates the linkages between the SBCS and their external 
systems for assembly, employment, and early sustainment phases of the Delta state 
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HA/DR scenario.  Each link is derived from an operational need within the CONOPS and 
further justified and defined through the SBCS requirements and general performance 
objectives.  Figure 29 identifies the required links between the SBCS and the Sea Base 
system.  Again, emphasis is placed upon the physical load transfer connections and not 
C2 aspects, although generally included.  Additional system view diagrams are found in 
Appendix E.  Operational/Physical Context Diagrams.   
 
Figure 29.   General linkage description between the SBCS and external Sea Base 
systems (SV-2).  Each physical linkage was evaluated to model the load exchanges 
occurring at-sea, in ports, and austere accesses.   
3. Operational Resource Flow Requirements 
A key aspect of defining alternative SBCS is to identify and define operationally 
required physical connections to enable further M&S efforts.  The OV-2 details the 
resource exchanges and relevant attributes of the exchanges.  It identifies who exchanges 
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what resources, with whom, why the resource is necessary, and how the resource 
exchange must occur.  Each before mentioned physical linkage aggregates multiple 
physical exchanges.  Figure 30 is an OV-2 tree diagram of the essential mission task 
“Provide Consumables” that illustrates the resource flow from provider to consumer and 
in some cases the intermediary platform and physical connection method used to conduct 
the exchange.  Each essential mission task within the phased operational activities was 
diagrammed to assist in identification of deficient resource exchange capabilities.   
It must be noted that not every physical connection is necessary or preferred and 
is highly dependent upon coinciding vessel functions such as conducting flight deck or 
well-deck operations.  The logistics distribution and deployment strategy used from the 
large vessel to SBCs also has a large impact on which interconnection is utilized.  







Figure 30.   Assembly resource exchange diagram of provide consumables to Delta 
state (OV-2).  Existing and assumed load exchanges were modeled to define 
potential paths for SBCS loading and unloading.  The dashed lines indicate a 
redundant physical interface that would be likely inferior to alternative exchange 
methods unless strategically advantageous.  
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VI. SBCS FUNCTIONAL MODELING 
The SBCS’s functional modeling was generated keeping continuity with the 
amphibious operation’s lines-of-operation nomenclature (Figure 31).  The analytical 
review of Seabasing guidance and doctrine supported application of the same five LOO 
to missions-other-than war and provided descriptions that aided in functional flow 
modeling of the Seabasing elements.  The assembly and employment functions were 
modeled as independent functions.  Functional modeling of the sustainment LOO 
duplicated the assembly and employment functions, but included tailored sustainment 
operational activity inputs, constraints, mechanisms, and outputs.  The resulting 
functional modeling could be applied to any scenario given the context of the HA/DR 
CONOPS.  While the operational activity to functional modeling was not modeled one-
to-one, every function supported at least one essential mission task or supporting task.  
Functional modeling emphasis was placed upon load exchanges and not upon SBCS 
communication or self-defensive systems.     
 
Figure 31.   Functional Decomposition of Conduct Amphibious Operations.  
Assembly, Employment, and early Sustainment operations were further evaluated 
to determine the SBCS operational activities. 
Figure 32 illustrates a high-level view of the assemble function that includes in-
port and at-sea load exchanges and supporting functions.  Assembly functions were 
constructed to align with the assembly CONOPS phase operational requirements.  
Supporting functions include establishing a docking interface, establishing generic load 















storage or seating, removing those load exchange interfaces, and then undocking.  Load 
exchange functions were selected to capture the large quantity and diversity of SBC load 
exchange interfaces, loading rates, and storage/seating capacities required to interoperate 
with Seabasing platforms and provide discernable points to conduct dynamic analysis.    
The employ the force function includes transporting the secured items to or from 
the objective area and the same previously described load exchange functions (Figure 
32).  However, objective access loading functions were constrained by limitations that 
would be evident in Delta state’s flooding crisis (i.e., not offering pier services or pier 
rigging).  Additionally, transit functions were decomposed to capture operational area 
limitations of the SBCs in accessing navigationally fouled or draft limiting waterways.   
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Figure 32.   Modeling of SBCS “Assemble the Force” function (left).  Modeling of 
“Employ the Force” function (right).  Further decomposition provided detailed 
functional mapping and M&S insight. 
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A. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION OVERVIEW 
Functional modeling was created using Integrated Definition language zero 
(IDEF0) methodology.  Functional input and output items represented essential mission 
task loads such as vehicles, personnel, palletized cargo, or ammunition.  Potential 
input/output items that would require special loading, storage, or seating considerations 
were selected.  Functional controls and mechanisms were detailed to establish some of 
the known modeling constraints and scenario specific SBCs performing the function, 
respectively.  Each load exchange function was decomposed to a level that ultimately 
revealed a generic physical connection type such as providing or receiving a ramp or 
crane.  The intent of the LOO FFBD was to simplify the complex distribution activities to 
a manageable and repeatable process better adapted to simulation modeling. 
While each function was described using a basic functional flow body-
diagramming (FFBD) format, even at the intermediate decomposition level modeling 
required great system articulation as it grew greatly in complexity.  Such modeling is the 
desired result of dynamic M&S analysis and can only be accomplished by further 
developing the scenario details and SBCS configurations.  The generated IDEF0 models 
and item definitions, included in Appendix J.  System Functionality Description (SV-4), 
are intended to provide an elementary functional description applicable to the defined 
SBCS components in a HA/DR mission context.  The majority of the functional 
diagramming is best viewed digitally through the CORE© database or digital documents.     
B.  ASSEMBLY AT-SEA IDEF0 MODELING 
The scope and complexity of the functional decompositions do not lend 
themselves well to viewing by the reader.  However, a few sample descriptions of a key 
SBCS functionality, load at-sea, are highlighted and discussed below in Figure 33.  The 
function 2.5.1, “Establish an at-sea Load Interface,” makes the input items capable of 
being transported at-sea through the establishment of a physical load exchange interface.  
A cursory examination reveals that an at-sea load interface is established for the essential 
mission tasking transport of consumable cargo, MEB force units, infrastructure repair 
items, medical and veterinarian support units, and Riverine units from the Sea Base by 
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the SBCS.  Additionally, personnel recovered from NEO objectives ashore have been 
positioned to on-load onto a Sea Base platform.  Its sub-functions are performed by the 
2020 legacy JHSV, SSC, and LCAC SLEP surface connectors. 
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Figure 33.   IEF0 modeling of the assembly function “Load at-Sea” (Level 2).  
Detailed descriptions of the SBCS’s inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms 
provided insight into the load requirements of each connector. 
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Figure 34.   IEF0 modeling of assembly “Load at-Sea” (Level 4).  A detailed IDEF0 
description provided descriptions of load resource exchange interfaces between the 
SBCS and external systems. 
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An at-sea load exchange interface can be created by the Sea Base connector or for 
it.  Figure 34 above, “Receive at-sea Interface,” is the lowest decomposition level of 
function 2.51 with the Provide at-sea Interface being an equivalent.  This decomposition 
level provides atomic level functions required to receive at-sea load exchanges such as 
Receiving Well Deck Operations or Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP).  For example, 
the input item “Delta Force Units,” composed of heavy construction vehicles, equipment, 
supplies, and munitions have the opportunity to be transferred via well deck operations, 
heavy-lift helicopter VERTREP, or MLP supported flexible docking for SSC/LCAC.  
Again, the legacy SBCs that support each function are identified.  Such modeling will 
provide standardized and repeatable constraints to measuring the completion of 
operational activities.  Equivalent modeling to depict essential mission tasking specified 
in sustainment operations was generated and analyzed in the same way. 
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VII. CONCEPTUAL PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
ALTERNATIVES 
A. OPERATIONAL CONOPS ASSUMPTIONS 
A determination of feasible Sea Base surface connector system alternatives 
requires detailed strategic and operational concept-of-operations development.  The 
multitude of at-sea load exchange interfaces available to the SBCS to conduct essential 
mission tasks and undefined future logistics strategies necessitate refinement of HA/DR 
Sea Base operations and tactics to further evaluate potential surface connector systems.  
As previously discussed, Naval assets are assumed to be tasked with HA/DR support of 
Delta state and are supplemented with MSC assigned vessels such as the JHSV and T-
Craft.  The operational characteristics of these vessels and those whom source provided 
goods, services, personnel, and support define the SBCS alternatives.  The operational 
CONOPS utilized in this assessment, drafted by the author from Seabasing war fighting 
doctrine and wargame implications, should be considered a proximate solution to 
defining the SBCS alternatives that meet requisite mission essential tasks (USMC 
Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010).  Applications of the 
Sea Base in HA missions and resulting Joint sanctioned operational or tactical level 
CONOPS are either classified or non-existent given the scope of this analysis. 
Operational level assumptions to supplement the broader CONOPS assumptions are 
further highlighted in Appendix K.  Alternative SBCS Configurations for the Operational 
CONOPS.   
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE ASSESSMENT 
The objective of SBCS alternative configuration assessment is to determine the 
key T-Craft capabilities required to enhance the capability of the currently planned 
system.  Evaluation of the SBCS utilizing only 2020 legacy components provides a 
baseline to justify any further acquisitions to enhance operational effectiveness.  The 
following steps were used to determine potential T-Craft variant SBCS configurations: 
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1. A thorough review of the SBCS’s operational activity decompositions 
(OV-5), resource exchange diagrams (OV-2), and a defined set of 
operational level assumptions that complement the operational overviews 
(OV-1) respective to the assembly, employment, and early sustainment 
phases was conducted.  It provided insight into the initial SBCS 
configurations.    
2. The author determined potential ideal interfaces using these diagrams and 
assessment tools by evaluating potential at-sea load exchange interfaces 
that met the operational activity requirements and planned or existing 
physical system interfaces.  This is highly dependent upon operational 
strategies utilized in deploying unprecedented amounts of cargo and 
personnel at sea, but the traditional or intended roles of the watercraft or 
enablers were incorporated into each operational strategy.  For instance, 
the SSC/LCAC is ideally suited to service amphibious shipping and yet 
have an extended role of servicing MLP load exchanges.  The JHSV 
follows operational concept principles implying its use as a long range and 
high speed medium lift transport.   
3. After determining the T-Craft variant(s) with the higher likelihood 
of maximizing at-sea throughput for each essential mission task, the 
legacy SBC watercraft and their complementary roles to fulfill the mission 
task were assessed and noted.  Additional configurations exist that 
justifiable shift the SBCS’s roles to legacy craft, but given the essential 
mission tasking those selected should be evaluated foremost (Annotated in 
Appendix K).     
4. Lines-of-operation specific T-Craft variant capabilities were then 
combined to meet the SBCS requirements for the assembly, employment, 
and early sustainment phases.  
Through evaluation of the resultant configurations it becomes evident that this is a 
cyclical process that advocates further justification of operational and tactical CONOPS 
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assumptions.  Inclusion of the T-Craft in the SBCS alters traditional and planned at-sea 
logistics distribution doctrine; therefore, evaluative metrics will be satisfied through one 
or more combinations of a logistics distribution strategy fitted with the most suitable 
operational and tactical strategies and alternative T-Craft variants.  For example, the 
elimination of the SBCS’ MEDEVAC and priority transport role resulting in a dedicated 
JHSV transport could allow the distribution of such duties to shuttle T-AKE, amphibious 
shipping, or even to operations not considered in this analysis such as the improved long-
range lift capacity of at-sea VSTOL assets.   
1. Legacy Baseline Alternatives 
All phased assembly and employment operations were achievable through 
employment of the unaccompanied SSC/LCAC combination from amphibious shipping 
or the MLP; however, not every combination was ideal.  Some combinations were found 
to constrain support of the NEO/SAR activities.  Regional utilization of the JHSV in 
assembly/employment provides high speed transport and austere access of early response 
forces within the JOA such as the NEO/SAR and security supporting Riverine squadrons 
that would be otherwise unavailable.  The JHSV also provides valuable helicopter 
personnel transfer functions, with obvious C2 implications also, that are valuable to 
spearhead local small boat NEO/SAR efforts.  With the exception of providing force 
projection, limited by heavy vertical lift only vehicle transfer requirements, each essential 
task was potentially benefitted by the addition of the JHSV to complete a SSC/LCAC 
SBCS in assembly/employment phases.  The JHSV and LCAC platforms also offered at 
least feasible solutions to meeting early sustainment resource exchange requirements.     
The early sustainment operations of providing consumable items (palletized & 
containerized) and force support were seemingly achievable by the SSC/LCAC 
combination.  However, the movement of personnel required from austere objectives 
accesses to medical platforms and non-emergency transport among Sea Base platforms 
required a SBC with the ability to at least conduct helicopter landings and take-offs.  
Sustainment operations with legacy SBC platforms are characterized by an increase in 
connector roles for the SBCs as the dependence upon the JHSV’s embarked helicopter 
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and open ocean transfer capabilities increase to provide a high speed line-of-
communication between the Sea Base and the advance base.  The burden of Sea Base to 
objective load transport is still held with the LCAC/SSC but increasingly reliant upon Sea 
Base enablers such as the MLP and INLS.  A coarse evaluation of the early sustainment 
legacy SBCS reveals that the JHSV and SSC/LCAC configuration continues well suited 
to meet the directed tasks, but ability of this SBCS to meet logistics throughput 
requirements is highly questionable.   
2. T-Craft Variant Alternatives 
The addition of T-Craft variants increases the complexity of evaluating the 
effectiveness of each within the legacy SBCS.  Available surface connector enablers such 
as the INLS and MLP act as intermediaries between the SSC/LCAC and other MSC 
platforms, but the load exchange interoperability between the enablers and the T-Craft 
are yet defined.  One of the major assumptions are that an at-sea load exchange from a T-
Craft ramp will restrict simultaneous SSC/LCAC operations with the available beam of 
the MLP and to a lesser degree the INLS.  These factors are dependent upon many T-
Craft specifications such as the T-Craft size and mooring line requirements.  
Additionally, the long and precarious transit into flooded inland waters results in a long 
duration round-trip transit for the SSC/LCAC boat group and T-Craft.  Alternatively, the 
relatively faster loading/unloading operations of the SSC/LCAC with the Sea Base may 
allow the avoidance of conflicting operations with different SBC watercraft.  Three T-
Craft variants with independent capabilities were considered to have niches within the 
existing legacy SBCS capabilities.   
Three variations of a “standard” T-Craft were evaluated within the operational 
CONOPS.  An at-sea load exchange interface of a standard T-Craft allows a bow ramp 
connection with the INLS and RRDF combinations in moderate sea state.  Mutually 
exclusive variants to the standard T-Craft include the same functionality with the 
following additions: 1) Side-ramp or bow/stern ramp interface with an LMSR, 2) 
VERTREP without the ability to launch or recover helicopters, 3) and improved DPS 
capability allowing skin-on-skin transfers with vessels capable of at-sea crane operations.  
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Further inclusion of the UHAC as an alternative displacement craft showed to be fruitless 
as it was determined to be incapable of transport into flooded inland waterways, but the 
platform characteristics should prove significantly beneficial in open ocean transport 
operations into Lagos.  A single T-Craft variant was not determined capable of meeting 
all essential task transport requirements alone in the assembly/employment phases.   
Key VERTREP and amphibious shipping well deck interoperability prevented 
any one T-Craft variant from feasibly achieving all resource exchange requirements.  The 
JHSV continued to be irreplaceable in its NEO/SAR role and the LCAC/SSC was 
essential in extraction of heavy lift cargo from amphibious shipping at-sea.  The T-Craft 
variant required for each task was appropriately complementary to the designated roles of 
the SSC/LCAC.  The two alternative SBCS configurations were characterized by the 
VERTREP or LMSR capable T-Craft variants.  The VERTREP capable T-Craft 
configuration was best suited for the assembly/employment phases.  It relied upon the 
SSC/LCAC for heavy infrastructure equipment and vehicle lift from the MPS(E) and 
LMSR that was already necessary or ideal.  Alternatively, a T-Craft variant configuration 
with a direct side/stern ramp to the LMSR well complemented the SSC/LCAC also.  
However, this comes at the expense of setting up and conducting extra intermediary 
operations with SBC enablers.  These enablers, the RRDF/INLS and MLP, allow the T-
Craft and SSC/LCAC the ability to remove palletized consumables from the amphibious 
ships and T-AKE, respectively.  As the surface vessels and resource inputs of the non-
SBCSs transitioned to support early sustainment operations, the ability of the T-Craft 
variants within the SBCS to meet those requirements also changed.      
Two potential T-Craft variant defined SBCS configurations, the DPS and the 
direct LMSR gate connection capable vessels, surfaced from the sustainment phase 
assessment with equal prospect.  In order to meet the priority and MEDEVAC transport 
mission tasks, each variant was considered to also complement the SSC/LCAC and JHSV 
SBCS.  Inclusion of the JHSV was required to provide high-speed open ocean transport 
of passengers and embarked helicopter operations that are only suited for the JHSV 
platform within the SBCS.  A DPS T-Craft variant SBCS configuration allows removal 
of palletized and containerized cargo from the primary providers, commercial LO/LO 
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ships, in the harbor or cleared river outlets without conflicting with concurrent INLS 
offloads from their sterns.  A DPS T-Craft also supports amphibious shipping and T-AKE 
pallet transfer operations at sea.  However, this configuration requires any removal of 
vehicle items from the LMSR to be enabled by a MLP or RRDF/INLS at-sea which may 
better be used as a dedicated asset to container offload.  A secondary configuration 
characterized by the T-Craft capable of a direct LMSR connection was feasible.  The T-
Craft would be designated to provide force support stock from the LMSR and 
containerized consumable offload from the MLP or RRDF/INLS.  This configuration 
requires that the SSC/LCAC be primarily dedicated to the at-sea exchange and transport 
of palletized consumable items.  An at-sea connection with these varied providers 
requires considerable availability of the MLP for at-sea crane operations from the LOLO 
vessels and the T-AKE.  These connections with the MLP are potentially restricted by sea 
state.  The resulting phased SBCS alternatives were synthesized to provide a combination 
of robust T-Craft variant alternatives. 
A combination of the phased T-Craft variant SBCSs results in four combinations:  
1) direct LMSR side/stern port connection only, 2) VERTREP capable with a DPS, 3) 
VERTREP capable with a direct LMSR side/stern port, 4) or direct LMSR side/stern port 
connection with DPS.  All combinations are illustrated in Figure 35.  However, the last 
alternative may possibly offer redundant functionality between phased mission tasks.  
These variants would supplement the 2020 legacy JHSV, SSC, and LCAC SLEP 







Figure 35.   Prospective T-Craft Variants.  The resulting variants complement the 
legacy SBCS and provide a potential throughput improvement and greater 
functional capabilities throughout the assembly, employment, and early sustainment 
phases.  (Images from Main, 2010, pp. 45–67) 
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The physical manifestation of the Seabasing Joint Operational Concept has 
gradually taken shape through recent Joint acquisitions.  These pieces, whether they are 
the MSC’s T-AKE fleet or MLP, or the Army and Navy variants of the JHSV, or the 
USMC’s V-22 Osprey, have continued to define the Sea Base and allow progressive 
development of the Seabasing operational concept through the range-of-military 
operations.  In the progressive conceptual development of ONR’s transformable craft 
sponsored research the T-Craft program lead inquired to the identification of the physical 
connections, thus the platform’s Seabasing interoperability characteristics, which would 
distinguish it among the future Sea Base surface connectors.  Given such a 
transformational technology, it became evident that for continued success of the T-Craft 
acquisition program, the “who, what, when, where, why” and most importantly “how” 
the T-Craft would have to be formulated.  Such questions may only be answered by 
taking a mere representative slice of an application of the Joint Operational Concept for 
Seabasing.  This required the development of an operational concept that further derived 
a potential operational and physical SBCS architecture.  This analysis has provided but 
one outcome of the T-Craft’s at-sea interoperability characteristics, even to be further 
refined and possibly corrected through M&S, which will establish a foundation for 
further conceptual development. 
Research questions were initially established to further the conceptual 
development of the Transformable Craft within a Sea Base Connector System.  The 
following is a review of those questions.      
• What are the mission, originating, and system requirements for a SBC 
system? 
• What is the objectives hierarchy of the SBCS as seen from the primary 
stakeholders?  Who are the stakeholders? 
• What are the appropriate Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for the SBCS 
mission requirements?  
• What are the appropriate Measures of Performance (MOPs) for the SBCS 
requirements? 
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• What is the operational concept of the SBCS over the lines-of-operation?  
How are surface connectors being used?  What are the operational 
activities of the SBCS?   
• What are the internal and external interfaces between SBCS elements? 
• What is the functional behavior of the SBCS? 
• What are the alternative families of SBCSs and their associated 
performance tradeoffs?  
Each question was answered in detail within this thesis or appendixes.   
The mission, originating and system requirements for the Sea Base Connector 
System were derived from Joint Seabasing doctrine and the assessed capability needs of 
Army watercraft.  Joint Seabasing capabilities typically included objective and threshold 
values and were often characterized as surface connector requirements for all Seabasing 
assets that could ultimately be allocated to task specific load requirements for each 
connector Army watercraft capabilities were integrated to emphasize maintaining 
deployment momentum and force maneuverability (Appendix A.  Sea Base Connector 
System Capabilities). 
An objectives hierarchy of the SBCS was developed by converging the prioritized 
watercraft capability requirements as seen by major and minor stakeholders.  The Joint 
Seabasing stakeholders were identified as a focused grouping of combattant commands, 
operational commands, and service commanders along with other minor Seabasing 
analysis groups.  The Army watercraft stakeholders were identified as CASCOM, Army 
Strategic Plans and Operations, and other associated analysis directorates.  The 
encompassing SBCS objective heirarchy list was generated: improving Joint and 
multinational C2 capacity, maximizing connector throughput, increasing OTH access to 
austere entry points to support distributed operations, improving at-sea interfaces for 
transfer of supplies and medium/heavy lift in SS4, and the ability to rapidly shift combat 
ready units.   
The Sea Base Connector System measures-of-effectiveness and perfomance were 
linked to commensurate Seabasing and Army watercraft MOE/MOP and their parent 
Joint tasks.  Appropriate SBCS MOE/MOPs were directly applied from overarching 
seabasing MOE/MOPs and again from the lowest level MOE defined by the Army and 
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Navy service specific tasks.  Directed tasks, originating from a Uniform Joint Task List 
(UJTL) operational humanitarian assistance template, were decomposed from operational 
activities into their respective Joint and inter-service military tasks to provide lists of 
relevant and operationaly valuable metrics (CJCS, 2003).   
A potential SBCS operational concept over the Seabasing lines-of-operation was 
determined from its directed and implied operational tasks in a HA/DR CONOPS to 
determine the simplest use-case.  The simple use-case was progressively expanded to 
encapsulate the most complex scenarios.  The simplest use-case for the SBCS was at-sea 
loading of cargo from CLF ships and deploying that cargo to shore facilities.  This use 
case was expanded to eventually include the exchange of objective area personnel to and 
from the Sea Base.  The CONOPS was guided by the humanitarian assistance template 
derived UJTLs.  A MBSE approach to define a hierarchy of each service’s operational 
tasks and appropriate measures-of-effectiveness (MOE) was used to simultaneously 
define the functions necessary for their fulfillment.  While numerous Joint and 
multinational strategies to achieve the HA/DR tasking exist, a holistic view of these 
combined tasks and the limitations imposed by the crisis was used to formulate an 
operational plan of Seabasing activities.  To quantitatively evaluate the capability of the 
SBCS the generic scenarios were applied to a Navy and USMC relevant and significant 
mission.  
The lessons and the general strategic plan discussed in the Expeditionary Warrior 
2010 war game’s HA/DR mission provided a general description of anticipated Joint and 
multinational operations. The HA/DR CONOPS utilized in this analysis offered 
numerous scenarios differing by geographic limitations, local threat, and crisis severity 
across the entire coast and inland waterways of Nigeria, but a single  scenario with  
accompanying constraints and assumptions was used to capture the bulk of LOO-phased 
SBCS capability requirements.  The author derived operational and tactical level scenario 
descriptions and use cases to allow proportional adjustment of the Sea Base’s resources 
available in the selected scenarios with respect to the entire Nigeria crisis response and a 
potential description of T-Craft tasking within the SBCS.  While such operational 
analysis through potential scenarios is useful in constraining operational variables and 
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defining performance requirements, it needs to be highlighted that these detailed 
activities are highly dependent upon the strategic, operational, and tactical plans and 
assumptions generated by the author.  Although the basis for such strategic plans and 
assumptions are referenced in Seabasing doctrine and validated through USMC 
wargaming, the 2020 HA/DR Sea Base is still yet an evolving concept and specific 
operational plans are not publicly available.      
A context diagram was created to describe the high-level interfaces between the 
SBCS and external systems.  Through an extension of the context diagram, the 
architecture environment to include the internal and external interactions was described 
within the context of a general Seabasing mission.  This operational view provided the 
broad overview of the inter-service contributions and their required mission tasks in the 
HA/DR campaign while foreshadowing the general assumptions of the CONOPS.  Such 
analysis shaped the fundamental descriptions of the SBCS, external systems, and their 
interfaces.  The interfaces were decomposed to physical and informational linkages that 
better defined the future necessary standards and external system interoperability 
considerations.  As emphasis in this analysis was upon the physical linkages, it was a 
concern to develop and describe the external Sea Base load exchange links (Appendix E.  
Operational/Physical Context Diagram).   
The author developed the functional behavior of the SBCS from the operational 
scenarios.  Stated HA/DR tasking was decomposed, guided by the military task list(s) 
refining the operational activities, to define the necessary SBCS functions.  IDEF0 
modeling and FFBD modeling provided a means of decomposing the functions of the 
SBCS to appropriate levels while simultaneously allowing them to be traced to the 
operational activities hierarchy.  From the operational scenarios, the data list of inputs, 
controls, mechanisms, and outputs of the SBCS’s top-level functions were determined to 
model the conversion of the external Sea Base system’s provided resources, to be 
consumed by the objective area system and vice-versa (i.e., delivering food to Lagos or 
civilian MEDEVACs to advanced base).   
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Alternative configurations of the SBCS were developed given the established 
HA/DR CONOPS.  Through the scope of the assembly, employment, and early 
sustainment phases it was determined that the baseline SBCS configuration of LCAC 
SLEP, SSC, and JHSV met the functional requirements.  However, through high level 
analysis possible advantages and disadvantages of an additional T-Craft variant were 
highlighted.  The recommended system alternatives were as follows: 1) direct LMSR 
side/stern port connection only, 2) VERTREP capable with a DPS, or 3) VERTREP 
capable with a direct LMSR side/stern port.    
A. KEY POINTS  
The author is sensitive to the notion that not understanding the problem renders 
any effort impossible to solve it.  This research’s conceptual context was drawn from 
numerous Joint military Seabasing integration documents and joint experimentation to 
construct a feasible humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operational concept and 
coinciding requirements for further trade-off analysis of the T-Craft.  While supporting 
Joint Seabasing references provide a general seabasing strategy, the operational concept 
and tactics employed by the U.S. Joint and multi-national forces are much more uncertain 
and naturally scenario specific.  Therefore, the author has attempted to minimize the 
likelihood of implementing a problem without a needed solution by adopting a relevant 
and significant CONOPS from Joint Seabasing experimentation.  Further analysis should 
be constantly aware that the prescribed operational and tactical level assumptions are 
merely assumptions and should be altered through trade-off analysis.  This would 
consequently shift any underlying SBCS configuration assumptions as the system 
recalibrates to optimally balance the altered tasking. 
Quantitative analysis of at least three T-Craft functional load exchange variants 
within the established architectural framework is recommended.  Cursory qualitative 
analysis has provided feasible SBCS configurations that not only describe the physical 
platforms, but also a noted and illustrated shifting of operational load transport tasking 
within the system.  The operational and physical viewpoints of the 2020 SBCS have been 
developed through the professionally recognized and powerful system architecting tools 
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of DoDAF 1.5 and documented in CORE©, thus may easily be adopted and adapted as a 
foundation for a simulation based trade-off study.  In review of the recommended system 
alternatives, 1) direct LMSR side/stern port connection only, 2) VERTREP capable with 
a DPS, or 3) VERTREP capable with a direct LMSR side/stern port, the author has noted 
possible advantages and disadvantages that a high-level top-down analysis would allow.   
A T-Craft enabled with a direct LMSR port connection that does not require an 
intermediate connection is likely the most technologically achievable variant solution.  It 
offers a greater throughput probability in the assembly phase and from the prepositioned 
LMSRs heavily laden with the resources needed for a quick response by the assembled 
early response security forces, medical teams, and engineers.  However, its interfaces 
with the amphibious shipping and T-AKE provisions require painstakingly slow and 
awkward usage of MLP platform that would burden routine well deck and flight deck 
operations.  However, this T-Craft variant could potentially offer a transformative 
sustainment solution of offloading palletized or containerized HA consumables from the 
Ready Reserve’s LMSRs when combined with onboard MHE or LVSR trucking.  This 
capability would presumably complement the same held by the MLP, yet offer a more 
flexible and maneuverable capacity for at-sea RSOI or direct objective delivery.   
The DPS and VERTREP enabled T-Craft will likely provide the greatest diversity 
in load exchanges without disrupting coinciding surface connector operations that makes 
it likely the most robust solution.  It includes the same benefits of the afore-mentioned T-
Craft variant, but is increasingly dependent upon dynamic positioning system and 
possibly stabilized crane technology that are still being developed.  It offers to greatly 
increase the throughput capacity of LMSRs, LO/LO vessels, and amphibious ships by 
offering an alternative cargo removal method through skin-on-skin crane operations that 
do not disrupt stern port/gate operations with the MLP, RRDF/INLS, or LMCS.  Also, a 
VERTREP capable T-Craft poses the least amount of disruption to palletized consumable 
distribution methods heavily utilized by amphibious shipping and T-AKE vessels.  
The advantages of a T-Craft equipped with a VERTREP capability and a direct 
LMSR side/stern port coincide with that of the DPS and VERTREP variant, except the 
over-dependence of all the SBCs and enablers utilizing the source vessel’s stern port may 
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conflict to effectively reduce load throughput.  This would likely be more evident during 
the LMSR and LOLO vessel offload during the assembly and sustainment phases.  The 
point is moot if all LMSR logistics operations are centrally fixated on the VTS-to-MLP 
interface or a side port interface with the T-Craft is also possible.     
An alternative T-Craft variant not evaluated, but divulged itself in the assessment, 
was a T-Craft with the ability to launch and recover H-60 aircraft or alike would 
significantly increase its range of capabilities.  This added ability could justify the 
substitution of the T-Craft in many essential tasks constrained to the organic helicopter 
capable JHSV.  The utilization of this variation of the T-Craft for tasking requiring 
sustained helicopter support would rely upon ESG/CSG based or foreign military aircraft.  
This was not included in this analysis as a dedicated flight deck crew and flight deck 
requirements seemed to overburden the “aircraft light” and minimal manning model.     
The core facets of the SBCS architecture, operational and functional models, 
create a foundation for further analysis.  The generated operational activity model 
provides a scalable and easily implemented foundation for any Joint humanitarian 
assistance mission that envelops the current precepts of the Joint Operational Concepts.  
Additionally, the functional and physical models of the system architecture are equally 
transferable to other naval amphibious operations.  While the functional modeling 
techniques used will likely not transfer directly to a M&S interface, it does provide an 
input/output and constraint defining roadmap to the SBC physical load exchanges in a 
recurring and easily duplicated structure that can be quantitatively evaluated.  The 
included physical and capability descriptions of the Sea Base connectors define their role 
within the system and their relative stakeholder importance that provides insight into 
system MOE weightings.   
B. AREAS TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH 
The intent of this research was to enable further analysis of the T-Craft within the 
Sea Base connector system and is but one product of a top-down analysis.  It offers an 
example of a proven methodology that validates the premise for further derived detailed 
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analysis.  This SBCS architecture has established the following framework and 
justification to enable further research of the T-Craft: 
• Strategic and operational level CONOPs descriptions  
• Notional Seabasing element quantities and characteristics 
• Operational activity modeling and objectives hierarchy 
• Identification of approved MOE & MOPs 
• Functional modeling 
• Physical Modeling 
Established models are recommended to assist in the tailoring of M&S software 
tools appropriate to complex systems-of-system logistics distribution analysis.  NPS’s 
MOVES Institute’s 2007 efforts in detailed logistics modeling of the Sea Base using 
NSS/COMBATXXI/SIMKIT/DIS tool kit is apt for HA/DR and surface connector system 
adaptation  (Brutzman, Buss & Blais, 2004).   
Without further mission analysis, these efforts to develop an architecture for the 
Navy centric humanitarian assistance mission set should be perceived as bisecting the 
entirety of the SBCS architecture.  Full comprehension of the T-Craft’s requirements 
definition will be better understood through continued development of the HA/DR 
mission from an Army conceptualization and a MCO mission set.  A comparable set of 
Joint SBCS CONOPS and architecture of MCO should be completed and furthered in 
M&S analysis.  This would offer exploration of the SBCS configuration from the Army 
centric CONOPS and the rigorous and intense demands of high frequency and heavy-
armor vehicle lift capacity required of a JFEO.   
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APPENDIX A.  SEA BASE CONNECTOR SYSTEM CAPABILITIES 
The Sea Base Surface Connector System capabilities were derived from two 
JROC source documents.  The Seabasing JCD capabilities relevant to the surface 
connector system were attributed to its capability portfolio.  Not all Seabasing 
capabilities are directly applicable to the SBCS as some are generic requirements of the 
Sea Base concept, but should provide M&S objective MOEs that are valuable to 
Seabasing stakeholders.  Applicable SBCS capabilities ranged from supporting Sea Base 
command and control, logistics distribution, and force application of Joint and 
multinational forces.  Any acquisition to close SBCS capability gaps is assumed to be a 
Joint program; therefore, the author felt it was important to subsume the Army’s 
watercraft capability gaps provided in the Army Watercraft FNA.  These capability gaps 
provided a perspective relevant to forces that are primarily concerned about force 
application in a threat environment.  Again, all capabilities based analysis documents are 
established on a common JROC approved process.  All capabilities assigned to the SBCS 
were aligned to the current 2009 draft of the Joint Capability Area to provide 
categorization and emphasize a Joint interest in future acquisitions.  At the current time, 
the Joint and inter-service task lists were not yet directly aligned to the tiered levels of the 
JCA, but were instead done so in the CADM operational activity analysis. 
The SBCS capabilities continued the AO phase organization provided within the 
Seabasing JCD.  Additionally, supporting capability gaps that were relevant to all phases 
































































Table 6.   LOO Phased SBCS Requirements  
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APPENDIX B.  DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION  
The following is a direct excerpt from the Expeditionary Warrior 2010 player 




• Multi-National Humanitarian Task Force (MNHTF)  
• DoS Lead, DoD supporting  
2. Scope of Effort 
Plan to conduct relief operations until the Host Nation, United Nations, U.S. 
GOV, Non-GOV and International Relief Agencies get in place and are ready to fully 
support relief efforts.  
3. Scenario Context  
• Spring 2020: Exceptionally heavy rains across the Gulf of Guinea region 
during the first half of 2020 lead to widespread flooding and damage 
throughout Nigeria’s southern, coastal regions. This year’s flooding is 
worse than normal. Across the coastal region, flooding resulting in: loss of 
life and the spread of waterborne diseases; displaced tens of thousands of 
people; and damaged crops, roads, bridges and other infrastructure. Poor 
sanitation and drainage is affecting the clean water supply in many areas. 
The Government of Nigeria (GON) and international aid agencies are so 
far able to manage the situation, but strained resource capabilities are a 
growing problem.  
• June 2020: A slow moving front moved through the Bight of Benin region 
of Nigeria and into Benin. Seventy-two hours of torrential rain caused a 
second wave of severe flooding -particularly along the Ogun River 
system, in the southwest region, and throughout the Niger Delta, in the 
south-south region. Total affected population is estimated to be 3.3 million 
people spread across 13 states. Flooding is the worst seen in living 
memory. Seventy-five percent of the city of Warri is under 2-3m of water 
and large portions of Lagos are under water. Drainage from inland water 
moving downstream is likely to raise water levels in coastal regions and 
along the Niger River. Reservoirs and lakes are filling to capacity. Cases 
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of disease and infections are rising throughout the southern region. 
Waterways are clogged with debris making transit hazardous (Figure 36 
and Table 7).  
• Looting, crime and ethnic violence are on the rise as the Nigerian military 
and security forces cope with this emergency. AQIM is claiming 
responsibility for a string of attacks against non-Muslim Nigerians and 
foreign relief workers. GON is seen to be slow in responding in some 
areas. MESS filled the public service vacuum in many areas by providing 
aid, services and security. MESS is also conducting an information 
operations (IO) campaign against the GON.  
• The GON and international aid agencies are not able to handle this crisis, 
causing the GON to actively seek global support. Other neighboring 
African states have also been affected by heavy rains and flooding and are 
not able to assist.  
• Multinational Humanitarian Task Force, termed Combined Support Force, 
assists the GON conducting Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Relief Operations throughout the coastal region of southern Nigeria.  
4. General Situation and GON Requirements 
 




Table 7.   Quantities and Descriptions of the Affected Nigerian State Populations 
There are 80+ local and international NGO / PVO organizations active in Nigeria 
supporting relief efforts.  A Civilian-Military Operations Center (CMOC) has been 
previously established in Lagos, but the increasing scale of multi-national involvement 
and severity of the crisis has already surpassed the limited facilities available to support 
the necessary coordination and communication.    
GON requires:  
• Medical / Veterinarian supplies and services  
• Water and food supplies; water purification  
• Shelter, Clothing, Hygiene supplies  
• Power generation and Fuel  
• Infrastructure repair  
• Transportation (Air, Ground, Sea)  
• Air & Seaport repair and Control 
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a. Southwest Region Situation and GON Requirements 
  
Figure 37.   Affected areas of the southwest region 
 
Table 8.   Quantities, Descriptions, and Threat Environment of the Affected Nigerian 
State Populations 
• GON & NGOs running IDP camps.  
• GON & NGOs responsible for distributing supplies from distribution 
centers to population.  
• GON requests the following assistance shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9.   State Specific FHADR Needs Requested 
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b. Southeast and South-South Regions Situation and GON 
Requirements 
 
Figure 38.   Southeast and South-South Nigeria Crisis Assessment and Straight-Line 
Distances 
 





• GON & NGOs running IDP camps.  
• GON & NGOs responsible for distributing supplies from distribution 
centers to population.  
• GON requests international assistance to take over relief efforts in Benin 
City until international NGOs and GON can take over.  
• GON requests the following assistance shown in Table 11. 
 
 
Table 11.   Quantities and Descriptions of the Affected Population  
in the State of EDO and Benin City 
• GON is lacking resources and manpower to effectively manage the 
situation in Benin City.  
• GON requests international assistance to take over relief efforts in Benin 
City and Edo State until international NGOs and GON can take over.  
• Establish and sustain IDP camps to support 14,500 people for 30 days 
until GON and NGOs can effectively take over.  
• Deliver food, water, medicine, shelter and other supplies.   
• Provide veterinary and medical services. 
• Repair damaged infrastructure / general engineer support.  
• Distribute supplies and services throughout Edo state until GON and 
NGOs can effectively take over.  
• Evacuate 1,100 people from flood areas.  
B. GENERAL THREAT  
• Biggest threat to foreign relief workers is from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM). 
• AQIM will look for targets of opportunity against foreign workers and 
military personnel.  
• All threat groups are stealing / hijacking relief supplies.  
• All threat groups will avoid confrontations with host nation forces above 
squad strength.  
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• MESS and other groups will monitor and assess foreign forces’ TTPs, 
ROE, etc.  
 
Figure 39.   Scenario Threat Situation 
C. AIRPORT AND SEA PORT STATUS 
• Air Traffic Control Radars in Lagos, Ilorin and Port Harcourt down 
because of storm damage, flooding, absent personnel, power outages, or 
possible computer network attacks. 
• Runways in Lagos & Niger Delta regions closed or degraded by debris on 
runway, flooding/mud, temporary IDP camps. 
• Port of Lagos closed. 
• Port of Warri closed – severe flooding; heavy amount of debris in main 
channel. 
• Port of Sapele closed – heavy amount of debris in main channel. 
• Port Harcourt port operations degraded. 
• Port of Calabar fully operational 
• Autonomous Port of Cotonou, Benin, closed 
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Figure 40.   Scenario Airport and Sea Port Status 
D. NIGERIAN NAVY  
• Navy facilities at Lagos damaged 
• Navy facilities at Calabar operational 
• Operational Vessels and Craft 
• 1 x Frigate 
• 1 Corvette 
• 2 x Minesweeper 
• 3 x Fast Missile Craft 
• 4 x Ocean Patrol Craft 
• 1 x Coastal Patrol Craft 
• 12 x Patrol Boats 
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• 1 x LST 
• 5 x Log / Support ships 
E. MISSION STATEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS 
In accordance with all the relevant UN General Assembly Resolutions, MNHTF 
supports the Government of Nigeria in order to provide aid and assistance to the affected 
populations of the coastal region. 
1. U.S. Security Agreement 
• U.S. forces (USF) operate in support of NAF command 
• Authorized Operations : Train NAF and police, and participate in 
combined exercises and conduct FHA/DR 
• USF may not undertake any operations outside those listed 
• USF utilize existing Nigerian military bases; airfields; ports, civilian ports 
and airfields and can construct temporary HA/DR support facilities 
• Article 98 in effect (Bilateral Immunity Agreement) 
• USF under U.S. legal jurisdiction 
2. Multinational Security Agreement 
• Other multinational forces operate in support of NAF command 
• Authorized Operations: Train NAF and police, and participate in 
combined exercises and conduct FHA/Dr 
• OMNF may not undertake any operations outside those listed 
• OMNF utilize existing Nigerian military bases; airfields; ports, civilian 
ports and airfields and can construct temporary HA/DR support facilities 
• OMN equivalent to Article 98 
• OMNF under OMN legal jurisdiction 
F. EXECUTIVE OUTLOOK 
In 2020, Nigeria is the second most powerful economy on the African continent, a 
leading African military power and a demographically diverse nation. Nigeria gets 95% 
of its revenue from oil exports, although industry only consumes 10% of its labor force. 
Oil wealth, a surge of development loans from China; India; and the West, and a 
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concentration of political and economic power in a few hands make Nigeria one of the 
world’s most corrupt nations. Nigeria’s Armed Forces (NAF) are among Africa’s best 
equipped and trained troops, deployed to multiple United Nations peace-keeping 
operations. Demographically, Nigeria has a population of 179 million people – this is 
Africa’s largest population. Nigeria has over 250 ethnic groups; each group divided into 
multiple tribes and sub-tribes. The four main ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, 
Igbo and Ijaw.  
 
Figure 41.   Nigeria 
Each of Nigeria’s four main ethnic groups congregates in specific geographical 
areas, but has representation throughout all of Nigeria’s major cities. The Hausa-Fulani 
dominate northern Nigeria and control Nigeria’s economic, military and political life. 
The Yoruba primarily reside in the southwest. Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous city (18 
million) is in what Yorubans call Yorubaland. Politically, Yorubans follow the political 
elite in the nearest city. The Ijaw reside in the Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria. The Ijaw 
are consistently at odds with the government of Nigeria (GON) over oil revenue 
distribution, leading to militant attacks against Nigeria’s oil industry. Finally, the Igbo 
primarily live near Enugu and the areas just north of the Niger Delta. During the 1960’s, 
Igbo officers of the NAF rebelled against the Hausa-Fulani dominated government and 
military. These officers started the Biafra Separatist Movement, which the GON put 
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down by 1970. All four ethnic groups continue to fight amongst themselves and against 
each other, causing levels of violence in Nigeria to remain elevated – even during times 
of stability.  
Nigeria’s social situation remains unstable with a growing youth bulge, urban 
sprawl and poor health. Nigeria has over 100 million people under the age of 64 and a 
population density rate of 150 people per square kilometer. Most Nigerians live in 
densely populated urban centers along the coast – which is under constant threat of 
flooding due to its low-level to the sea. Additionally, urban centers lack economic 
opportunity; regular sewage, electricity and other infrastructure; and security and public 
health services. Nigeria’s cities are prime locations for criminal; terrorist; and militant 
recruitment, gang activity, and disease outbreaks.  
Although Nigeria faces multiple challenges from corruption, violence and societal 
and infrastructure dilapidation, the country is stable in 2020. It is working with the U.S. 
and other multinational countries in security force assistance; maintains diverse economic 
relations with many countries, to include the United States, China, India, South Africa 
and the United Kingdom; and is striving to consolidate leadership of a Pan-African role 
on the global stage. 
G. OVERVIEW  
Decaying infrastructure, especially acute in cities, is one of the deficiencies that 
Nigeria’s Vision 2020 policy seeks to address. Currently, few roads are capable of 
supporting much beyond a standard, compact car, only 40% of the population has access 
to electricity; 72% to acceptable drinking water, and only Lagos and Abuja have 
workable sewage systems. The government is attempting to repair the country’s poorly 
maintained road network. However, a continued short-fall in available funds means that 
repairs are slow and ineffective. Nigeria’s railroads are also deteriorating, causing the 
GON to ask for Chinese loans to repair and expand the system. The government is also 
pursuing a strategy of total port privatization. By granting concessions to private port 
operators, the Nigerian government hopes to improve the quality of port facilities and 
operations. Because of strong worker protests and strikes, privatization of ports and other 
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transportation infrastructure is slow. Nigeria’s airports and civil aviation system have a 
poor reputation for efficiency and safety, and government-owned Nigerian Airways is 
struggling. In 2015, rumors suggested the GON considered a private-public joint venture 
with either South African airlines or China Air. 
 
Figure 42.   Nigerian Interior is Primarily Inaccessible by Vehicles from the Coast 
1. Health 
The poor condition of health and health care in Nigeria are two of the factors 
responsible for an average life expectancy of only 47 years. Poor overall living conditions 
are another factor. In 2019, only 72% of urban residents and 49% of rural residents had 
access to safe drinking water. Only 48% of urban residents and 30% of rural residents 
had access to adequate sanitation. Many Nigerians devote one to three hours of their day 
to the chore of collecting water for domestic use. In addition, the incidence of human 
immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) is very 
elevated. As of the end of 2019, about 7 million Nigerian adults had HIV/AIDS, 
representing a prevalence rate of 4 percent. During 2019, about 310,000 Nigerians died 
from HIV/AIDS. Tuberculosis, polio and malaria also pose challenges. In 2019, the 
World Bank found that Nigeria had the third highest TB burden in the world and the 
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second highest in Africa. In 2017, Nigeria accounted for 63% of polio cases worldwide. 
No improvement was registered in 2019, when polio cases rose to 801. Malaria remains a 
serious problem, with 3 million cases and 6,000 related deaths in 2019. 
General Data: Health 
• Total: 99.52 deaths/1,000 live births 
• male: 104.44 deaths/1,000 live births 
• female: 88.38 deaths/1,000 live births 
• Life expectancy at birth 
• total population: 47.44 years 
• male: 46.83 years 
• female: 48.07 years 
• Total fertility rate: 5.45 children born/woman 
HIV/AIDS 
• deaths: 310,000 
• Major infectious diseases 
• degree of risk: very high 
Food or Waterborne Diseases: 
• bacterial and protozoal diarrhea 
• hepatitis A 
• typhoid fever 
• vector borne diseases: malaria 
• respiratory disease: meningococcal meningitis 
• aerosolized dust or soil contact disease: one of the most highly endemic 
areas for Lassa fever 
2. Community and Ethnic Violence 
Nigeria has many cultures, constituting several different communities. 
Communities, from small villages to large urban areas can have any number of ethnic 
groups residing in them. As a result of historical tensions between competing ethnic 
groups, internal community violence is a persistent concern. Community violence can 
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also flare because of differences in economic practices, such as farming vs. ranching; 
landowners vs. workers; and community access to oil resources 
Insurgencies/Terrorist Groups 
The Movement for the Emancipation of Southern States (MESS) 
• Formation: Summer of 2015 
• Goal: Political party and opposition group 
• Political platform: democratic reform, anti-corruption and better 
representation and recognition of Southern Nigerian economic, social, 
environmental & ethnic rights and concerns. 
• Support: The MESS has a growing popularity that cuts across socio-ethno-
economic-religious demographics in the 19 southern states, Abuja and 
amongst Southerners living in the north and Southern Nigerians living 
abroad. 
• Leadership: former Governor of Lagos State and former vice president. He 
is a popular public figure with a clean record; a firm believer in the 
democratic process; and wants to reform Nigeria. 
• 2017 establish MESS Vigilante Force (MVF) 
• MVF description: MVF is designed to augment local law enforcement 
activities in the south and is composed almost exclusively of Western 
trained former NAF and police personnel. The MVF is registered with the 
GON and benefits from the British government’s Security Justice and 
Growth Program. 
• For more detail see Threat Overview 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
• Goal: establish an Islamic state in Nigeria as part of the ultimate goal of an 
Islamic state across the entire Trans-Sahel region and the Islamic 
Caliphate. 
• Operations: IED attacks, suicide bombings, assassinations and 
kidnappings against foreign civilian and GON targets. 
• Force: 2,900 operatives 
• Support: Muslim gang members and disaffected youths living in the urban 
slums of Lagos and Ibadan. 




The Nigerian Port Authority is responsible for managing Nigeria’s ports, which 
have fallen behind international standards in terms of the quality of facilities and 
operational efficiency. Recognizing that the government lacks the funding and expertise 
to modernize facilities and to run the ports efficiently, the NPA is pursuing partial port 
privatization by means of granting concessions to private port operators. Under the terms 
of concession agreements, the government has begun to transfer operating rights to 
private companies for 10–25 years without relinquishing ownership of the port land. 
Nigeria’s principal container port is Lagos Port, which consists of separate facilities at 
Apapa and Tin Can Island and has a rail connection to points inland. Lagos Port, which 
has a container handling capacity of 22,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), handles 
two-thirds of Nigeria’s non-oil trade. The main petroleum outlets are Delta Port 
Complex, including Burutu, and Port Harcourt, a transshipment port located 66 
kilometers from the Gulf of Guinea along the Bonny River in the Niger Delta. Relatively 
modern and efficient onshore and offshore terminals managed by multinational oil 
companies handle most oil and gas exports. 
 
Figure 43.   Nigeria’s major ports normally operational 
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2. Inland Waterways  
Nigeria has 8,600 kilometers of inland waterways. The most important are the 
Niger River and its tributary, the Benue River. The Niger Delta makes up 7.5% of 
Nigeria’s land mass covering over 70,000 sq km. The delta is series of interconnected 
rivers, canals and creeks. Since 2010, Nigeria has invested heavily in the dredging of 
important waterways to improve access to inland ports and cities. Pollution of waterways 
remains a major issue for Nigeria. In the Niger Delta extreme erosion and water pollution 
go hand in hand, especially around large cities like Port Harcourt and Warri. Water 
deterioration severely reduces the population’s access to fresh, drinkable water. In 
Nigeria’s southwest, continued water shortages, with poor water management, pollution 
and erosion around Lagos and other major cities, threatens the long-term stability of the 
public’s health. Additionally, only 72% of the population has access to acceptable water 
and only Abuja and Lagos have a community sewage system. Outside of these two cities, 
48% of the population has access to some kind of sanitation facilities. 
 
 
Figure 44.   Nigeria waterways 
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All Year Traffic4 
• Benin River: Access via Escravos River navigable up to Sapele / Channel 
width no further info (NFI) x 6.1m deep; can handle ships up to 500ft in 
length with a 4.9m draft. 
• Escravos River: Channel Width NFI x 30m deep. 
• Forcados / Warri Rivers: Access via Escravos or Forcados River navigable 
up to Warri / Channel width NFI x 11.5m deep; can handle ships up to 
500ft in length with a 6.4m draft. 
• Niger River: Navigable from Warri to Baro / Channel width 100m x 2.5m 
deep. 
• Bonny River: 66km upstream from coast to Port Harcourt / Channel width 
NFI 10+m deep; can handle ships up to 500ft in length with a 9m draft. 
• Cross River: 47km upstream from coast to Port of Calabar / Channel width 
NFI x 11m deep; can handle ships up to 500ft in length with a 9m draft. 
 
Seasonal Traffic5 
• Ogun River: Channel depth 2.5m (rainy) and 1m (dry) 
• Osun River: Channel depth 2.5m (rainy) and 1m (dry) 
• Osse River: Channel depth 2.5m (rainy) and 1m (dry) 
• Benue River: Channel depth 3m (rainy) and 2m (dry) 
I. STRATEGIC OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA  
1. Summary  
Nigeria is a leading African country in peace-keeping operations, regional bodies, 
military and economic strength. However, political corruption, a lack of economic 
diversity and social mistrust between groups continuously undermines Nigeria’s 
prospects for stability, security, and sustainable growth.  
                                                 
4 All information is approximate based upon open source data and assumptions and future dredging 
projects. 
5 I All information is approximate based upon open source data and assumptions and future dredging 
projects. 
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2. Background  
Nigeria has a long history of supporting peace-keeping operations throughout the 
world. In African, the country uses its leadership positions in the Economic Community 
of West African States and the African Union to support United Nations’ resolutions in 
Africa. As a result of continued international deployments, the NAF maintains a 
relatively high level of operational level proficiency over its African brethren. Much of 
Nigeria’s political and military strength evolved from the country’s possession of vast oil 
and natural gas reserves. These reserves not only provide 95% of the government of 
Nigeria’s (GON) revenue, but they also contribute to violence throughout the Niger Delta 
region, in southern Nigeria.  
Oil theft and pipeline destruction are common occurrences in the Niger Delta. A 
complex matrix of ethnic, tribal, criminal and community violence and government 
corruption result in the use of oil to settle old political and personal scores. Financial 
windfalls, from oil related theft and destruction provide useful funds in arming and 
recruiting youth in depressed communities and slums. Nigeria’s dependence on oil for a 
preponderance of its revenues makes oil related violence not only a threat to domestic 
stability and tranquility but can also pose an existential threat to the Nigerian 
government, if political patronage fails to successfully manipulate competing violent 
actors. Violence is also common throughout the southern coast at large, as corrupt 
politicians and criminal actors utilize city slums, disenchanted youth and traditional 
tribal; ethnic and community tensions to increase their political and criminal power. 
Underlying the threat to these tensions is Nigeria’s rising youth bulge: a plentiful reserve 








APPENDIX C.  COCOM RESOURCE POOL AND EVOLUTION 
 
Figure 45.   Assumed External and SBCS Component Utilization for the HA/COIN  
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Figure 46.   The Current Plan of SBCS Evolution (After U.S. Army Transportation 
Office, 2008) 
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APPENDIX D.  STRATEGIC LEVEL CONOPS 
A. ASSEMBLY/EMPLOYMENT PHASES 
1. Delta Consumable Cargo 
Configured units of humanitarian assistance cargo.  Provide class 1, 2, 6, & 8 
cargo. Cargo meets tasking requirements of delivering food, water, medicine, clothes, 
shelter, and supplies.   
Items are compiled from amphibious shipping initially and then T-AKE shuttle 
ships.  Cargo may also be provided indirectly from amphibious shipping/T-AKE cranes 
to an intermediate platform that is capable of acting as a skin-to-skin assembly area 
(MLP, T-Craft).  Consumable items are delivered to Warri or distributed to multiple sites 
along the western bank of the Niger, Warri, or Forcados rivers.   
2. Delta Medical/Vet Providers 
Medical/Veterinarian staffs are provided from the fly-in forces dispersed via 
aerial assets to the Sea Base and made available through aerial PAX to amphibious 
shipping.  All MEDEVACs in the assembly phase will be removed via airlift or routine 
consumable transports. 
The medical equipment and complementary supplies are equipped from the 
MPS(E) AK-3016 vessel's Naval Expeditionary Medical Support System (NEMMS) 
either directly or indirectly.  The AK-3016, with its maneuverable stern gate and SS3 
crane can deliver skin-to-skin to a SBC or the MLP.  This is a one-time on load during 
the assembly phase.  Veterinary animal specific equipment and supplies will be 
transferred with the staff via amphibious shipping.  Temporary medical camps will be 
established and supplied in the city of Warri or in multiple sites along the western bank of 
the Niger, Warri, or Forcados rivers.     
3. Delta Infrastructure Repair 
The MPS(E) AK-3016 vessel's prepositioned Naval Mobile Construction 
Battalion (NMCB) equipment and supplies can be provided via the maneuverable stern 
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ramp to a SBC.  Use of the MPS(E) crane may be available for some of the lighter 
vehicles.  Prepositioned equipment may be used by accompanying Naval Construction 
Battalions or USA Core of Engineers forward deployed in Forward Engineering Support 
Teams.   
The Naval Construction Division is assumed to be provided via amphibious 
shipping.  The division consists of the Naval Construction Regiment (NCR), Naval 
Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB), and Underwater Construction Teams (UCT).  
These forces will be transferred via amphibious shipping.  Both the prepositioned NMCB 
and amphibious shipping is anticipated to provide class 4 cargo/equipment for enabling 
infrastructure repair of the port of Warri. 
The follow-on Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB) is not assumed to be 
available until the Sustainment phase.   
4. Delta Force Projection 
Force projection is the MC personnel and equipment originating from the 
amphibious shipping.  Prepositioned vehicles, supplies, fuel, and munitions are provided 
from the AMSEA class AK–3008/9 via a stern ramp discharge or 29 ton crane.  An at-sea 
assembly area is preferred, but not required for administrative offload of vehicles and 
cargo.  MC personnel, limited petroleum products, and supplies are available amphibious 
shipping and can be offloaded via well-deck operations, ship crane, or INLS/LMCS 
configuration.  The core of force projection will be the NECC forces employed to provide 
initial SAR assistance of the Delta region and continued security for the SBC lines-of-
communication within the Warri and Niger waterways.  Additional force projection 
forces will provide local security of HA aid distribution that occurs during the day and 
will be transported back to afloat vessels overnight.   
5. Delta NEO/SAR 
Given the regional flooding of the state of Delta, SAR operations need to be 
conducted by small boats co-located with an afloat station.  The rain forest region of 
Delta state is anticipated to be very difficult to transit especially at increasing ranges from 
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the city landscape of the city of Warri. Pockets of Nigerian citizens in distress are 
anticipated to be located in areas on the outskirts of the Delta region in difficult to access 
areas even without above normal flooding.  Some areas within the city and inland rivers 
are anticipated to be accessible by ACVs and primarily limited by size. The task is 
achieved by employing Army or Navy Riverine forces that posses the initial capability to 
assist aerial assets in SAR, but conduct follow-up river security of surface craft 
communication lines between the sea and upriver distribution points.  While Al-Qaida 
does not pose a direct threat to Delta operations in support of HA, the vulnerability of the 
U.S. forces in this environment exists and the opportunities to strike are abundant. 
The Navy Riverine Forces could be provided from many sources.  If CONUS 
forces are surged from the east coast Riverine forces and their equipment would be 
transported via the CVN, amphibious shipping, or airlifted to destinations such as Lome.  
If provided from deployed forces, such as currently in Iraq, the Riverine forces would be 
expected to be air lifted.  Relocating the Army/Navy's Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) 
can be accomplished as a boat/trailer unit via CH-53 or independently with the trailer unit 
being limited to skin-to-skin or crane deployment or SH delivery.  The SURC are capable 
of being recovered in trailer to LCAC/SSC craft or hoisted onto the JHSV.  T-Craft is 
anticipated to have similar bow/stern ramp characteristics as the SSC that allow recovery 
onto a trailer. NEO personnel will transported to logistic distribution centers such as 
Warri or Port Harcourt for placement into IDP camps. 
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Figure 47.   Operational Level CONOPS of Delta Assembly/Employment by Naval 
and Joint SBCs.  Fouling of Inland Waterways Restricts Access to Non-Amphibious 
Vessels. 
B. SUSTAINMENT (EARLY) 
1. Delta Consumables (Palletized) 
Palletized consumables are sourced from amphibious shipping and GO/NGO 
providing HA relief supplies.  Within the CONOPS amphibious shipping conducts a 
logistics circuit to load palletized consumable cargo from the deep water ports of Lome 
and Sao Tome.  This palletized cargo in the advanced port facilities by civilian or MSC 
provided LMSR or cargo ships and the containerized cargo is broken out and palletized in 
Naval, Army, or contracted host nation facilities.  Palletized cargo is loaded via LOTS 
operations, as allowed by the in-harbor sea conditions, from typical commercial 
international relief agency shipping vessels.  These vessels are typically older, medium 
draft vessels equipped with organic rigging for shore offloading into austere ports.  In 
combination with vessels equipped with dynamic positioning systems higher sea state 
offloading could feasibly occur.   
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2. Delta Consumables (Containerized) 
Containerized cargo is sourced from NGO/GO and MSC owned or contracted 
LOLO vessels.  Skin-to-skin container transfer via crane would occur to recipient or 
intermediate platforms ideally in low sea state harbor operations.  As container offloading 
will be limited by offload areas, recipient or intermediate platforms must possess a 
container Material Handling Equipment (MHE).  While this is available in many methods 
it could occur in at least these manners.  1) Onboard MHE stacking containers for at-sea 
transport or onto MK14 LVSR trailers. 2) Direct loading onto USMC MK14 container 
trailers.  3) Indirect loading of containers from unloading area onto the MK48/18 (self-
loading) LVSR.  All combinations could occur with the Army's LVSR equivalent 
capability trucking.   
3. Delta Force Support 
Force support is the MC personnel and equipment originating from the 
amphibious shipping.  Prepositioned vehicles, supplies, fuel, and munitions are provided 
from the AMSEA class AK–3008/9 via a stern ramp discharge or 29 ton crane.  An at-sea 
assembly area is preferred, but not required for administrative offload of vehicles and 
cargo.  MC personnel, limited petroleum products, and supplies are available from 
amphibious shipping and can be offloaded via well-deck operations, ship crane, or 
INLS/LMCS configurations.  The core of force projection will be the NECC forces 
employed to provide initial SAR assistance of the Delta region and continued security for 
the SBC lines-of-communication within the Warri and Niger waterways.  Additional 
force projection forces will provide local security of HA aid distribution that occurs 
during the day and will be transported back to afloat vessels overnight.   
4. Delta MEDEVAC 
The first line of medical aid and triage will be performed at shore locations 
dispersed within the IDP camps within the Delta.  Medical emergencies that are beyond 
the capability of the shore assets will be transported to the T-AH medical ship, ESG, or 
CSG.  The T-AH vessels primarily receive cases from helicopter personnel exchanges 
 
 138
although small boat transfers do occur.  However, large groups of non-emergency cases 
may be transported via surface connectors equipped with surface connectors ideally 
capable of helicopter personnel transfers. 
5. Delta Priority Transport 
Priority transport includes high speed surface movement of personnel, low risk 
MEDEVACs, and essential parts to and from the Sea Base.  High speed and medium 
capacity transport acts to alleviate the medium-range shipment of such items within the 
theater.  While typical medium range shipments are conducted by COD/VOD aircraft, 
these surface connectors provide a short to medium duration alternative.  This transfers 
some of the logistics deployment and distribution requirements from the CVN directly to 
any of the amphibious shipping vessels without the use of as many intermediate transfer 
assets.  Priority transport is to and from advanced bases equipped with major airports 
such as Lome and Sao Tome.  Such efforts would create another layer of distribution 
options for personnel transfers, MEDEVAC, and essential parts that currently can only be 
achieved with aerial assets.   
 
Figure 48.   Operational Level CONOPS of Delta early Sustainment by Naval and 
Joint SBCs. Fouling of Inland Waterways Restricts Access to Non-Amphibious 
Vessels. 
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APPENDIX E.  OPERATIONAL/PHYSICAL CONTEXT DIAGRAMS 
(OV-2, SV-1, AND SV-3A) 
 
 
Figure 49.   All of the defined SBCS Defined Operational Nodes are within the Joint 
Operational Commander Node 
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Figure 50.   OV-2 Depicting the Need Lines Between Internal SBCS Nodes 
 













Figure 52.   Regional MSC, COMLOGEUR/CTF-63, OV-2 Depicting Need Lines 
Between Internal SBCS Nodes 
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Figure 53.   SBCS General Linkage Descriptions to the External Landing Force 
System (SV-2) 
 
Figure 54.   General Linkage Descriptions to the External Commercial Shipping 
System.  Note That These Physical Linkages Only Occur in the Sustainment LOO 
Phase (SV-2). 
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Figure 55.   Resource Exchange Diagrams 
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APPENDIX G.  OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY HEIRARCHY 
DESCRIPTIONS (OV-5) 
Element  Definition 
 Operational Activity 
1 Provide Delta 
State Aid 
Delta State Narrative 
 
"The GON is lacking resources and manpower to effectively manage the situation in 
the state of Delta.  GON requests international assistance to provide crisis aid to 
distributed locations within the flooded state of Delta.  The flooding has extended 
beyond the traditional Niger flood plains and has since displaced large numbers of 
people.  International forces are asked to deliver food, water, medicine, shelter and 
other supplies. 
- Provide veterinary and medical services. 
- Repair damaged infrastructure/general engineer support.  
- Evacuate people from flood areas" (U.S. Marine Corps Wargaming Division & 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010). 
 
Delta state's main harbor is Warri.  While Warri typically provides an austere port 
access, it is inaccessible due to flooding and therefore will be considered to only 
provide austere access likely to a concrete pier or quay wall.  No port provided 
offloading capability is assumed.   
 
The austere access point of Port Warri is located approximately 60 nm from the 
Escravos River outlet.  The Benin River access is "via Escravos River navigable up to 
Sapele/Channel [with a] width no further info x 6.1 m deep; can handle ships up to 
500 ft in length with a 4.9m draft" (U.S. Marine Corps Wargaming Division & 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2010).  However, the river system and 
adjacent planes are flooded and contain large amounts of debris that make the river 
and flood plains inaccessible by propeller vessels.  
1.1 Provide Delta 
State NEO & SAR 
Tasking 




It is assumed that these people are distributed across the flood plain area in highly 
inaccessible locations likely distant from the city center.  The Warri is primarily a 
rain forest region; however, the city is considered to be abundant with cleared areas 
common of city landscapes.  While some of the more difficult to access locations can 
be accomplished via aerial SAR the sheer number of personnel in the flood areas 
requiring evacuation results in the need for a means of conducting surface based 
SAR.  Such a task is best accomplished mainly by small craft or in limited scenarios 
ACVs equipped with personnel carriers.   
This task is includes recovering personnel and delivering them to the distributed IDP 
camps in Delta state for temporary housing and health services and in a smaller scale 
delivery of personnel to the Sea Base.   
mph. 
 
The objective area accesses are austere and at-sea assembly is only constrained to 
taking on the Riverine Squadron's forces personnel, equipment, and vehicles initially 
for expanded SAR.  As these forces are positioned on CONUS they will be 
transported in amphibious vessels or deployed in high speed craft from CONUS.  The 
 154
Element  Definition 
personnel, cargo, and small boats, and trailers, are best transferred via direct well-
deck operations or indirectly via intermediary transfer operations.  The capable 





To provide the means for and to transport personnel and/or cargo (JP 1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-
01.2, NDP 1, 4, NWP 4-01 Series). 
 
M1 Number Passengers transported per day. 
M2 Percent Of passengers arrive on time at final destination. 




To move forces to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This 
task includes the employment of forces on the battlefield in combination with fire or 
fire potential. Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat, the means of 
concentrating forces at the decisive point to achieve the surprise, psychological 
shock, physical momentum, and moral dominance which enables smaller forces to 
defeat larger ones. This task includes the movement of combat and support units (JP 
3-0, 3-01.1, 3-02.2, 3-03, 3-09, 3-50.21) (JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-15, 5-0, CJCSI 
3202.01, CJCSM 3122.03A). 
 




Report, locate, support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel to friendly control. 
Execution of the mission includes the full spectrum of PR personnel, weapons 
systems, and methods from benign recoveries in permissive environments to Combat 
Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR). It is a 
requirement for components to conduct joint CSAR task force operations. Joint 
Doctrine specifies for components in a Joint Force, at the direction of the JFC, to 
provide specific CSAR capabilities to support joint CSAR operations (JP 3-50.2, 3-
50.21). 
 




AFT 2.3.1 Perform CSAR Functions. 
AFT 2.3.2 Perform CSAR Functions. 
ATM 5.30 Conduct Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). 
ATM 3.5.2 Conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW). 
ART 2.6 Employ Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Techniques. 
NTA 6.2.2 Perform Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). 
NTA 6.2.3 Perform Rescue and Recovery in a Non-hostile Environment. 




Tactical operations involving land, sea and air forces to evacuate U. S. dependents, U. 
S. Government employees, and private citizens (U. S. and Third-country) from 
locations in a foreign country or HN to a designated area within the theater. Includes 
preparing evacuated personnel for follow-on repatriation to the United States or home 
nation-state (JP 3-07). 
M1 Percent Of personnel evacuated that were meant to be evacuated in accordance 




AFT 4.4.1 Perform Special Operations Forces Employment Functions. 
AFT 6.5.1.4 Support External Organizations. 
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Element  Definition 
ATM 3.8 Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). 
NTA 6.2.1 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area. 
1.2 Provide Delta 








SBCs conduct at-sea transfer of Class 1, 6, 8, and conduct temporary lashing of cargo 
for transit. If available, conduct package preparation for distribution while in-transit.  
May initially require the ability to transfer trucking capable of carrying palletized 
loads. 
 
Cargo classes are initially provided from amphibious ships and the CVN (VETREP).  
They are later sustained in the Assembly by T-AKE vessels supporting shuttle ship 
operations.  An additional option is receipt of stores via VERTREP on the JHSV or 




Configure a load at a supply activity for a user (FM 63-11) (CASCOM). 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Configured loads support the unit in accomplishing its mission. 
02 Yes/No Procedures to prepare configured loads do not negatively impact on the 
supported unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. 
03 Time Required to develop or update plans to establish support operations after 
receipt of warning order. 
04 Time Longevity of each type of projected mission in AO. 
05 Percent Difference between planned and actual demand by supply line in AO. 
06 Percent Of host-nation support available in AO. 
07 Number Of personnel in AO requiring support. 
08 Number And type of vehicles requiring support in AO. 
09 Number Of composite items within a single request for each type of unit in AO. 
10 Number And type of weapons systems and other equipment in each supported unit 
that require resupply. 
11 Number Of rounds of ammunition each weapon system in the supported unit 
consumes per mission. 
12 Number And types of transport used to move supplies. 
13 Number Of days of supply for all classes/line numbers of supply on hand. 
1.2.2 Provide 
Class VI 
Coordinate and provide personal demand items, such as health and hygiene products 
and nonmilitary sales items (FM 10-1) (CASCOM). 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has the necessary class VI supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for class VI supplies before it can conduct 
its mission. 
03 Time Required to develop or update plans to establish support operations after 
receipt of warning order. 
04 Time To develop concept of support sustainment requirements after receipt of 
warning order. 
05 Time To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels of supply in AO. 
06 Percent Difference between planned and actual demand by supply line in AO. 
07 Percent Of class VI supplies available in AO compared to requirements. 
08 Percent Of replenishment stocks delivered on time in AO. 
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Element  Definition 
09 Percent Of shortfalls in class VI supply in AO that have acceptable alternatives. 
10 Percent Of required class VI supplies in AO delivered. 
11 Percent Of planned class VI supply support achieved in AO. 
12 Percent Of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in moving 
class VI supplies. 
13 Number Of days of class VI supply stockpiled in AO to support campaign. 
14 Number Of days of sustainment supply in AO supported by available facilities. 
15 Number Of tons per day of class VI supply in AO delivered to operating forces. 
1.2.3 Provide 
Class VIII 
Provide class VIII medical materiel to include medical supplies, equipment, and 
medical peculiar repair parts (FM 4-02.1) (USAMEDDC&S).  
Note: ART 6.5.3 (Provide Medical Logistics) addresses the other aspects of combat 
health logistics. 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has class VIII supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for class VIII supplies before it can conduct 
its mission. 
03 Yes/No Unit has Class VIII medical unique repair parts to conduct its mission. 
04 Yes/No Unit does not have to wait for Class VIII medical peculiar parts before it 
can conduct its mission. 
05 Time Required to develop or update plans to establish support operations after 
receipt of warning order. 
06 Time To transship class VIII supplies and medical equipment upon receipt of 
warning order. 
07 Time To provide emergency shipment of class VIII supplies within AO. 
08 Time To refine medical equipment maintenance and repair support program after 
receipt of warning order. 
09 Time To receive medical equipment peculiar repair parts after requisition. 
10 Time An average piece of medical equipment is not mission capable (awaiting 
parts). 
11 Time To requisition, procure, and provide critical medical equipment peculiar 
repair parts. 
12 Percent Difference between planned and actual demand by supply line in AO. 
13 Percent Of planned class VIII supply support achieved in AO. 
14 Percent Of class VIII supplies require replenishment per day. 
15 Percent Of shortfalls in Class VIII supply in AO that have acceptable alternatives. 
16 Percent Of required Class VIII supplies in AO delivered. 
17 Percent Of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in moving 
Class VII supplies. 
18 Percent Of Class VIII supply requisitions filled in AO. 
19 Percent Of required delivery date (RDD) for Class VIII supplies in AO achieved. 
20 Percent Of critical replenishment stocks in AO that experienced late delivery. 
21 Percent Of Class VIII supplies (meeting regulatory requirements) provided by host 
nation. 
22 Percent Of average medical equipment down. 
23 Percent Of TPFDL medical logistics units deployed and operational. 
24 Percent Of medical equipment dead-lined for supply. 
25 Percent Of Class VII medical equipment peculiar repair parts requirements 
provided by the host nation. 
26 Number Of instances when medical capability is unavailable due to shortage or 
lack of class VIII supplies or equipment. 
27 Number Of tons per day of Class VIII supply (and medical peculiar repair parts) in 
AO delivered to operating forces. 
 157
Element  Definition 
1.2.4 Provide 
Class I 
Provide food in bulk or prepackaged rations and bottled water. This task also includes 
the provision of health and comfort packages, such as disposable razors and other 
personnel care items, other AAFES tactical field exchanges are operational. (FM 10-
23) (CASCOM) 








Provide miscellaneous supplies and captured materials (FM 10-1) (CASCOM). 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has miscellaneous supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for miscellaneous supplies before it can 
conduct its mission. 
03 Time Required to develop or update plans to establish support operations after 
receipt of warning order. 
04 Time To develop concept of support for miscellaneous supply requirements after 
receipt of warning order. 
05 Time To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels of supply in AO. 
06 Time To certify captured supplies as being safe substitutes for US supplies. 
07 Percent Difference between planned and actual demand by supply line in AO. 
08 Percent Of planned supply support for miscellaneous supplies achieved in AO. 
09 Percent Of miscellaneous supplies available in AO compared to requirements. 
10 Percent Of miscellaneous replenishment stocks delivered on time in AO. 
11 Percent Of shortfalls in miscellaneous supplies that have acceptable alternatives. 
12 Percent Of supply lines in AO that can be supported by using captured supplies. 
13 Percent Of required miscellaneous supplies in AO delivered. 
14 Percent Of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in moving 
miscellaneous supplies. 
15 Percent Of miscellaneous supply requisitions filled in AO. 
16 Percent Of RDD for miscellaneous supplies in AO achieved. 
17 Percent Of critical replenishment stocks in AO that experienced late delivery. 
18 Percent Of miscellaneous supplies provided by host nation. 
19 Percent Of daily supply requirements for a particular item met by use of captured 
materiel. 
20 Number Of days of miscellaneous supplies stockpiled in AO to support operations.
21 Number Of days of miscellaneous supplies in AO supported by available facilities.
22 Number Of tons of miscellaneous supplies per day delivered to operating forces. 
1.3.2 Provide 
Class II 
Provide clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, 
hand tools, geospatial products (maps), administrative and housekeeping supplies and 
equipment (FM 10-27) (CASCOM). 
 
No. Scale Measure 
06 Time Of class I supply stockpiled in AO to support operations. 
07 Time Of sustainment supply in AO supported by available facilities. 
08 Percent Difference between planned and actual demand by supply line in AO. 
09 Percent Of planned class I supply support achieved in AO. 
10 Percent Of class I supplies available in AO compared to requirements. 
11 Percent Of replenishment stocks delivered on time in AO. 
12 Percent Of shortfalls in class I supply in AO that have acceptable alternatives. 
13 Percent Of required class I supplies in AO delivered. 
14 Percent Of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in moving 
class I supplies. 
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15 Percent Of class I supply requisitions filled in AO. 
16 Percent Of RDD for class I supplies in AO achieved. 
17 Percent Of critical replenishment stocks in AO that experienced late delivery. 
18 Percent Of class I supplies provided by host nation. 
19 Number Of tons per day of class I supply in AO delivered to operating forces. 
1.3.3 Provide 
Class X 
Provide material to support nonmilitary programs, such as agriculture and economic 
development (FM 10-1) (CASCOM). 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has class X supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for class X supplies before it can conduct 
its mission. 
03 Yes/No US and host-nation laws and regulations allow civilians to use the supplies 
provided. 
04 Time To establish liaison with appropriate host-nation civilian government 
officials in AO after receipt of mission. 
05 Time To coordinate host-nation support agreements on activation of the AO. 
06 Percent Of sustainment supplies in AO procured from host-nation sources. 
07 Percent Of logistic effort in AO provided by host nation. 
08 Number Of facilities used by US units in AO provided by host nation. 
09 Number Of host-nation support agreements in effect in AO. 
10 Number Of US military units that have host-nation liaison officers assigned in AO.
11 Number Of tons per day of class X supplies in AO delivered for civilian use. 






To coordinate the evacuation of the sick and wounded and to obtain consultation and 
assistance from remote sources. (JP 4-0, 4-02 Series, 4-02.2, NDP 4, NWP 4-02 
Series, MCWP 4-11.1) 
 
M1 Percent Accountability of personnel entering the health services treatment 
pipeline. 
M2 Hours From wound or injury until person is in surgery or other appropriate care. 
M3 Percent Of casualties returned to duty. 
1.5 Provide Delta 
State Infra. Repair 
Includes provide Delta state Engineering Repair support functionality. 
1.5.1 Provide 
Class IX 
Provide any part, subassembly, assembly, or component required for installation in 
the maintenance of an end item, subassembly, or component. (FM 10-1) (CASCOM) 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has class IX supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for class IX supplies before it can conduct 
its mission. 
03 Time To refine supply support program after receipt of warning order. 
04 Time To receive repair parts after requisition. 
05 Time An average piece of equipment is not mission capable (awaiting parts). 
06 Time To requisition, procure, and provide critical repair parts. 
07 Percent Of average equipment downtime. 
08 Percent Of TPFDD maintenance units deployed and operational. 
09 Percent Of equipment dead-lined for supply. 
10 Percent Of transportation units deployed and operational. 
11 Percent Of class IX requirements provided by host nation. 
12 Number Of tons per day of class IX supply in AO delivered to operating forces. 
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Provide packaged products—including lubricants, greases, hydraulic fluids, 
compressed gasses, and specialty items—that are stored, transported, and issued in 
containers with a capacity of 55 gallons or less (FM 10-67)(CASCOM). 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No The unit has class III supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for packaged class III supplies before it can 
conduct its mission. 
03 Time To refine the supply support program for an AO after receipt of warning 
order. 
04 Time Of operational delay due to fuel shortages. 
05 Time Of supply of required packaged petroleum products in place to support 
operations. 
06 Percent And type of daily class III packaged petroleum products provided by host 
nation. 
07 Percent And type of required packaged petroleum products delivered to theater. 
08 Percent Of packaged petroleum products deliveries completed compared to 
forecasted requirements. 
09 Percent Of attempted deliveries destroyed by enemy action. 




To provide specialized mechanical devices to assist in rapid handling (offloading 
aircraft, landing craft, and shipping, and uploading to other means of transportation or 
storage) of supplies, materiel, and equipment. This task includes providing qualified 
personnel to operate MHE/WHE. (JP 4-0, 4-01.5, NDP 4, NWP 4-01 Series, 
MCWP 4-1, MCWP 4-11, NAVSUP PUB Series, FMFM 4- 1) 
 
M1 Hours To attain all required MHE. 
M2 Percent Of authorized MHE. 
M3 Percent Of required personnel qualified to operate MHE. 
1.5.4 Provide 
Retail Fuel 
Provide retail fuels to individual systems from tankers, rail tank cars, hose lines, or 
bulk transporters. (FM 10-67) (CASCOM) 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has the necessary bulk class III supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Time That the supply of required fuel in place to support campaign. 
03 Percent And type of daily class III retail fuel requirements provided by host 
nation. 
04 Percent Of retail fuel deliveries completed compared to forecasted requirements. 
05 Percent Of available retail fuel lost to spills. 
06 Number Of gallons per day of retail fuel lost to spills. 
07 Number Of gallons and types of retail fuel delivered to users within the AO. 
1.5.5 Provide 
Class IV 
Provide construction materials including installed equipment and all fortification and 
barrier materials. ART 6.1.4 includes the conduct of quarry, sawmill, and rock-
crushing operations, and the production of asphalt and concrete. (FM 10-27) 
(CASCOM) 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has class IV supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for class IV supplies before it can conduct 
its mission. 
03 Time Required to develop or update plans to establish support operations after 
receipt of warning order. 
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04 Time To develop concept of support sustainment requirements after receipt of 
warning order. 
05 Time To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels of supply in AO. 
06 Percent Difference between projected engineer construction material 
requirements and actual requirements in AO. 
07 Percent Of planned class IV supply support achieved in AO. 
08 Percent Of class IV supplies available in AO compared to requirements. 
09 Percent Of replenishment stocks delivered on time in AO. 
10 Percent Of shortfalls in class IV supply in AO that have acceptable alternatives. 
11 Percent Of required class IV supplies in AO delivered. 
12 Percent Of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in providing 
class IV supplies to the right locations in the right quantities. 
13 Percent Of class IV supply requisitions filled in AO. 
14 Percent Of RDD for class IV supplies in AO achieved. 
15 Percent Of critical replenishment stocks in AO that experienced late delivery. 
16 Percent Of class IV supplies provided by host nation. 
17 Number Of days of class IV supply stockpiled in AO to support campaign. 
18 Number Of days of sustainment supply in AO supported by available facilities. 
19 Number Of sawmills operating within the AO. 
20 Number Of rock crushing facilities/quarries operating within AO. 




Provide water. ART 6.1.11 includes purification, distribution, storage, and quality 
surveillance of water. (FM 10-52) (CASCOM) 
Note: ART 6.10.3 (Provide Engineer Construction Support) addresses construction, 
repairing, maintenance, and operations of permanent and semi-permanent water 
facilities, such as the drilling of water wells. 
 
No. Scale Measure 
01 Yes/No Unit has potable/non-potable water supplies to conduct its mission. 
02 Yes/No The unit does not have to wait for potable and non-potable water before it 
can conduct its mission. 
03 Time Required to develop or update plans to establish support operations after 
receipt of warning order. 
04 Time To develop concept of support sustainment requirements after receipt of 
warning order. 
05 Time To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels of supply in AO. 
06 Percent Difference between planned and actual demand by supply line in AO. 
07 Percent Of planned potable water support achieved in AO. 
08 Percent Of potable water generation equipment available in AO compared to 
requirements. 
09 Percent Of shortfalls in potable water generation and distribution equipment in AO 
that have acceptable alternatives. 
10 Percent Of required potable water in AO generated. 
11 Percent Of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in generating 
and distributing potable water. 
12 Percent Of potable water (bottled) provided by host nation. 
13 Number And types of potable water generation equipment stockpiled in AO to 
support operations. 
14 Number Of days of sustainment supply in AO supported by available facilities. 
15 Number Of gallons per day of potable water in AO delivered to operating forces. 
1.6 Provide Delta 
State Engineering 
Functional modeling inputs included in Providing Delta State Infrastructure Repair 
Functionality. 
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Repair 







To exercise authority and direction over assigned or attached forces in the 
accomplishment of a mission. C2 involves maintaining visibility over and arranging 
personnel, equipment, and facilities during the planning and conducting of military 
operations (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 4-01.1, 5- 00.2) (JP 0-2, 3-03, 3-05, 3-08v2, 3-




The ability to transport information and services via assured end-to-end connectivity 
across the NC environment. 





Combat identification (CID) is the process of attaining an accurate 
characterization of unknown detected objects to the extent that high 
confidence, and timely application of military options and weapon resources can 
occur. Depending on the situation and the operational decisions that must be made, 
this characterization may be limited to, “friend,” “enemy,” or “neutral.” In other 
situations, other characterizations may be required including, but not limited to class, 
type, nationality and mission configuration. CID characterizations, when applied with 
combatant commander's Rules of Engagement (ROE), enable engagement decisions 
and the subsequent use, or prohibition of use, of lethal and nonlethal weaponry to 
accomplish military objectives. CID is used for force posturing, command and 
control, situational awareness as well as shoot, no-shoot employment decisions (JP 3-
52, JP 3- 56.1). 
 
Note: CID of enemy and neutral objects is heavily dependent on successful detection, 
which is often very difficult, near real-time fusion/correlation of data from multiple 
sensors, and a number of other critical ISR capabilities. The end goal (i.e., correct 
identification of objects) depends considerably on the success of the detection 
function. Further, the ability to identify and characterizeenemy and neutral objects, 
even if detected, depends extensively on successful collection and analysis of target 
signatures, etc. Warfighters must be at least 95% certain that an object or entity has 
been correctly characterized since any greater than 5% uncertainty creates an 
unacceptable level of risk of fratricide or enemy penetration.” (Capstone 
Requirements Document for CID, 19 March, 2001). 
 
M1 Percent Of friendly air forces following established procedures to identify 
themselves CJCSM 3500.04C. 
M2 Percent Of friendly ground forces, following established procedures to identify 
themselves. 
M3 Percent Of friendly naval (surface, subsurface) forces following established 
procedures to identify themselves. 
M4 Percent *Of friendly air forces, ground forces, and/or naval forces  detected 
friendly objects/entities. 
M5 Percent *Of friendly air forces, ground forces, and/or naval forces detected 
enemy objects/entities. 




AFT 7.1.4 Monitor Status of Friendly Forces. 
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ART 5.3.1.5 Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces. 
NTA 6.1.1.3 Positively Identify Friendly Forces. 











Given operational or strategic objectives, dispose joint and/or multinational forces, 
conventional forces, and special operations forces (SOF) to impact the conduct of a 
campaign or major operation by either securing positional advantages before battle is 




Given operational or strategic objectives, control areas of the JOA whose possession 





Given situational awareness requirements, maintain visibility over friendly unit 





Given an operation, capture, obtain, and distribute lessons learned. 






TA 6.3 Conduct Rear Area Security 
Security operations of designated rear area units that contribute to the security of the 
entire joint force. For example, bases may contain aircraft or missiles capable of 
performing defensive counter-air missions, radars, and other equipment critical to air 
defense or units conducting counterintelligence (CI), executing electronic protection, 
or guarding enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). The Joint Rear Area (JRA) is a specific 
land/sea area within a joint force commander’s operational area designated to 
facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force 
(JP 3-10.1, ATM 6.1.4, NTA 6.3.1.1, NTA 6.3.1.3, FM 100-5). 
 
M1 Percent Key LOCs/Points in which threat forces are incapable of inflicting Level 
II Damage with less than 12 hour indicators being picked up by Rear Area Intel 
Forces within JOA rear area. 
 
Service Tasks: 
AFT 4.4.1 Perform Special Operations Forces Employment Functions. 
ART 5.3.5.4.1 Conduct Rear Area and Base Security Operations. 
NTA 1.5.5.5.4 Provide Area Security. 
NTA 6.3.1 Protect and Secure Area of Operations. 
NTA 6.3.2 Conduct Military Law Enforcement Support (Afloat & Ashore). 




Amphibious Task Force Commander.  Historically, the AMWC is a command role 
that has been divided between two individuals, dependent on the particular phase of 
an amphibious operation. When the amphibious landing assets were embarked, the 
CWC or CVBG commander served as the AMWC. Tactical command then shifted to 
the senior shore-based CO once the amphibious forces secured the beachhead. 
Currently, United States Naval and Marine forces are transforming to meet future 
operations with the creation of the Expeditionary Strike Group Forward Deployed 
Naval Force (ESG-FDNF). With the marriage of the Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) and the CVBG, operational command is now fully integrated with the CWC 
 163
Element  Definition 
concept. Although the CWC retains the authority to act as the AMWC, the creation of 
the ESG-FDNF provides for the senior Marine Commanding Officer embarked with 
amphibious forces to serve as the AMWC. 
CDR, RIVRON 
ONE 
Commander, Riverine Group One.  Participates in theater security cooperation 
through joint or multi-lateral exercises, personnel exchanges, and humanitarian 
assistance in Riverine area of operations or other suitable environments. 
– Conducts Maritime Security Operations, providing Riverine area control and denial 
through protection of critical infrastructure, preventing the flow of contraband, and 
disrupting movement of enemy forces or supplies on rivers and waterways. 
– Enables power projection by providing fire support through either direct fire or 




MSC Logistics Europe Commander is dual hatted.  COMLOGEUR is the operational 
commander of the MPSRON One's Prepositioned ships (includes high speed vessels) 
and CTF-63 MSC sealift ships. 
 
Sealift Logistics Command Europe, or SEALOGEUR, is one of five Military Sealift 
Command operational commands worldwide. In addition to its headquarters in 
Naples, Italy, SEALOGEUR has representatives stationed in Rota, Spain; Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands and Souda Bay, Greece. 
 
Military Sealift Command Sealift ships in SEALOGEUR's theater move military 
equipment, supplies and fuel for U.S. European Command and the Navy's 6th Fleet in 
Europe and Africa. 
 
SEALOGEUR reports to Military Sealift Command, which is headquartered in 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Commander, Task Force 63 
 
SEALOGEUR's commander is double-hatted as Commander, Task Force 63, or CTF-
63. CTF-63 is the operational commander of all U.S. 6th Fleet air and sea logistics 
assets. While in theater, Military Sealift Command's Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force and 
Special Mission ships report to CTF-63 along with a cadre of cargo planes that 
support 6th Fleet and U.S European Command logistics missions. CTF-63 is also 
responsible for ordering and tracking spare parts and supplies being delivered to ships 
in theater. 
 
CTF-63 is the immediate operational commander of MSC's Maritime Prepositioning 
Ship Squadron One, or MPSRON One, based in the Mediterranean Sea. The ships of 
MPSRON One are forward deployed year-round prepositioning U.S. military cargo at 
sea. Should a military or humanitarian crisis arise in theater, the squadron is 
positioned to quickly deliver its cargo ashore, ensuring a fast U.S. response to 
contingency situations. 
 
While SEALOGEUR and CTF-63 are technically separate commands, they are co-
located and work as a unified staff under a single commander. This combined effort 
streamlines logistics operations in the European theater, allowing the CTF-
63/SEALOGEUR organization to provide superior customer service to U.S. and 
NATO military forces in the area of responsibility. 
 
CTF-63 reports to Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet. 
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Composite Warfare Commander The officer in tactical command is normally the 
composite warfare commander. However the composite warfare commander concept 
allows an officer in tactical command to delegate tactical command to the composite 
warfare commander. The composite warfare commander wages combat operations to 
counter threats to the force and to maintain tactical sea control with assets assigned; 
while the officer in tactical command retains close control of power projection and 




An assumed JHSV company CO organized under MPSRON. 
Joint High Speed 
Vessel CO 
 





NAVCHAPGRU Commander, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group.  A deployable command 
and control element comprised of 25 reserve personnel.  The NAVCHAPGRUs serve 






An ATF transport group commander that is assigned to the Joint Task Force.  They 
are assigned strategic control of embarked assault craft units aboard the ATF shipping 
during ATF operations.   
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APPENDIX I.  SYSTEM-TO-SYSTEM MATRIX (SV-3A) 
 
Table 13.   Sea Base Connector System System-to-System Matrix Traces Physical 
Components to Their Respective Operational Nodes 
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APPENDIX J.  SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY DESCRIPTION (SV-4) 
 












Figure 60.   The “Move Advanced Based Units” functions within the SBCS function 
“Assemble” 
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A. ASSEMBLE PHASE ITEM DESCRIPTION 
Assembly Item  Assembly Definition 
1.1 Delta 
Consumables 
HA/DR consumable items (class 1,2, 6, & 8).  Cargo meets tasking requirements of 




The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 








All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
2.1 Delta Med/Vet 
Units 
Units consist of personnel and accompanying equipment and supplies. 
2.2 Delta Med/Vet 
Units Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
2.3 Delta Med/Vet 
Cargo Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
2.4 Delta Med/Vet 
Passengers 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
2.5 Delta Med/Vet 
Units Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
3.1 Delta Infra 
Repair Items 
Items consist of equipment/vehicles, construction material, supplies, and munitions. 
3.2 Delta Infra 
Repair Vehicles 
Exchange Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
3.3 Delta Infra 
Repair Munitions 
Exchange Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load.  
3.4 Delta Infra 
Repair Supplies 
Exchange Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
3.5 Delta Infra 
Repair Munitions 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
3.6 Delta Infra 
Repair Vehicles 
Positioned 
A mix of over-sized vehicles and non-oversized vehicles.  Item moved from origin to 
destination. 
3.7 Delta Infra 
Repair Supplies 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
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Assembly Item  Assembly Definition 
3.8 Delta Infra 
Repair Items 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
4.1 Delta Force 
Units 
Items consist of equipment/vehicles, supplies, munitions, personnel, and petroleum 
products. 
4.2 Delta Force 
Vehicle Exchange 
Interface 
Includes infrastructure repair vehicles/equipment (assumed to be a mix of over-sized 
vehicles that are not VERTREP capable).  The existence of a load exchange 
interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support 
the transfer of the respective load. 
4.3 Delta Force 
Munitions Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure munitions.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
4.4 Delta Force 
Supplies Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
4.5 Delta Force 
Personnel Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
4.6 Delta Force 
Vehicles Positioned 
A mix of over-sized vehicles and non-oversized vehicles.  Item moved from origin to 
destination. 
4.7 Delta Force 
Munitions 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
4.8 Delta Force 
Supplies Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
4.9 Delta Force 
Personnel 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
4.10 Delta Force 
Units Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
5.1 Delta Riverine 
Units 
Items consist of equipment/vehicles, supplies, munitions, personnel, and petroleum 
products. 
5.2 Delta Riverine 
Boats  Exchange 
Interface 
Includes infrastructure repair vehicles/equipment (assumed to be a mix of over-sized 
vehicles that are not VERTREP capable). The existence of a load exchange interface 
such as a ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the 
transfer of the respective load. 
5.3 Delta Riverine 
Munitions Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure munitions.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
5.4 Delta Riverine 
Supplies Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
5.5 Delta Riverine 
Personnel Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
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Assembly Item  Assembly Definition 
5.6 Delta Riverine 
Boats Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
5.7 Delta Riverine 
Munitions 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
5.8 Delta Riverine 
Supplies Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
5.9 Delta Riverine 
Personnel 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
5.10 Delta Riverine 
Units Secured 






Non- injured NEO personnel.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a 
ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
5.17 Delta NEO 
Personnel 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
5.18 Delta NEO 
Personnel in 
Custody 
NEO personnel in a temporary waiting status by Seabasing assets and provided 
adequate protection and health services.  
Armory Capacity The capacity of the ship's approved armory to safely and securely store munitions.  
Some platforms do not possess a designated armory, but do have the capability to 
store munitions per designated instructions.   
Asset C2 
Interoperability 
Includes Joint, multi-national, and international crisis organization vessel 
interoperability to establish secure/unsecure communication linkages to support at-




Includes Joint, multi-national, and international crisis organization vessel 
interoperability to establish physical linkages at-sea for cargo or personnel transfer. 
At-Sea Connection 
Needs 
The physical connections required to make secure and safe interconnections to 
conduct at-sea load exchange under an approved standard operating procedure. 
At-Sea Loading 
Capable 
A platform capable of conducting at-sea loading due to proper at-sea connection 
exchange interfaces with another source or providing platform. 
CLF UNREP 
Availability 
Availability of regionally stationed CLF UNREP ships within inter/intra-theater 
areas.   
Concurrent 
Operation Safety 
Inherent loading and storage constraints imposed upon specific vessels that decrease 
the speed of an alternative activity.  Such considerations are flight quarters, well 
deck operations, LCAC/SSC fan operation on the cargo deck loading, UNREP 
STREAM, and ordnance loading. 
Deck Crew Speed Operational speeds highly vary by operational experience.  Secondary factors are 
stowage capacity and configurations.  Availability of heavy equipment loaders may 
have a large impact. 
Docking The state of receiving, understanding, and storing communication messages 
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Assembly Item  Assembly Definition 
Communication 
Received 
supporting current or advanced docking needs. 
Docking Needs The general watercrafts needs required to be filled for docking operations such as 
linehandlers, support power, sewage, water, fueling, personnel transfer equipment, 
and load exchange equipment requirements.   
Docking Plan The resulting at-sea docking platforms or base agreement and coordination plan. 
Employable Units Units that are characterized by cohesive units equipped with the required equipment 
and supplies to conduct tasked operational activities. 
Flight Deck 
Restrictions 
Vessels are limited in flight operations platforms that it can embark, temporarily 
land, and conduct VERTREP.   
Fuel Efficiency 
Configurations 





Common Marine Radio standards and acceptable practices. 
Heavy Vertical Lift 
Availability 
H-53 or replacement availability from ESG/CSG or land based units. 
Inland Waterway 
Accessibility 
A general categorization of a platform with a draft that does not restrict its ability to 
conduct inland waterway operations.  The inland waterway depth is defined by 
operational activities and austere access depths.   




At-sea connection and load transfer configurations that can occur. 
Interface 
Established 




Internal/External ramp slopes, turning radiuses, and dimensions that restrict the 
availability of vehicle transport to/from SBC vessels. 
Load Transfer 
Completed 
The completion of assigned operational activity load transfer of personnel, 
equipment, cargo, vehicles, or munitions. 
Loading Pressure 
Limitations 
Deck pressure as appropriately measured.   
Loading Safety 
Margins 
In consideration of load pack densities, dry cargo storage area, and configurations 




Load placement considerations to ensure the SBC is within level trim standards for 
safe operation.   
Pierside Loading 
Availability 
A platform capable of conducting advanced base supporting loading from or to the 
pier. 
Rigging Availability Availability of deck rigging that enables load transfer operations. 
Rigging Transfer 
Speed 
The inherent differences in speed as a product of the type of rigging available 
(transfer speed and capacity) and operational experience.  
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Assembly Item  Assembly Definition 
Sea State 
Constraints 
Imposed SBC limitations on at-sea connections, load exchange interfaces, and load 
transfer weights to maintain stability under the assumed sea state definitions.  
Includes combined effects of wave height, sea spray, swell height, and wind 
velocities aggregated into standardized measurement scales. 
Seating/Berthing 
Availability 
Capacity of long term or short term berthing availability.  Includes necessary 
functions of sanitation, meal preparation, and lodging.   
Security Resource 
Availability 
The availability of the Sea Base to provide security assets to minimize the threat 
condition to an acceptable level. 
Services Filled A platform that has had planned fuel, water, and sewage requirements filled by 
austere or advanced base services.   
Stacking Height 
Limitations 
ISO container or pallet stacking height and limitations. 
Storage Space 
Availability 
In consideration of load pack densities, dry cargo storage area, and configurations 
that provide required accessibility.  A function of usable storage area and height.   
Theater Base 
Availability 
In-theater advanced base availability.  Territorial access is influenced by political 
standing between host nation and U.S./MN forces. 
Threat Conditions Threats imposed by adversarial forces consistent with the CONOPS assumptions. 
Tie-Down 
Quantities/Locations 
Load limits can be imposed by the number and available locations of tie-downs 
required for griping.  Oversized vehicles/heavy vehicles require are likely to impose 
constraints. 
Undocking Needs The number and availability of the linehandlers or flight deck crew.  May also 
require additional tug assistance, navigational pilots, or route clearances.   
Undocking Support 
Provided 
The ability of the vessel to obtain the required number and availability of the 
linehandlers or flight deck crew.  May also require additional tug assistance, 
navigational pilots, or route clearances.   
Unrestricted Vessel A vessel that is not limited in at-sea movement by docking or load transfer 
operations.   
Vehicle Turning 
Radius Availability 
The onboard SBC dimensions restricting maneuverability of vehicle placement. 
Weather Constraints Weather constraints affecting the safety of flight of Joint aerial assets. 
Table 14.   Assemble Phase Functional Input, Output, and Control Item Description 
 




The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 




All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
1.6 Delta Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or external.  
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Employ Item  Employ Item Definition 
Consumable Ashore 
2.2 Delta Med/Vet 
Units Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
2.5 Delta Med/Vet 
Units Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
2.7 Delta Med/Vet 
Units Ashore 
Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or external.  
3.2 Delta Infra 
Repair Vehicles 
Exchange Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
3.3 Delta Infra 
Repair Munitions 
Exchange Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load.  
3.4 Delta Infra 
Repair Supplies 
Exchange Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
3.8 Delta Infra 
Repair Items 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
3.10 Delta Infra 
Repair Items Ashore 
Includes supplies and munitions.  Item transferred to destination ashore to be 
transferred by its own means or external.   
3.11 Delta Infra 
Repair Vehicles 
Ashore 
Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or external.  
4.2 Delta Force 
Vehicles Exchange 
Interface 
Includes infrastructure repair vehicles/equipment (assumed to be a mix of over-sized 
vehicles that are not VERTREP capable).  The existence of a load exchange 
interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support 
the transfer of the respective load. 
4.3 Delta Force 
Munitions Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure munitions.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
4.4 Delta Force 
Supplies Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
4.5 Delta Force 
Personnel Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
4.10 Delta Force 
Units Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
4.12 Delta Force 
Vehicles Ashore 
Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or external.  
4.13 Delta Force 
Units Ashore 
Includes supplies, munitions, and personnel.  Item transferred to destination ashore 
to be transferred by its own means or external.   
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Employ Item  Employ Item Definition 
5.2 Delta Riverine 
Boats  Exchange 
Interface 
Includes infrastructure repair vehicles/equipment (assumed to be a mix of over-sized 
vehicles that are not VERTREP capable). The existence of a load exchange interface 
such as a ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the 
transfer of the respective load. 
5.3 Delta Riverine 
Munitions Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure munitions.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
5.4 Delta Riverine 
Supplies Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, 
crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the 
respective load. 
5.5 Delta Riverine 
Personnel Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
5.10 Delta Riverine 
Units Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
5.12 Delta Riverine 
Boats Ashore 
Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or external.  
5.13 Delta Riverine 
Units Ashore 









Non- injured NEO personnel.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a 






Item moved from origin to destination. 
5.17 Delta NEO 
Personnel 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
Active Threats Threats characterized by those that are not relying upon passive detection and 
engagement systems such as waterborne IEDs or mines.   




A delay caused from a required slowing of the vessel's transit speed to conduct 
amphibious to open ocean or vice-versa transition.   
Armory Capacity The capacity of the ship's approved armory to safely and securely store munitions.  
Some platforms do not possess a designated armory, but do have the capability to 
store munitions per designated instructions.   
Asset C2 
Interoperability 
Includes Joint, multi-national, and international crisis organization vessel 
interoperability to establish secure/unsecure communication linkages to support at-
sea  cargo or personnel transfer, offensive/defensive communications, and general 
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Employ Item  Employ Item Definition 
C2/ISR. 
Austere Access Unimproved points ashore, including pier, beach, landing zone, etc. 
Concurrent 
Operation Safety 
Inherent loading and storage constraints imposed upon specific vessels that decrease 
the speed of an alternative activity.  Such considerations are flight quarters, well 
deck operations, LCAC/SSC fan operation on the cargo deck loading, UNREP 
STREAMing, and ordnance loading. 
Deck Crew Speed Operational speeds highly vary by operational experience.  Secondary factors are 
stowage capacity and configurations.  Availability of heavy equipment loaders may 




The state of receiving, understanding, and storing communication messages 
supporting current or advanced docking needs. 
Docking Needs The general watercraft's needs required to be filled for docking operations such as 
linehandlers, support power, sewage, water, fueling, personnel transfer equipment, 
and load exchange equipment requirements.   
Employable Units Units that are characterized by cohesive units equipped with the required equipment 
and supplies to conduct tasked operational activities. 
Flight Deck 
Restrictions 
Vessels are limited in flight operations platforms that it can embark, temporarily 
land, and conduct VERTREP.   
Fuel Efficiency 
Configurations 





Common Marine Radio standards and acceptable practices. 
Heavy Vertical Lift 
Availability 
H-53 or replacement availability from ESG/CSG or land based units. 
Inland Waterway 
Accessibility 
A general categorization of a platform with a draft that does not restrict its ability to 
conduct inland waterway operations.  The inland waterway depth is defined by 
operational activities and austere access depths.   




At-sea connection and load transfer configurations that can occur. 
Interface 
Established 




Internal/External ramp slopes, turning radiuses, and dimensions that restrict the 
availability of vehicle transport to/from SBC vessels. 




The completion of assigned operational activity load transfer of personnel, 
equipment, cargo, vehicles, or munitions. 
Loading Pressure 
Limitations 
Deck pressure as appropriately measured.   
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Employ Item  Employ Item Definition 
Loading Safety 
Margins 
In consideration of load pack densities, dry cargo storage area, and configurations 




Load placement considerations to ensure the SBC is within level trim standards for 
safe operation.   
Neutralized Threat Active or passive threat rendered incapable of causing harm. 
Objective Loading 
Capable 
A platform capable of conducting objective loading.  The platforms capable are not 




Within the HA/DR mission objective access is not constrained in the sustainment 
phase, but always subjected to engineering clearance. 
Passive Threats Threats such as waterborne IED or mines.  
Rigging Availability Availability of deck rigging that enables load transfer operations. 
Rigging Transfer 
Speed 
The inherent differences in speed as a product of the type of rigging available 
(transfer speed and capacity) and operational experience.  
ROE Rules of engagement or standing rules of engagement 
RTB Vessel A SBC on orders to return to base (RTB) or proceed to next assignment. 
Sea State 
Constraints 
Imposed SBC limitations on at-sea connections, load exchange interfaces, and load 
transfer weights to maintain stability under the assumed sea state definitions.  
Includes combined effects of wave height, sea spray, swell height, and wind 
velocities aggregated into standardized measurement scales. 
Seating/Berthing 
Availability 
Capacity of long term or short term berthing availability.  Includes necessary 
functions of sanitation, meal preparation, and lodging.   
Security Resource 
Availability 
The availability of the Sea Base to provide security assets to minimize the threat 
condition to an acceptable level. 
Services Filled A platform that has had planned fuel, water, and sewage requirements filled by 
austere or advanced base services.   
Shallow Draft 
Accessible 
A general categorization of a platform with a draft that does not restrict its ability to 
conduct shallow water coastal operations.  Shallow water depth is defined by 
operational activities and austere access depths.   
Stacking Height 
Limitations 
ISO container or pallet stacking height and limitations. 
Storage Space 
Availability 
In consideration of load pack densities, dry cargo storage area, and configurations 
that provide required accessibility.  A function of usable storage area and height.   
Theater Base 
Availability 
In-theater advanced base availability.  Territorial access is influenced by political 
standing between host nation and U.S./MN forces. 
Threat Conditions Threats imposed by adversarial forces consistent with the CONOPS assumptions. 
Tie-Down 
Quantities/Locations 
Load limits can be imposed by the number and available locations of tie-downs 




Imposed SBC transit speeds given navigational area, draft, and sea state.  
 182
Employ Item  Employ Item Definition 
Undocking Needs The number and availability of the linehandlers or flight deck crew.  May also 
require additional tug assistance, navigational pilots, or route clearances.   
Undocking Support 
Provided 
The ability of the vessel to obtain the required number and availability of the 
linehandlers or flight deck crew.  May also require additional tug assistance, 
navigational pilots, or route clearances.   
Unrestricted Vessel A vessel that is not limited in at-sea movement by docking or load transfer 
operations.   
Vehicle Turning 
Radius Availability 
The onboard SBC dimensions restricting maneuverability of vehicle placement. 
Very Shallow Water 
Accessible 
A general categorization of a platform with a draft that does not restrict its ability to 
conduct very shallow water coastal operations.  Very shallow water depth is defined 
by operational activities and austere access depths.   
Weather Constraints Weather constraints affecting the safety of flight of Joint aerial assets. 
Table 15.   Employment Functional Input, Output, and Control Item Description 
B. SUSTAINMENT PHASE ITEM DESCRIPTION 
Assemble Item   Assemble Item Definition 
1.1 Delta Consumables 
(Palletized) Items 
Items consist of palletized construction material and relief supplies. 
1.2 Delta Consumables 
(Palletized) Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
1.3 Delta Consumables 
(Palletized) Positioned 
Palletized consumables have been moved into position to be secured for at-sea 
transfer. 
1.4 Delta Consumables 
(Palletized) Items 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
2.1 Delta Consumables 
(Containerized) Items 
Items consist of containerized construction material and relief supplies. 
2.2 Delta Consumables 
(Containerized) 
Exchange Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
2.3 Delta Consumables 
(Containerized) 
Positioned 
Containerized consumables have been moved into position to be secured for at-
sea transfer. 
2.4 Delta Consumables 
(Containerized) Items 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
3.1 Delta Force Units Items consist of equipment/vehicles, supplies, munitions, personnel, and 
petroleum products. 
3.2 Delta Force Vehicles Includes infrastructure repair vehicles/equipment (assumed to be a mix of 
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Assemble Item   Assemble Item Definition 
Exchange Interface oversized vehicles that are not VERTREP capable).  The existence of a load 
exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck established that is 
sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
3.3 Delta Force 
Munitions Exchange 
Interface 
Infrastructure munitions.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a 
ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of 
the respective load. 
3.4 Delta Force Supplies 
Exchange Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a 
ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of 
the respective load. 
3.5 Delta Force 
Munitions Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
3.6 Delta Force Vehicles 
Positioned 
A mix of over-sized vehicles and non-oversized vehicles.  Item moved from 
origin to destination. 
3.7 Delta Force Supplies 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
3.8 Delta Force Units 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
3.12 Delta Force 
Personnel Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
3.13 Delta Force 
Personnel Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
4.1 Delta MEDEVAC 
at-Sea Personnel 
Exchange 
The existence of a load exchange interface that is sufficient to support the 
transfer of the respective load. 
4.5 Delta Objective 
MEDEVAC Seated 
MEDEVAC personnel seated and monitored by qualified medical staffing. 
4.6 Delta Objective 
MEDEVAC Personnel 
in Custody 
MEDEVAC personnel transferred to at-sea or base medical facilities.   
5.1 Delta Priority 
Transport Units 
Items consist of personnel, low risk MEDEVACs, and essential parts necessary 
for sustained Seabasing operations.  
5.2 Delta Priority 
Transport Supply 
Exchange Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface that is sufficient to support the 
transfer of the respective personnel. 
5.3 Delta Priority 
Transport Personnel 
Exchange Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface that is sufficient to support the 
transfer of the respective personnel. 
5.4 Delta Priority 
Transport Supplies 
Positioned 
Item moved from origin to destination. 
5.5 Delta Priority 
Transport Personnel 
Positioned 
Items moved from origin to destination. 
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Assemble Item   Assemble Item Definition 
5.6 Delta Priority 
Transport Units Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
5.7 Delta Priority Units 
Ashore 
Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or 
external.   
Table 16.   Assemble Functional Input, Output, and Control Item Description within the 
Early Sustainment Phase (Redundant Assembly Items Excluded) 
Employment Item   Employment Item Definition 
1.2 Delta Consumables 
(Palletized) Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
1.4 Delta Consumables 
(Palletized) Items 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
1.6 Delta Consumables 
(Palletized) Items 
Ashore 
Palletized items brought ashore onto an austere access in a manner that allows 
for feasible and economical consumable distribution. 
2.2 Delta Consumables 
(Containerized) 
Exchange Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
2.4 Delta Consumables 
(Containerized) Items 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
2.6 Delta Consumables 
(Containerized) Items 
Ashore 
Containers brought ashore onto an austere access in a manner that allows for 
feasible and economical consumable distribution.  Packed containers may be 
broken out locally or transported to IDP camps or warehousing facilities for 
further distribution.  All retrograde containers would be temporarily stored for 
follow-on return or semi-permanent storage.  
3.2 Delta Force Vehicles 
Exchange Interface 
Includes infrastructure repair vehicles/equipment (assumed to be a mix of 
oversized vehicles that are not VERTREP capable).  The existence of a load 
exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck established that is 
sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
3.4 Delta Force Supplies 
Exchange Interface 
Infrastructure supplies.  The existence of a load exchange interface such as a 
ramp, crane, or well deck established that is sufficient to support the transfer of 
the respective load. 
3.8 Delta Force Units 
Secured 
All classes of items secured for at-sea transfer appropriately for their respective 
travel durations. 
3.10 Delta Force Units 
Ashore 
Includes supplies, munitions, and personnel.  Item transferred to destination 
ashore to be transferred by its own means or external.   
3.11 Delta Force 
Vehicles Ashore 
Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or 
external.   
3.12 Delta Force 
Personnel Exchange 
The existence of a load exchange interface such as a ramp, crane, or well deck 
Established that is sufficient to support the transfer of the respective load. 
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Employment Item   Employment Item Definition 
Interface 
4.2 Delta Objective 
MEDEVAC Personnel 
Emergency personnel capable of self or minor assisted movement.   
4.3 Delta Objective 
MEDEVAC Exchange 
Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface that is sufficient to support the 
transfer of the respective personnel. 
4.4 Delta Objective 
MEDEVAC Positioned 
MEDEVAC personnel moved from origin to destination. 
4.5 Delta Objective 
MEDEVAC Seated 
MEDEVAC personnel seated and monitored by qualified medical staffing. 
5.2 Delta Priority 
Transport Supply 
Exchange Interface 
The existence of a load exchange interface that is sufficient to support the 
transfer of the respective personnel. 
5.7 Delta Priority Units 
Ashore 
Item transferred to destination ashore to be transferred by its own means or 
external.   
Table 17.   Functional Input, Output, and Control Item Description within the Early 
Sustainment Phase. (Redundant Assembly Items Excluded) 
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APPENDIX K.  ALTERNATIVE SBCS CONFIGURATIONS FOR 
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APPENDIX L.  CORE DEFINITIONS 
Select terms and definitions were directly extracted from JIC and JCD definition 
tables (Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), (Department of 
Defense, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2007). 




The ACB's primary mission is to provide ship to shore 
transportation of fuel, materials, and equipment in support of 
Amphibious Ready Group, Marine Expeditionary Force and 
Brigade sized operations, and Maritime Propositioned Force 
(MPF) operations. Transport of equipment and materials is 
accomplished primarily by means of barge ferry operations. 
ACB's construct elevated and floating causeway piers, install 
ship to shore fueling systems, erect 1300-man camps, and 
provide camp support, perimeter defense, and construction 




The Naval Construction Regiment provides command and 
control of multiple expeditionary construction units of the 
Naval Construction Force in support of a Navy component 
commander, joint force commander or Marine air-ground 
task force commander.  If required, the NCR can command 
and control multiple Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 
elements or other U.S. military services’ engineer units. 
Underwater Construction 
Team 
An Underwater Construction Team (UCT) provides 
construction, inspection and repair of ocean facilities such as 
wharves, piers, underwater pipelines, moorings, boat ramps, 
etc. They are capable of diving to 190 feet using scuba or 
surface supplied air to perform work underwater.   
Accessibility The flexibility to bypass or operate within the physical 
constraints presented by terrain, hydrography, weather, depth 
of operations, and threat is an important attribute of 
Seabasing operations.  Seabasing must be supportable both 
day and night, during fair weather or poor, and maneuver 
elements must be capable of conducting operations across 
different types of terrain and coastal boundaries in austere 
conditions to safely deliver combat forces, supplies, and 
materiel to achieve objectives at varying ranges of 
operations. (Ref: Seabasing JIC) 
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Advanced Base A base located in or near an operational area whose primary 
mission is to support military operations. (Ref: JP 1-02).  
Advanced bases can include main operating bases (MOB), 
forward operating sites (FOS), and cooperative security 
locations (CSL) (Ref: National Defense Strategy 2005). 
Amphibious Force An amphibious task force and a landing force together with 
other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for 
amphibious operations (Ref: JP 1-02). 
Attribute A testable or measurable characteristic that describes an 
aspect of a system or capability (JIC). 
Austere Access Unimproved points ashore, including pier, beach, landing 
zone, etc. 
Austere Environment An operational environment with the following 
characteristics:  little or no host-nation support; limited pre-
existing infrastructure and facilities; immature ports of 
debarkation; inadequate transportation and communications 
networks; unsophisticated medical, supply and other services.  
It is a particularly difficult environment for conducting 
operations of expeditionary joint forces.  Derived to support 
Seabasing JIC Concept of Operations where little or no host 
nation infrastructure is available to support joint military 
operations (Ref: Seabasing JIC). 
Austere Port An austere port includes characteristics of degraded and 
minor ports and has one or more of the following limitations: 
loading/discharge capability; cargo handling; pier, quay or 
berth facilities (length and/or water depth); and access.  
Derived to support Seabasing JIC Concept of Operations 
where seaport of debarkation has limited capabilities (Ref: 
Seabasing JIC). 
Capability The ability to achieve an effect to a standard under specified 
conditions through multiple combinations of means and ways 
to perform a set of tasks (JIC). 
 193
Capacity Describes the maximum degree to which Seabasing 
operations are able to receive, store, organize, integrate, 
project, support, and sustain a designated quantity of the joint 
force.  It is a key attribute as it determines to some extent the 
size and the ability of the JFC to conduct Seabasing 
operations.  Capacity describes the limits of joint force 
capabilities that can be supported from the Sea Base and is 
driven in large part by the functional limitations of the 
Seabasing infrastructure (i.e., volume, weight, radio 
frequency spectrum and associated bandwidth, workstations, 
skill sets, maintenance capability, etc.).  Seabasing operations 
are scalable; the infrastructure can be configured to fit the 
force.  Therefore capacity need not be a limiting factor, but 
must be planned for when employing a joint force from a Sea 
Base.  
Combat Loading Combat loading involves arranging personnel and stowing 
equipment and supplies in a configuration that conforms to 
the organization’s anticipated tactical operation. Individual 
items must be positioned so that they can be readily unloaded 
at the time and in the sequence that most effectively supports 
the planned scheme of maneuver. The three types of combat 
loading are as follows: combat unit loading, combat 
organizational loading, and combat spread loading. 
Combat Organizational 
Loading 
This system allows units and equipment to debark and 
assemble ashore prior to tactical employment. Its use of ship 
space is more economical than combat unit loading. 
Combat Spread Loading The loading of troops, equipment, and supplies from a single 
organization onto two or more ships. This system is used to 
deploy organizations equipped with numerous vehicles 
and/or large amounts of heavy equipment. One of its key 
objectives is to preserve the tactical capability of the force in 
the event of loss or diversion of a single ship. Critical CS 
units such as artillery and armor are often loaded this way. 
Combat Unit Loading The loading of an assault troop organization – with its 
essential combat equipment and supplies – onto a single ship, 
in such a way that it will be available to support the tactical 
plan upon debarkation. 
Command-Linked Tasks Tasks performed by organizations/agencies outside the 
commander’s direct control are “command linked tasks.” 
(e.g., adjacent units, national intelligence, joint logistics 
activities, etc.). 
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Condition The minimum proficiency required in the performance of a 
task. For mission-essential tasks of joint forces, each task 
standard is defined by the joint force commander and 
consists of a measure and criterion. 
Condition (from Task 
Lists) 
A variable of the operational environment or situation in 
which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that 
may affect performance. 
Connector A system, usually surface or vertical, that provides a means 
of movement for joint forces, equipment, materiel, supplies 
and parts, between two or more distributed units of the Sea 
Base (in this case units of the Sea Base may include fixed or 
unimproved points ashore, including pier, beach, landing 
zone, etc.)  An inherent characteristic is an interoperable 
connection (e.g.,, interface) between the units that it 
connects.  Derived to support development of Seabasing JIC 
(Ref: Seabasing JIC). 
Counter-Insurgency 
Operations 
Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency 
(Ref: JP 1-02). 
Deployment Momentum A characteristic of a military campaign that seeks to close 
gaps between arrivals of deployed forces, and eliminate 
operational pauses caused by the need to secure 
lodgments/points of debarkation for follow-on forces.  When 
these gaps are closed, deployment momentum is achieved, 
improving the capability of the force to expand initial 
operations and build combat power sufficiently to assume the 
offensive throughout the JOA (Ref: Seabasing JIC). 
Essential Absolutely necessary; indispensable; critical to mission 
success. 
Forward Operating Base A base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is 
established to extend command and control or 
communications or to provide support for training and 
tactical operations. Facilities may be established for 
temporary or longer duration operations and may include an 
airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier 
(Modified from JP 1-02 to capture air and maritime aspects 
of a forward operating base).  
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Humanitarian Assistance Operations conducted to relieve or reduce the results of 
natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions 
such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might 
present a serious threat to life or that can result in great 
damage to or loss of property.  Assistance provided is 
designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host 
nation civil authorities or agencies (Modified from JP 1-02). 
Infrastructure The measure of a family of systems and capabilities that 
provide essential services toward accomplishing the mission.  
It describes the physical plant, facilities, systems, services, 
manpower, and skill sets required to support Seabasing 
operations (i.e., receive, assemble, store, integrate, project, 
transfer, support, and sustain a designated quantity of the 
joint force).  Infrastructure is a critical cornerstone of 
Seabasing operations.  It supports the functional requirements 
of joint force operations, e.g.,, the movement of selected 
forces and equipment (by air and sea), berthing, equipment 
storage, net-centric environment, C2 capabilities, logistics 
(supply, sustainment and maintenance), rehabilitation, 
medical care, etc.  The components of infrastructure are 
generally fixed sets of systems and capabilities that provide 
essential services, but can be configured to adapt to various 
mission packages 
Interoperability The capability of the Sea Base infrastructure and joint force 
to provide and accept assets and services from other units, 
systems, and forces, and to operate these exchanged assets 
and services together in an effective manner.  Specifically, 
interoperability is the Sea Base capability to seamlessly 
operate with joint and a multinational force, i.e., the Sea Base 
infrastructure is designed to accommodate different forces, 
equipment, services, and still operate effectively.  Derived to 
support Seabasing JIC attributes: measures and effectiveness 
(Modified from JP 1-02). 
Joint Advance Force 
Operations 
Military operations conducted within the Joint Operations 
Area (JOA) by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in order to 
prepare the objective area for the main assault by forcible 
entry forces.  JAFO may include operations to gain and 
maintain local domain dominance (Ref: JP 3-18 Joint 
Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations dated Jul 2001). 
Joint Forcible Entry 
Operations 
Seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed 
opposition (Ref: JP 3-18 Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry 
Operations dated Jul 2001). 
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Joint Integration Concept A description of how the Joint Force Commander 10-20 
years in the future will integrate capabilities to generate 
effects and achieve an objective.  A JIC includes an 
illustrative CONOPS for a specific scenario and a set of 
distinguishing principles applicable to a range of scenarios 
(Ref: CJCSI 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS)). 
Combat Operations Large-scale operations conducted against a nation state(s) 
that possesses significant regional military capability, with 
global reach in selected capabilities, and the will to employ 
that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to 
US National Security (Ref: Major Combat Operations Joint 
Operating Concept (MCO JOC) dated September 2004). 
Marine Core Tactical List Marine Corps Task List – a comprehensive list of Marine 
Corps tasks, doctrinally based, designed to support current 
and future METL development. 
Measure Quantitative or qualitative basis for describing the quality of 
task performance. 
Measures of Effectiveness Measures designed to correspond to accomplishment of 
mission objectives and achievement of desired effects. 
Measures of Performance Measures designed to quantify the degree of perfection in 
accomplishing functions or tasks. 
Metric A quantitative measure associated with an attribute. 
Mission The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the 
action to be taken and the reason therefore. 
Mission Essential Task A task selected by a force commander from the Universal 
Naval Task List (UNTL) deemed essential to mission 
accomplishment. 
Mission Essential Task 
List 
A list of tasks considered essential to the accomplishment of 
assigned or anticipated missions. A METL includes essential 





Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCBs) provide 
responsive military construction support to Navy, Marine 
Corps and other forces in military operations, construct base 
facilities and conduct defensive operations. In addition to 
standard wood, steel, masonry and concrete construction, 
NMCBs also perform specialized construction such as water 
well drilling and battle damage repair. They are able to work 
and defend themselves at construction sites outside of their 
base camp and convoy through unsecured areas. In times of 
emergency or disaster, NMCBs conduct disaster control and 
recovery operations.  There are Nine active duty and Twelve 
reserve NMCBs.  
Navy Tactical Task List Navy Tactical Task List – the comprehensive list of Navy 
and Coast Guard (Department of Defense related missions) 
tasks, doctrinally based, designed to support current and 
future METL development. 
Non-self Sustaining Ship A non-self-sustaining vessel is one that is incapable of off-
loading without cranes from external sources. 
Operational Template An operations template provides a graphical depiction of the 
activities performed as part of a military operation. It depicts 
activities and interactions among them. The activities 
represented in an operations template can include tasks 
performed by the commander and staff, tasks performed by 
adjacent commands (e.g.,, command-linked tasks), and tasks 
performed by subordinate commands or organizations (e.g.,, 
supporting tasks). Three basic types of task characteristics 
and interactions among tasks may be depicted in operations 
templates. They are temporal, informational, and spatial. A 
different view can be constructed to depict each of these 
types of characteristics and interactions. 
Prime Mover The units of the Sea Base that provide the primary means of 
movement to/from and in the JOA, for joint forces, 
equipment, supplies and parts.  Prime movers also provide 
infrastructure to support joint forces and their equipment for 
a designated period of time. Derived to support description of 
Seabasing CONOPS (Ref: Seabasing JIC). 
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Rate The Sea Base's maximum capability to receive, store, 
organize, integrate, forward, support and sustain, a 
designated quantity of the joint force over a period of time 
under a standard set of conditions.  The joint force includes 
personnel, their equipment, organic lift (air and surface), 
organic strike, force protection, intelligence, information 
exchange, command and control, and the required logistics 
(supply, sustainment, and maintenance).  The rate of the joint 
force that flow into and from the Sea Base will be driven in 
large part by the functional limitations of the Sea Base 
capacity and infrastructure (i.e., aircraft sortie generation rate 
and surface throughput rate as driven by 
embarkation/debarkation points (air, surface), speed of 
offload / on load / staging / integration / rehabilitation, baud 
rate, information processing speed, etc.).  Rate is not 
normally scalable – that is to say physical infrastructure 
cannot be modified to support an increase in rate.  Derived to 
support Seabasing JIC attributes measures and effectiveness 
(Ref: Seabasing JIC). 
Reconstitute Those actions that the JFC plans and implements to restore 
units to a desired level of combat effectiveness 
commensurate with mission requirements and available 
resources.  Reconstitution operations include retrograde and 
regeneration.  Derived to support development of Seabasing 
Lines of Operation (Modified from JP 3-35 Joint Deployment 
and Redeployment Operations). 
Sea Base The Sea Base of the future will be an inherently 
maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, networked 
platforms that enable the global power projection of 
offensive and defensive forces from the sea, and includes the 
ability to assemble, equip, project, support, and sustain those 
forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint 
Operations Area.  Derived to support synopsis of central idea 
and CONOPS (Ref: Seabasing JIC). 
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Sea State A scale that categorizes the force of progressively higher seas 
by wave height. In accordance with the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and Joint Meteorology 
and Oceanography (METOC) Conceptual Data Model 
(JMCDM), sea state is the code that denotes the roughness of 
the surface of the sea in terms of average wave height (Ref: 
Joint Metrology and Oceanography Conceptual Data Model). 
0 – CALM, GLASSY                WAVE HEIGHT = 0 METERS 
1 – CALM, RIPPLED                WAVE HEIGHT = 0 – 0.1 METERS
2 – SMOOTH, WAVELETS           WAVE HEIGHT = 0.1 – 0.5 
METERS 
3 – SLIGHT    WAVE HEIGHT = 0.5 – 1.25 
METERS 
4 – MODERATE    WAVE HEIGHT = 1.25 – 2.5 
METERS 
5 – ROUGH     WAVE HEIGHT = 2.5 – 4.0 
METERS 
6 – VERY ROUGH    WAVE HEIGHT = 4.0 – 6.0 
METERS 
7 – HIGH    WAVE HEIGHT = 6.0 – 9.0 
METERS 
8 – VERY HIGH    WAVE HEIGHT = 9.0 –14.0 
METERS 
9 – PHENOMENAL    WAVE HEIGHT = OVER 14.0 
METERS 
Seabasing The rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, 
reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power 
from the sea, while providing continuous support, 
sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint 
forces without reliance on land bases within the JOA.  These 
capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and 
facilitate assured access and entry from the sea (Ref: 
Approved at JCS Tank June 2004). 
Seize the Initiative Assuming offensive actions to confuse, demoralize, disrupt 
and defeat the enemy.  Using knowledge superiority to 
achieve military advantage over the enemy (Ref: Joint 
Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States (JP-1) 
dated November 2000). 
Self Sustaining Ship A self-sustaining vessel is capable of off-loading with 
organic cranes. 
Standard The minimum proficiency required in the performance of a 
task. For mission-essential tasks of joint forces, each task 
standard is defined by the joint force commander and 
consists of a measure and criterion. 
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Standard (from Task 
Lists) 
The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the 
performance of a particular task under a specified set of 
conditions, expressed as quantitative or qualitative measures. 
The commander establishes standards. 
Supporting Task Tasks in the same chain of command that support the 
commander are “supporting tasks.” Senior METL tasks that a 
junior’s MET supports are supported tasks. 
Task An action or activity based upon doctrine, standard 
procedures, mission analysis or concepts that may be 
assigned to an  individual or organization.(JIC) 
Task (from Task Lists) A discrete event or action, not specific to a single unit, 
weapon system, or individual that enables a mission or 
function to be accomplished. 
Uniform Joint Task List The comprehensive list of tasks at the strategic and 
operational levels of war. The UJTL defines some tactical 
level tasks that are performed by more than one Service 
component and relies on individual service task lists to define 
tasks at the tactical level of war. The MCTL and NTTL link 
to the top level tactical tasks (TA) in the UJTL, e.g., TA 1 
equals NTA 1 and MCT 1; TA 2 equals NTA 2 and MCT 2, 
etc. 
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